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Preface 
The fact that an Austrian student writes his dissertation on South Africa 
probably requires some sort of explanation if not justification. I was focusing 
on questions of development economics in my graduate program and I did 
have a general interest in Africa then, but still my interest in and my passion 
for South Africa is mostly explained by a two year stay in the country after 
having obtained my masters degree in Vienna. While I was not working 
or studying in the field of economics, it was nevertheless impossible not to 
notice the daunting social and economic challenges South Africa was facing 
more than a decade after the end of apartheid. So when I returned to 
Austria and to university I knew that I would try to research one of these 
in my dissertation. 
Writing a dissertation is not a small matter, and while doing so I have 
accrued debts to countless people around me. I want to thank all of them, 
particularly those I forget to mention below. 
First and foremost I would like to thank my parents for supporting me 
throughout my studies and up until today-their support seems no less 
important now then it was many years ago when I started my academic 
career. Much to their regret, Sr. Pallotti from the Mariannhill Missionary 
Sisters enabled me to spend two wonderful years in South Africa to work as a 
teacher and to discover a most fascinating country. Although it is now three-
and a half years that I returned to Austria, continued and close contact to 
some very special people there has kept the object of my scientific endeavors 
close to my heart as well. They are Ronita Mahilall, Shaku Reddy, Sibongile 
Dlamini and Thandeka Mchunu. 
In my time at the Institute of International Economics and Development 
at the Vienna University of Economics I have profited from a healthy balance 
of academic guidance and academic freedom, from fruitful discussion and 
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a friendly and motivating work climate. For this, Ingrid Kubin, Joachim 
Becker and my other colleagues at the Institute are responsible. 
Lastly, I want to thank my friends in Vienna for their understanding of 
mood swings that were caused by the very document you are holding in your 
hands right now. Unfortunately, I cannot in good faith promise betterment 
on this account. And thank you Osa, you were closest to the ups and downs, 
and you endured them with a truly unique and admirable patience. 
X 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9




1. 1 Motivation 
A myriad of serious and pressing problems confront the South African econ-
omy. The current account is firmly in deficit, the country still relies on its 
natural resources-and thus sectors that are very volatile-for a large part 
of its foreign exchange earnings, growth is less dynamic than policy makers 
aim for and, last but certainly not least, up to forty percent (depending on 
the definition) of the working age population are without a job. This is not 
only an enormous waste of resources and a social tragedy in itself but also 
lies at the bottom of a whole range of other problems-including poverty, 
inequality, and rampant crime. 
All of these problems can be explained at least partly by the peculiar 
structure of the South African economy-an economy that has grown around 
a strong and dominant mining sector. With regards to the external dimen-
sion, the current account deficit widens whenever the economy grows because 
the manufacturing sector is still inward-oriented and a net consumer of for-
eign exchange. This historical orientation towards the domestic market is 
possible only because mineral exports financed an import substitution in-
dustrialisation path. Unemployment rose to such levels due to massive job 
losses in mining, agriculture and manufacturing ever since the 1980s. With-
out touching on the (hotly debated) reasons for this decline here, it is safe 
to state that job losses in the first two sectors were to be expected due to 
a structural shift of the economy away from primary activities. The third, 
manufacturing, could have and should have provided job opportunities on a 
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much higher scale (Hirsch, 2005, 122ff.). It did not, despite the strong in-
dustrial base South Africa profits from ever since the discovery of diamonds, 
gold and a host of other immensely valuable mineral resources. So I turn 
my attention to the industrial sector, its particular features and structure, 
weaknesses and potentials for growth. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem-A Rapprochement 
South Africa can be characterized as a minerals economy (Altman, 2001, 
692). It is by far the richest economy in Sub Saharan Africa and it owes 
this position to its mineral wealth. The discovery of diamonds and gold 
in the late 19th century sparked a massive inflow of mainly British capi-
tal, accompanied by high numbers of skilled white workers (Marais, 2001, 
8). The economy was built up around the mining sector and many of the 
structural features characterizing South Africa today can be traced back to 
the 'mineral revolution' of the 1870s. Here it suffices to mention the cap-
ital intensive industrial development South Africa was experiencing since 
then. Due to their depth, the exploitation of the mines was a very capital 
intensive undertaking, requiring expensive exploration operations and elab-
orate and energy-intensive physical and chemical processes (Feinstein, 2005, 
201). This led to an early consolidation of the industry and at the same 
time these backward linkages fostered growth in coal mining and electricity 
generation, chemicals (explosives) and a range of other industries (Feinstein, 
2005, 107f.). The South African state reinforced these developments by es-
tablishing state-owned corporations such as Sasol (petrochemicals), Eskom 
(electricity) and Iscor (steel) and by joint ventures with the private sector. 
State investment and support up until the late 20th century was mostly con-
centrated in capital intensive sectors-where skilled and highly paid white 
workers would find jobs (Black, 1991, 159ff.). 
The evolution of the South African economy around the mining sector 
led Fine and Rustomjee (1996) to the coining of the term 'Minerals-Energy 
Complex' or MEC. By MEC they mean the mining sector and the tightly 
integrated sectors that grew around it: "Coal, gold, diamond and other min-
ing activities; electricity; non-metallic mineral products; iron and steel basic 
industries; non-ferrous metals basic industries; and fertilisers, pesticides, 
synthetic resins, plastics, other chemicals, basic chemicals and petroleum." 
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 79). In conventional statistics, most of the eco-
2 
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nomic activities mentioned above are subsumed under manufacturing, yet 
this is misleading. Take the smelting and refining of ore as an example: it 
is tightly integrated with mining itself in terms of technology and the pro-
d uction process and organisationally. More activity in this sector therefore 
should not be perceived as diversification of the economy away from min-
ing. When these characteristics are taken into account and manufacturing 
is defined narrowly ( excluding MEC activities), then it becomes apparent 
that the manufacturing sector was stagnating at around 15% to 17% of GDP 
between 1960 and 1990, while the MEC remained the core of the economy-
despite a smaller contribution of mining per se (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 
81). 
One of the problems is that the MEC is capital intensive which leads 
to a 'paradoxical' production structure in a country with abundant sup-
ply of unskilled labour. The trend continued in the 1990s. "Low rates of 
growth in the labour intensive sectors have combined with overall rising cap-
ital intensity resulting in consistent declines in manufacturing employment." 
(Kaplan, 2003, 10) 
So the crucial question is how to diversify out of this capital intensive 
core of the economy, using its strengths, the acquired skills and knowledge 
and the potential linkages to downstream sectors, and to steer industrial 
development towards a more diversified, dynamic and labour absorbing path. 
It is a question that was asked by the incoming ANC government in 
1994, yet then economic priorities were clearly on macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. And it is a question that resurfaces now, with the macroeconomic fun-
damentals in place and both the scientific community and the government 
shifting attention to questions of sectoral composition and microeconomic 
reform within the broad field of industrial policy (see for example Naidoo, 
2006). 
1.3 State of the Field 
The recurring theme is 'linkages': they played a crucial role in South Africa's 
economic development, where mining activities created backward linkages 
to providing industries such as chemicals and forward linkages to industrial 
buyers of their output, so called downstream industries. And they were and 
are central in industrial policy discussions. 
3 
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Linkages in Development Economics 
In economic theory, the concept of linkages is an old one which came to 
prominence thanks to the rise of development economics after World War 
Two. Before that, German economist Friedrich List stressed the importance 
of productive capabilities that are built up in the development process, and 
how the pursuit of certain industrial activities calls forth production and 
is productivity enhancing in other sectors of the economy (List, 1950). Af-
ter 1945, the concept of linkages was at the very core of the nascent disci-
pline of development economics. Rosenstein-Rodan argued for a "large scale 
planned industrialization" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, 205) in order to enable 
the exploitation of complementarity of industries. Myrdal (1957), rather 
than perceiving the economy as a system that tends toward a stable equilib-
rium, introduced the notion of a vicious (or virtuous) circle where exogenous 
shocks lead to a self-reinforcing process of cumulative causation. Albert 0. 
Hirschman then went on to explicitly define backward and forward linkages, 
the former inducing local production of inputs once demand for these inputs 
reaches a critical scale, the latter providing inputs locally for downstream 
producers (Hirschman, 1966). He also enriched the concept by stressing two 
necessary conditions for linkages to work: scale effects-without economies 
of scale the concept of linkages would be meaningless since every economic 
activity is linked to many others-and private entrepreneurial or public re-
sponsiveness to incentives. Linkages can also be understood as providing 
investment opportunities and therefore act as guidance for private and state 
investment (Hirschman, 1981). 
Linkages also informed sector specific industrial policy in East Asia where 
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan deliberately 'got the prices wrong' 
to steer industrial development (see for example Wade, 1990, Amsden, 
2001). These developments have relevance particularly because they are 
often evoked by policy makers as a role model for South Africa. 
To summarize, I would argue that both theoretical and empirical work 
has shown that linkages play a crucial part in the industrialisation path 
a country is taking. They provide opportunities for further activities-in 
the case of a minerals economy such as South Africa these opportunities 
naturally appear around the resource endowments. This corresponds to the 
actual development experience of South Africa. Yet linkages alone cannot be 
relied on to generate investment. Following Hirschman, I understand them 
more as opportunity still to be exploited by some agent. Usually this role is 
4 
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taken over by private business, but-and this is what can be learned from 
the East Asian experience-government should and can play a guiding role 
in the sectoral allocation of investment when the market cannot be relied 
upon. It should do so by forging a vision of which path the economy is 
supposed to take (see for example Chang, 1998); and by picking sectors for 
support that are on the one hand strongly linked to existing activities, and 
that on the other hand display dynamic potential as described above. 
Linkages in the New Economic Geography Literature 
Geographical economics tries to explain phenomena of 'second nature', de-
fined as endogenous forces, brought about by human action, that influence 
and shape the economic landscape and lead to large regional imbalances 
and clustering of economic activities (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, 2565). 
I will focus on the New Economic Geography (NEG), an area of research 
started and brought to prominence by authors such as Fujita, Venables and 
Krugman (the seminal reference being Krugman 1991a). 
Before I elaborate on the logic of NEG models, I want to briefly ex-
plain how NEG fits into this literature review-in other words how it can 
be brought together with the linkages argument of development economics. 
Interestingly, many papers in NEG cite the classics of development eco-
nomics such as Hirschman and Myrdal. Krugman himself dedicates one 
whole book (Krugman, 1997) to this cause. He explains how the ideas of de-
velopment economists and economic geographers-interesting and relevant 
as they were-failed to influence the mainstream of economic theory. Taking 
Hirschman's forward and backward linkages as an example, he argues that 
they only matter if combined with increasing returns to scale in production. 
Hirschman was aware of this, yet then, economies of scale were difficult to 
model in a general equilibrium context because they are irreconcilable with 
perfect competition. When the standards of mathematical rigour rose in the 
profession, the linkages and related arguments involving complementarities 
or circularity were pushed to the margins of economic theory (Krugman, 
1997, 25ff.). NEG models allow their reintroduction because they assume 
economies of scale in production and because they add a spatial dimension 
( transport costs) to the economy-both of which leads to mathematically 
told stories that do have a close resemblance to arguments in development 
economics reviewed above. 
5 
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The logic of NEG models is probably best explained by starting where 
it all started: with Krugman's first core-periphery (CP) model (Krugman, 
1991a). It constitutes an attempt to understand how and why the manufac-
turing sector within a national economy might come to be locally concen-
trated in a core of the economy, a core which then provides the rest of the 
economy or the periphery with its manufactured goods. Krugman assumes 
that there are two sectors, the agricultural or traditional sector which is 
characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and the 
manufacturing or modern sector which displays increasing returns to scale. 
Since transport costs are positive in manufacturing, this will inevitably lead 
to a limited number of manufacturing production sites (while agriculture is 
evenly spread). Demand comes from farmers, who are dispersed across the 
country, and from workers in manufacturing. Since the prevailing technol-
ogy in manufacturing leads to a concentration in production, final demand 
from manufacturing wages will be equally concentrated-and a pattern of 
circular causality emerges. Workers (firms) will move to the core because 
demand is high, and their very move to the core further increases demand 
in the core. 
The actual spatial distribution of manufacturing activity depends on 
the parameters of the model: if the manufacturing sector is small and trans-
port costs are high, then manufacturers will locate close to where farmers 
live, leading to a structure of small towns serving local markets. If then, 
over time, manufacturing increases in importance, transport costs fall and 
economies of scale become stronger, it is easy to see how "the tie of produc-
tion to the distribution of land will be broken. [ ... ] Population will start to 
concentrate and regions to diverge; once started, this process will feed on 
itself." (Krugman, 1991a, 487) 
Since Krugman's initial contribution, a host of different models with 
similar features and applications have been presented (for an overview and 
extensive summaries see Fujita et al., 2001; Baldwin et al., 2003). In the 
context of industrial policy and industrial development, models with vertical 
linkages (VL) are particularly interesting. The original contributions in this 
sub-field are from Krugman and Venables (Krugman and Venables, 1995; 
Venables, 1996). Fujita et al. (2001, chap. 14-16) present text book versions 
and very recently, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud provided a synthesis of VL 
models (Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2006). 
What the VL models have in common is that the spatial dynamics result 
not from movement of labour between regions as in the CP model, but from 
6 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
"intersectoral reallocation of factors within the same location" ( Ottaviano 
and Robert-Nicoud, 2006, 114). These models are set in an international 
context where labour is assumed to be immobile between regions, yet will 
move according to wage differentials between the traditional and the man-
ufacturing sector within one location. Firstly, this implies that permanent 
real wage differentials between countries are possible. Secondly, the driv-
ing force of agglomeration now is the manufacturing sector itself which not 
only produces but also consumes manufacturing goods as inputs. It is then 
possible to redefine linkage effects. If more firms settle in a region, firms in 
the region profit from a greater variety of inputs-a forward linkage. At the 
same time, more firms in a region imply a higher demand for manufactures 
as inputs-a backward linkage. While these linkage effects act as agglom-
erative force, the rising manufacturing wage level in the core relative to the 
periphery acts as dispersion force which at some point might incite firms to 
establish themselves in the periphery. 
Krugman and Venables (1995) develop this set up to retell the story of 
East Asia's rapid economic rise. In a two regions model, transport costs are 
initially high so manufacturing happens close to consumers in both regions, 
a manufacturing core and the periphery. When transport costs fall however, 
the region initially possessing a larger manufacturing sector offers better 
conditions for firms due to backward and forward linkages and will cause 
them to resettle and supply the rest of the world from the now established 
core. At the same time, this development drives up wages in the core. 
Letting transport costs fall further however will at one point "be sufficient 
that the lower wage rate in the periphery more than offsets the disadvantage 
of being remote from markets and suppliers." (Krugman and Venables, 1995, 
861). So firms will start to move and create linkages there, triggering a rapid 
industrialisation process. 
Venables (1996) enriches the model by adding a second industrial sector, 
one being upstream and supplying only the downstream sector, one being 
downstream, supplying consumers. Puga and Venables (1996, 1999) pro-
vide a particularly interesting framework that lends itself to applications on 
development economies and industrial development. They set up a multi-
country and multi-industry framework where each industry is imperfectly 
competitive and industries are linked by an input-output structure. Start-
ing with an initial core periphery distribution of manufacturing, they then 
add an exogenous growth process that expresses itself in increased demand 
for manufactured goods. At first, strong linkage effects let new firms in the 
7 
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core satisfy additional demand, driving up wages and increasing inequality 
between regions. At a certain wage level, it becomes profitable for firms 
to forego benefits from linkages in the centre, and take advantage of low 
wages in the periphery by moving there. They thereby create linkages and 
trigger a self-sustaining industrialisation process in the periphery-a story 
reminiscent of old ideas like circular causality and cumulative causation. 
To summarize, NEG models provide an analytical framework which al-
lows isolating 'second nature' effects such as linkages that might be partially 
responsible for agglomeration processes or, in the case of VL models, the 
evolution of industrial development in peripheral areas. 
1.4 Research Question and Purpose of the Study 
I started out with a rather vague formulation of the problem under scrutiny 
in this dissertation: how can South Africa diversify its industrial sector so 
to be less dependent on mineral exports and to increase labour absorption. 
By bringing together the different branches of research presented above, I 
will now try to narrow the research question and to express it in a more 
precise way. 
Development economists stress the importance of linkages in the process 
of economic growth. They can be seen as investment opportunities provided 
by an existing activity that incite further economic activity in linked sectors. 
The strength of linkage effects is evident in South Africa, where today's de-
velopment trajectory is still defined by its mineral endowment and the MEC 
that evolved around it. This is problematic because resource-based sectors 
are by nature volatile, they often lack the dynamism of manufacturing and, 
particularly in the case of South Africa, not enough jobs are created in these 
capital intensive sectors. At the same time, South Africa is not competitive 
on a global level in low skill manufacturing because it is a middle income 
country with a corresponding cost structure and comparatively high wages. 
Clearly, these are two sides of the same coin. 
I will first try to shed more light on this particular structure of the South 
African economy and its industrial sector by simulating a NEG model of 
the VL type with a highly aggregated input-output structure derived from 
actual South African input-output tables. Following Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996) the aggregation will distinguish between mining, the tightly linked 
manufacturing sectors close to primary activities (which together comprise 
8 
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the MEC) and other manufacturing sectors which include labour intensive 
industries. In order to illustrate the 'stuck in the middle' position of South 
Africa, I use a three regions framework by adding an advanced region ( the 
core in terms of NEG) and a low wage region. The three regions possess the 
same technology captured by the input-output structure, but are differently 
endowed with a sector-specific natural resource that is used in the mining 
sector. The latter is crucial to cater for South Africa's mineral endowment. 
Starting from an initial position that is supposed to (albeit crudely) reflect 
South Africa's current situation, I will then run a simulation similar to 
the ones done by Puga and Venables (1996, 1999). An exogenous growth 
process increases world demand for manufacturing. As a result, further 
agglomeration in the core and-depending on parameter values---dispersion 
and a resettlement of certain industries in peripheral regions will occur. 
Technology and initial endowments determine which region ends up with 
the respective activities. Presumably, labour intensive sectors will continue 
to evade South Africa while it might attract firms in sectors that are close 
to the MEC due to linkage effects. 
Essentially, the simulation will allow assessing the role of linkages quan-
titatively and depict how they-in combination with South Africa's resource 
endowment-might continue to shape its development path. 
Due to the high level of aggregation and the stylized form of the model, 
results obviously have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Additionally, ques-
tions of supreme importance in the theory of industrial policy-for example 
government's role or the institutional set up-are all abstracted from. In 
order to increase policy relevance, I will conduct a quantitative assessment 
of linkage strength and a qualitative case study on industrial policy. The 
econometric work uses a structural vector autoregression approach to assess 
the extent of influence of one sector's performance on other sectors in the 
South African economy. Linkages will be explicitly modeled in this frame-
work to test for the propositions arrived at in the simulation. In the case 
study on industrial policy, the recent changes in industrial policy strategy 
of the South African government are scrutinized-a more developmental 
and interventionist industrial policy is supposed to redirect its industrial 
development towards a more labour-absorbing path. Whether a break from 
existing patterns of sectoral growth and from existing patterns of economic 
policy geared towards these historically strong and well-supported sectors is 
realistic within the current framework will be subject of this case study. 
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To sum up, the research question can be restated as follows: To what 
extent do linkage effects define South Africa's industrial development tra-
jectory, and how suitable is current industrial policy to facilitate a change 
towards a more diversified industrial development? 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation will begin with an exposition of South Africa's industrial 
sector in chapter Two. For this purpose I will present a brief history of 
industrial development, with emphasis on the MEC and questions of path 
dependence and linkage effects. This is accompanied by a presentation of 
stylized facts corroborating the dominant role of the MEC up until today. 
The first section is concluded by a brief summation of the past and current 
policy response to the overall disappointing performance of the industrial 
sector. 
Chapter Three will present economic theory on linkages. The concept is 
traced back to development economics, related to industrial policy analysis 
of the Asian miracle and lastly presented in the NEG literature. In this 
chapter I will also write down in detail the VL model to be used later. 
Chapter Four consists of the simulation analysis. The simulation is based 
on a model taken from the literature. However the model is adapted to suit 
the South African case and simulation parameters are arrived at by using 
data from South Africa's industrial structure. 
In chapter Five, and in direct reference to the results of the simulation, 
an empirical assessment of linkage strengths is carried out. The methodology 
used is a structural vector autoregression. 
Chapter Six is a case study on industrial policy. It complements the 
simulation and econometric work in two ways: it evaluates results on the 
importance of linkages from a qualitative and sectoral perspective, and it 
provides an analysis of sector-specific industrial policy measures and their 
chances of success. 
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Chapter 2 
South African Industrial 
Development 
This dissertation deals with the sectoral development of the South African 
economy-how linkages and path dependence shape the structure of the 
economy and to what extent they might influence the future growth path. 
Any such project must start with a historical assessment first. If I claim 
that path dependence is an issue today, obviously it had to have been an 
issue historically. Depicting the development of the industrial sector over 
time will provide the basis for my hypothesis-in a way it aims to justify the 
research question. To this end I will try to show how South Africa's minerals 
endowment-discovered in the late 19th century-triggered the industriali-
sation process and has been extremely influential in its peculiarity up until 
today. The analysis of industrial development will always be complemented 
by an examination of economic and more narrowly industrial policy. Again, 
the historical overview will provide the basis for the appraisal of today's 
industrial policy and future options. 
The chapter is structured in three parts. Firstly, the minerals discoveries 
in 1867 and 1886 transformed the economy and turned South Africa into 
a modern capitalist economy. The rise of the mining houses and the early 
phase of industrialisation that followed will be analysed accordingly. This 
era also witnessed the political consolidation of South Africa, however two 
world wars and internal power struggles meant turbulent times and resulted 
in little cohesion in industrial policy. Secondly, the victory of the National 
Party in the general elections of 1948 heralded a new era for South Africa. 
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The architects of apartheid remained in power for more than 40 years and 
governed over both the post-war boom of the South African economy and its 
steady decline since the mid-1970s. The continuity in the economic devel-
opment path and, perhaps surprisingly, in industrial policy inconsistencies 
will be just as important as the break that my structure seems to imply, 
however. Thirdly, South Africa's democratic era started in 1994. The po-
litical opening was accompanied by the opening of the economy-with a 
decidedly mixed outcome in terms of output and employment performance. 
Obviously, the overall policy outlook shifted dramatically since, for the first 
time in South Africa's history, its leaders were accountable to all its citizens. 
To what extent this informed industrial policy considerations will conclude 
this chapter. The historical account ends in 2004, very recent developments 
will be covered in Chapter 6 on industrial policy strategy. 
2.1 The Discovery of Minerals and the Rise of 
Capitalism 
There is no definite account of how exactly the first diamond was discovered 
in South Africa. According to one version, a trader named John O'Reilly 
found children playing with the precious stone on a Boer farm near the 
Orange River in 1867. The farmer, unaware of its worth, initially refused 
to accept money for a pebble and insisted on giving it to O'Reilly for free. 
Two years later, the same farmer had apparently attained some knowledge 
on precious stones and sold another, far bigger stone (in fact it was an 80 
carat diamond which was later called the "Star of Africa") to local jewellers 
for more than eleven thousand pounds. Of this stone, the British colonial 
secretary at the time famously said that it would be "the rock on which the 
future of South Africa will be built." (Welsh, 2000, 235) 
History has of course proved him right. Diamonds and later gold trans-
formed the South African economy and with it its society and politics. 
From a sparsely populated rentier economy based on extensive agriculture, 
it turned into a modern capitalist one within half a century, with mining 
and manufacturing sectors second to none in Africa. The transformation 
provided the foundations for modern South Africa and in it one can already 
identify both the strengths and the weaknesses that characterize the South 
African economy 140 years later. The focus of the present account will of 
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course be on the industrial sector, which partly owes its peculiar structure 
to the developments in this early period. 
Early History 
Europeans arrived and settled at the Cape of Good Hope from 1652 onwards. 
For a long period they remained confined to the Cape peninsula and its 
surroundings. During the 18th and 19th century, descendants of the Dutch 
settlers, the Afrikaners or Boers, slowly migrated along the coast to the east 
and to the interior, engaging in extensive agriculture. These migrations, 
most famously the Great Trek of the 1830s and 1840s that was sparked 
by a controversy with the now British authorities in Cape Town, led to 
constant conflict with African societies. At issue was access to and control 
over land and more importantly labour-a very scarce good even before 
the advent of mining (Feinstein, 2005, 34). The economy was thus still 
dominated by agriculture in the mid-19th century. The trekkers that settled 
in the interior were subsistence farmers, and the same is true for African 
societies. Only in the coastal regions were there pockets of agricultural and 
commercial capitalism. Cape Town profited from its geographical position 
and the dynamic of the British Empire and became a commercial hub; the 
Cape Colony and Natal exported some agricultural products, notably wine 
and sugar (Iliffe, 1999, 90). 
Immediate Effects of the Discoveries 
The discovery of diamonds and then gold changed the character of the region 
and its economy. Within two decades mining activities totally dominated 
the economy, providing close to 60% of exports from the region (Feinstein, 
2005, 101). Surely a change of such proportions must have enormous con-
sequences for any region. I will try to briefly describe the most important 
for South Africa here, focusing on the role of monopoly capital, linkages to 
the manufacturing industry, and the political consequences, particularly in 
terms of industrial and labour policy. 
Firstly, the discoveries sparked a massive inflow of mainly British cap-
ital, and these capital groups quickly established control over the mining 
industry. Only briefly were independent diggers able to claim their stake 
in the diamond fields. Because the diamonds mostly lay underground, ex-
pensive shafts had to be built, requiring significant capital outlays. Soon 
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De Beers Consolidated Mines, founded by Cecil Rhodes, had consolidated 
the digging claims and controlled total diamond output. The monopolistic 
structure provided a blueprint for the gold industry. After the exhaustion 
of surface deposits, much of the gold of the Witwatersrand gold fields was 
not easily accessible, but embedded in small particles in deep lying hard 
quartz rock. Only large corporations were able to raise sufficient amounts of 
capital to undertake the expensive and risky deep-level mining (Feinstein, 
2005, 99f.). Fine and Rustomjee (1996, 98) show how mineral production 
was controlled by six mining houses by 1932. Since they were faced with 
virtually unlimited demand at a fixed price from world markets, they co-
operated closely with each other from the beginning. This was particularly 
obvious in the recruiting of migrant labour from the whole subcontinent, of 
which I will write more below. Crucially for the South African economy, 
they soon diversified and extended their activities to downstream mineral 
processing, the steel and chemicals sector, engineering, other manufacturing 
sectors and banking. As a result, the South African economy displays to this 
day exceptionally high levels of ownership concentration and monopolistic 
and oligopolistic structures in many of its sub-sectors. 
Of what nature exactly were the linkages that mining did provide to the 
rest of the economy? Before the turn of the century, there seemed to have 
been very few. Profits from mining were repatriated to Britain, and most 
inputs into mining and even food supplies for miners were imported (Clark, 
1994, 16). However, this proved to be too expensive, and slowly manu-
facturing increased-there were some consumer-goods and food processing 
industries and heavy industries providing inputs for the gold mines: cement, 
chemicals (particularly explosives), mechanical repair and coal-based elec-
tricity. The parallel construction of a national railway system added demand 
for coal, electricity and steel. However, in relation to mining and agriculture 
they remained minuscule: in 1913 their combined contribution to GDP was 
less than five percent (Feinstein, 2005, 115; see also Iliffe, 1999, 93). 
Manufacturing Gains in Importance 
The First World War provided a protective stimulus to the local economy, 
but in many instances local producers could not take advantage due to a 
lack of capacity-steel can serve as an example here. After the war however, 
manufacturing continuously gained in importance and an industrialization 
process worth its name finally set in. This is visible in the continuously 
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Agriculture Mining Industry 
1911 21,5 27,3 5,9 
1918 24,2 18 9,7 
1928 18,9 15,7 12,4 
1938 12,7 18,3 17 
1948 16,4 10 23,3 
Table 2.1: Share of activity in percent of GDP 
Source: Feinstein 2005, 129 
rising share of industry in total activity in Table 2.1. Moreover, the rising 
proportion of manufacturing activity in this period has to be seen in the 
context of strong overall growth. As a result, total employment in industry 
increased from 124.000 in 1916 to 668.000 in 1948 (Feinstein, 2005, 122). 
In terms of sectoral development, Table 2.2 shows how in 1924, the 
manufacturing sector was still dominated by basic consumer industries, par-
ticularly food and beverages that contributed a third of total manufacturing 
output. Heavy industry was concentrated in chemicals, and there was no-
table activity in non-metallic minerals and basic metals too--all of these of 
course very closely linked to the mining operations. The inter war period and 
the 1940s then witnessed significant diversification however. Overall, heavy 
industry gained in importance, mostly driven by the basic metal industries, 
increasing its share in total manufacturing to almost 50% in 1948/49. An-
other notable growth sector was transport equipment. Within light indus-
tries, the textiles and clothing sector expanded strongly. To a large extent, 
these developments were driven by the gold-induced boom after 1933 and 
then the Second World War-another period of protection from global com-
petition. This time South African producers were able to expand production 
and for the first time introduced large-scale standardized methods of mass 
production. In terms of employees, the average firm size doubled over the 
period (Feinstein, 2005, 123ff.). 
Economic and Industrial Policy 
To what extent was this industrialisation process driven by economic policy? 
It is undisputed that the creation of jobs in the manufacturing sector became 
an important and urgent goal in politics in this period. The Union of South 
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1924/25 1948/49 
Food, beverages and tobacco 32,4 19 
Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear 10 15,2 
Wood and furniture 6,9 6,4 
Paper, printing and publishing 11,2 7,7 
Other manufacturing 2,7 3,4 
Total light industry 63,2 51,7 
Chemicals and chemical products 12,1 9,5 
Pottery, glass, other non-metallic minerals 7 6 
Basic metal industries 8,9 17,6 
Metal products and machinery 3,3 5 
Transport equipment 5,3 7,8 
Rubber products 0,2 2,4 
Total heavy industry 36,8 48,3 
Total manufacturing 100 100 
Table 2.2: Share of sectoral net value of output in total manufacturing 
Source: Feinstein 2005: 116, 126 
Africa, in existence since 1910 as a dominion of the British empire, provided 
voting rights for the white population only and its foremost concern in the 
inter-war period therefore was the so-called 'poor whites' problem. The in-
creasingly urbanized and often unskilled Afrikaners competed directly for 
jobs with Africans, and only in manufacturing could there be well-paid em-
ployment for them. The mines whose profits were based on the exploitation 
of cheap African labour could certainly not be counted on in this regard. 
So the inter-war period saw the introduction of tariffs on manufacturing 
products to support domestic production and, perhaps more importantly, 
the foundation of Escom and Iscor, state-owned electricity supply and steel 
production entities that were supposed to fuel the industrialisation process. 
These strategic measures are often interpreted as a victory of Afrikaner 
interests~farmers, local manufacturers and the working class---over impe-
rial interests, i.e. the mining houses. And it is certainly true that mining 
capital opposed tariffs that would only increase their input and wage costs 
and that both Escom and Iscor's foundation was accompanied by national-
ist rhetoric, promising to support a domestic downstream industrialisation 
process and not imperial capital (Clark, 1994, 70). 
16 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
However, careful studies have revealed that industrial policy lacked con-
sistency and was in actual fact trimmed so as not to go against mining inter-
ests. First of all, the agricultural sector received strong support as well, even 
more so than manufacturing in terms of subsidies. Moreover, tariff protec-
tion for agriculture increased input costs for local manufacturing and stifled 
its growth (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 128f.). And while tariffs provided an 
important stimulus for the textiles sector, overall, rates actually remained 
low in international comparison, and they were "scarcely applied to key sec-
tors such as steel and engineering for fear of raising mining costs." (Iliffe, 
1999, 93) The electricity supply commission Escom was in its beginning a 
regulator for the already existing private producers of electricity which were 
owned by the mining houses. It was supposed to guarantee access to cheap 
electricity for downstream manufacturing. Despite the rhetoric, it always 
cooperated closely with mining corporations and certainly did not favour 
local interests over those of 'imperial capital'. Its discriminatory pricing 
policy towards the local railways which were charged a higher price than 
the miners is exemplary of this (Clark, 1994, 80). A similar argument can 
be made for Iscor, the state-owned steel corporation established in 1928. 
Tariffs in this sector were out of the question due to the lobbying power of 
gold mines and Iscor's position was further aggravated by its mandate to 
employ expensive white labour. Despite these initial difficulties, Iscor was 
able to supply the local market by 1940, fuelled in part by the mining boom 
of the 1930s (Clark, 1994, 101). 
Overall, the diversification observed in the economy "even in the absence 
of a cohesive industrial strategy" (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 144) was often 
due to diversification of the mining companies themselves and activities 
remained concentrated in sectors closely linked to South Africa's mineral 
endowment. 
Industrial strategy lacked cohesiveness also because it was saddled with 
more than one goal-additional to growth it was also to provide well-paid 
jobs for white workers. Both Escom and Iscor were troubled by the require-
ments to hire a certain percentage of 'civilized labour'. The segregation of 
the labour market which continued and was even more strictly enforced af-
ter the Second World War later turned out to be one of the most damaging 
legacies of the apartheid era. It was harmful to society at large, obviously, 
but it also seriously limited the possibilities of manufacturing growth from 
a very early stage. 
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While white labour was protected from African competition and its 
wages inflated by job reservation, cheap African labour was a necessity for 
the profitability of mines. The system established to fulfil this need was 
the yearly migration of workers from the so-called 'native reserves' (Terre-
blanche, 2002, 246). Black South Africans were compound to 8,3% of the 
land in the 1913 Land Act, thereby eliminating the opportunity to live from 
subsistence agriculture. At the same time, all efforts were made to prevent 
permanent urbanisation. Miners returned home every year over Christmas 
and were supposed to remain rooted in their reserves. While the system 
suited mining, manufacturing would have profited from a more stable work-
force, from a larger pool of semi-skilled and possibly even skilled labour, and 
last but not least from a bigger domestic market. During the war, economic 
and political need forced South Africa to employ more Africans in the fac-
tories, but the backlash of white voters was severe: they voted the National 
Party into power in 1948, and set in motion the formation of apartheid. 
2.2 Racial Capitalism-The Apartheid Era 
The surprise victory of the National Party was the starting point of an 
incumbency that lasted far longer than anybody would have expected at 
the time. White South Africans returned it into power repeatedly, and only 
the first multiracial elections in 1994 brought its reign to an end. The NP 
governed over the post-war boom that saw extraordinary growth rates in the 
1950s and 1960s and made white South Africans one of the richest groups 
of people world wide, but it could not prevent the decline and crisis of the 
economy that started in the early 1970s. The economic crisis was triggered 
by world economic turbulences, but its underlying causes were to be found 
without a doubt within the country. The economy never recovered, and its 
slow demise facilitated the end of the apartheid regime and a negotiated 
transition to democratic rule. When the African National Congress won the 
elections in 1994, it thus inherited a deeply troubled society and economy. 
The roots of the economic problems will be outlined below. 
2.2.1 Early Years - The Rise and Golden Age of Apartheid 
Apartheid was a system of grand racial segregation--of separate develop-
ment in the euphemistic language of the National Party. Seekings and Nat-
trass distinguish between three main areas of intervention and racial segrega-
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Table 2.3: Annual growth of real domestic product in percent 
Source: Feinstein 2005, 147 
tion: political, social and labour-market apartheid (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005, 18ff.). In all three areas there are strong continuities with the pre-1948 
era. Political apartheid meant the complete disenfranchisement of the black 
populace and the formation of the pseudo-independent Bantustans. The 
latter, although never fully functional or internationally recognized, were 
the logical endpoint of segregation: black South Africans lost South African 
citizenship and in turn became citizens of one of the Bantustans accord-
ing to ethnic affiliation. Social apartheid included residential segregation, 
segregated public amenities and the prohibition of sexual relationships. Res-
idential segregation led to massive forced relocations to 'whiten' the urban 
areas and remove Africans, Coloureds and Indians to the reserves (later Ban-
tustans) and assigned townships. Influx controls in the cities and pass laws 
aimed at limiting the number of Africans living in the townships and working 
in the urban areas. Lastly, labour-market apartheid reinforced the existing 
colour bar for skilled occupations and introduced the notorious Bantu ed-
ucation system that denied African children a decent education (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005, 18ff.). 
Economic Boom 
These reforms were met with stiff resistance by blacks, but the extraordi-
nary economic performance and fast rising income for whites in the early 
post-war years strengthened the hand of government. The South African 
economy grew at unprecedented pace. Like much of the rest of the world, it 
experienced a boom that saw an average annual expansion of around 5% in 
the 1950s and the 1960s. Growth was driven by mining-South Africa prof-
ited from world wide economic growth and buoyant commodity prices-and 
increasingly by industrial production (Table 2.3). 
The development of the Orange Free State Goldfields----only postponed 
to the 1950s due to the war-provided a massive expansionary boost to the 
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economy. As a project of unprecedented scale-by the end of the 1950s, 60 
percent of South Africa's total gold output came from the region (Feinstein, 
2005, 166)-it required close cooperation between the mining companies, 
most importantly the Anglo American Corporation, and the state. The 
latter had to provide huge capital outlays to make the operations viable 
in an area that completely lacked suitable infrastructure. That included 
the provision of water, transport infrastructure in the form of railways and 
electrification through a power station built by Escom (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996, 157). Part of the capital invested in this project came from profits 
earned in the trade of diamonds that experienced an exceptional increase in 
demand after the war. Additionally, other minerals increasingly added to 
total mining output in South Africa. These included, amongst others, coal, 
copper, iron ore, asbestos and uranium. 
Despite these developments in mining, the performance of industry stands 
out. Average yearly growth rates of more than six percent led the Chair-
man of the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI) to claim in 1962 that "in 
no other country has there, within the brief compass of twenty-five years, 
been a more complete metamorphosis of its economy and a more spectacu-
lar development of its industries." ( cited in Feinstein, 2005, 173) Expansion 
was accompanied by structural changes. The economy experienced a further 
shift away from consumer goods towards intermediate and capital goods (see 
Table 2.4). 
What triggered this boom? Certainly the role of mining and the var-
ious linkages of the mining industry to manufacturing need to be high-
lighted. Heavily investing mining corporations placed massive orders for 
capital equipment, drove the expansion of the chemical industry and used 
the resources they amassed themselves to diversify and invest into variol).s 
sectors of manufacturing. Fine and Rustomjee therefore claim that growth 
in the Minerals Energy Complex dominated the industrial expansion at the 
time. As Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) they define the sectors that are 
closely linked to mining and the minerals endowment in South Africa and 
that are dominated by the same large corporations that originated in mining. 
The sectors subsumed under the MEC label are coal, gold and other mining 
activities, electricity (overwhelmingly based on coal mining in South Africa), 
non-metallic mineral products, basic metal industries, and the chemicals 
and plastics sector (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 79). A good part of these 
activities are generally categorized as manufacturing, yet growth in these 
activities can hardly be interpreted as diversification away from the mining 
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1924/25 48/49 75/76 
Food, beverages and tobacco 32,4 19 14,1 
Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear 10 15,2 10,4 
Wood and furniture 6,9 6,4 3,2 
Paper, printing and publishing 11,2 7,7 7,7 
Other manufacturing 2,7 3,4 3,3 
Total light industry 63,2 51,7 38,7 
Chemicals and chemical products 12,1 9,5 11,4 
Pottery, glass, non-metallic minerals 7 6 5,3 
Basic metal industries 8,9 17,6 13 
Metal products and machinery 3,3 5 22,7 
Transport equipment 5,3 7,8 7,2 
Rubber products 0,2 2,4 1,7 
Total heavy industry 36,8 48,3 61,3 
Total manufacturing 100 100 100 
Table 2.4: Share of sectoral net value of output in total manufacturing 
Source: Feinstein 2005: 116, 126, 187 
and minerals sector of the economy. In the period after World War Two, 
evidence for this lopsided growth can be found in the expansion of the chem-
icals industry which was supported by the state's involvement in founding 
Sasol (on which more below) and which diversified into fuel-chemicals, syn-
thetic rubber, industrial chemicals, and the production of polymers such as 
polyethylene, heavily used in the plastics industries. Additionally, invest-
ments in the basic metals sector increased South Africa's capacity to produce 
steel; aluminium was smelted within the country from 1967, and Escom's 
capacity to produce electricity continuously increased (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996, 157ff.). 
However, this assessment has to be reconciled with the pace of growth 
in the metal products and machinery sector. Fabricated metal products and 
machinery (including electrical machinery) increased their share in manu-
facturing output from five percent just after the war to more than twenty 
percent in 1975 (see Table 2.4)-seemingly a clear indication of increasing 
maturity of the economy and also a vindication for the optimistic assess-
ment of the BTI Chairman. Yet, two important caveats undermine this 
argument: firstly, the investment came from mining conglomerates to a 
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large extent ( although foreign direct investment did play an important part 
in the early years too). This would not have been a problem in itself, but 
in the South African context, it further entrenched extreme concentration 
in ownership and hampered the long run dynamism in these sectors. The 
Anglo American Corporation expanded not only into metal products, but 
also into heavy engineering, chemicals, textiles, brewing, grain milling and 
paper making-invariably relying on big, capital-intensive plants (Feinstein, 
2005, 175). Secondly, even in its heyday, the metal products industry was a 
net user of foreign exchange (Clark, 1994, 135) and thus not internationally 
competitive. The domestic orientation in a comparatively small economy 
implied a low ceiling in terms of growth potential and a foreign-exchange 
constraint. Both were not of immediate concern during the economic boom 
but would come back to haunt policy makers in the long run. 
Industrial Policy 
In continuity to pre-war preferences, economic policy makers pursued a two-
pronged strategy: import substitution and public corporations that further 
expand their reach mostly within the confines of the MEC. The BTI was 
responsible for the setting of tariffs. The substantial structural transforma-
tion and manufacturing growth that is visible in Table 2.4 might be seen as 
evidence that the import substitution strategy was indeed successful. How-
ever, the jury on the BTI's performance is still out. While Black asserts 
that "as a result of protectionist policies, the first stage of import replace-
ment was well advanced by the late 1950s" (Black, 1991, 159), Fine and 
Rustomjee are much more skeptical: "Tariff protection was neither all per-
vading nor was it central to determining the pattern of industrialisation." 
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 185). In hindsight the BTI admits that tariffs 
were often granted on an ad hoc basis and that there was a distinct lack of 
consistent prioritising. If there was consistency, it related to employment 
creation for white workers-----often an implicit or even explicit prerequisite to 
receive tariff protection for a sector (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, 141). This 
certainly contributed to the capital intensity of the manufacturing sector in 
South Africa-to the advantage of increasingly skilled white workers and to 
the disadvantage of the large number of unskilled Africans that would have 
benefited from the expansion of low skill labour intensive industries. It is 
also undisputed that South Africa failed to push import substitution further 
up the production chain and that the manufacturing sector remained inward-
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oriented and internationally uncompetitive-implying that it continued to 
be a net user of foreign exchange. 
The influence of state corporations on the South African growth trajec-
tory is more clear-cut. Their interventions were narrowly targeted and the 
focus clearly lay on activities within the Minerals Energy Complex. Escom 
became the major supplier of electricity when it bought the Victoria Falls 
Power Company, owned by Anglo, in 1948. It completed the electricity grid 
by 1969 and continuously increased its output. As mentioned above, the 
overwhelming source of power for Escom was coal. In return, it supplied 
70% of its output to the mines and energy-intensive manufacturing, notably 
to Iscor by 1960-a further indication of the close linkages between elec-
tricity and mining. African and rural households did not profit from the 
availability of cheap electricity as their connection to the grid was deemed 
too expensive (Clark, 1994, 158). Iscor, the state-owned iron and steel pro-
ducer, played an even more prominent role as it continuously expanded its 
activities both upstream and downstream. In its core business, Iscor was 
able to produce 70 percent of the domestic steel requirement by 1955 (Clark, 
1994, 150). By then it also had its own coal plant and was involved in joint-
ventures with the private sector in several downstream activities such as the 
manufacturing of heavy machinery. In addition to Iscor and Escom, state 
corporations came into being through the Industrial Development Corpo-
ration (IDC), established in 1939. Initially, its aim was to support private 
capital in labour intensive manufacturing such as textiles and food. How-
ever, the difficulties it encountered in the textiles sector-stiff competition 
from cheap imports and permanent labour unrest-might have contributed 
to its changing of focus. From the 1950s it promoted large-scale investments 
in capital intensive industries. Most prominent among these are the found-
ing of Sasol (short for the Afrikaans Suid Afrikaanse Steenkool en Olie or 
South African Coal and Oil) and Foskor in 1950 and 1951 respectively. The 
latter is involved in the beneficiation of phosphates and the former converts 
oil to gas and then gas to petrol. The huge investments required to set up 
Sasol were too risky and big for the private sector so it remained a public 
corporation. It succeeded in its aim though and was later largely responsible 
for the development of the petro-chemicals industry in South Africa. The 
pattern that evolves gives an indication of South Africa's industrialisation 
strategy: "the use of minerals to produce industrial goods and provide sup-
port for skilled white, as opposed to unskilled, black employment [ ... ] based 
on increasing both capital and energy intensity and hence mechanisation." 
23 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 183) In contrast to the newly industrialising 
countries of East Asia, South Africa chose not to develop labour-intensive 
industries but opted instead for capital intensive production-cementing the 
exclusion of the African population from the modern economy. 
One industrial policy initiative that would have run counter to this strat-
egy but that is widely discredited as a complete failure is decentralisation. 
In 1960, the government formed the Board for the Decentralisation of In-
dustry, aiming to promote industries close to the homelands. Providing 
jobs close to the reserves, it was hoped, would stem the tide of African ur-
banisation. However the programme encountered the same difficulties that 
faced the IDC in its attempt to build up textiles production and never was 
effective (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 191£.). 
Weaknesses 
Despite the impressive growth rates of the economy and the manufacturing 
sector, the weaknesses of the latter were visible even at the time. They 
became glaringly obvious from the 1970s when the economy entered into 
crisis mode and will be described in depth in the following chapter. It 
therefore suffices to briefly outline the issues at this stage. 
Firstly, investments were concentrated in capital intensive sectors around 
the Minerals Energy Complex. Whilst a deliberate effort at the time, these 
choices precipitated the unemployment crisis that surfaced in the 1970s and 
plagued the economy ever since. Secondly, despite all efforts of import sub-
stitution, manufacturing goods had stubbornly high import components be-
cause locally produced intermediate and machinery goods were simply too 
expensive. In the 1960s, imports started to rise again and they changed 
in structure-they were increasingly composed of intermediate and capital 
goods (Scheepers, 1982, 22). Thirdly, manufacturing production was mostly 
oriented towards the domestic economy and failed to penetrate export mar-
kets. Given the small size of the economy and the ultra-low wages paid to 
Africans, this orientation was always going to limit the growth performance 
of the sector. Fourthly, the education and labour market policies took its 
toll in the form of an increasingly deficient skills base in the country. At the 
end of the 1960s a number of industries already complained about a lack of 
skilled labour-another theme that was to haunt the economy for decades 
to come. 
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Together, low productivity, import intensity and poor export perfor-
mance led to a major foreign-exchange deficit in manufacturing. In 1975, 
just at the start of the crisis years, manufacturing imports amounted to 5.7 
billion Rand, while exports earned a modest 1.8 billion (Feinstein, 2005, 
190). South Africa could only afford this massive leakage thanks to the 
export surplus in mining. 
2.2.2 Crisis and Transition 
The structural break that the South African economy experienced in 1973/74 
is clearly visible in the data. GDP growth slowed markedly, from an average 
close to or above 5% in the 1960s and early 1970s to just above 2% there-
after (Figure 2.1). GDP per capita actually decreased in the period 1973 
to 1994 (Feinstein, 2005, 201). A poor output performance meant that the 
structural weaknesses just described above came to the fore and caused a 
major economic and related political crisis in South Africa. 
What triggered the economic crisis? International developments, fore-
most the world economic slow down, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates and the oil crisis in 1973 certainly played 
a catalytic role. The immediate impact of these global developments was 
heightened inflationary pressure, due to rising prices of imported inputs-
mainly oil but also machinery. The price index for imported machinery 
grew 10,8 percent annually between 1970 and 1974 and then 19,7 percent 
annually until 1980 (Gelb, 1991, 20). Demand for imported machinery was 
inelastic and price hikes were passed on to consumers, resulting in a sharp 
rise in inflation. Inflation added to the woes of a working class increasingly 
hit by unemployment. African workers became more militant and the re-
sulting strikes-starting in Durban and Cape Town and peaking in 1973 and 
1974-heralded the end of stable work relations (Marais, 2001, 38). 
The liberalisation of the gold price had more mixed consequences, at 
least in the short run. The mining industry was faced with rising costs in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s and was thus 'saved' by the end of Bretton 
Woods: gold rose rapidly in value and allowed mining companies to extract 
gold from lower grades of ore that were not profitable previously. However 
relief proved to be temporary only and the long run decline in total gold 
produced in South Africa could not be halted (Feinstein, 2005, 203ff.). Also, 
a freely fluctuating gold price meant that the stability of South Africa's 
export earnings ended once and for all. The Rand fluctuated strongly, and 
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Figure 2.1: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate 
the country more closely resembled a traditional commodity exporter. The 
gold boom of the early 1980s, following the second oil shock, serves as an 
example: the surge in exports of minerals led to a rapid real appreciation of 
the currency, damaging export prospects of manufacturing (Feinstein, 2005, 
217f.). At the same time, the temporary boom led to massive investments 
by the private and the public sector, often financed by short-term credit. 
When the gold price collapsed in 1981, South Africa faced a severe debt 
crisis and plunged into recession (Gelb, 1991, 26f.). 
These external factors represent one side of the coin only, however. Had 
the South African economy been stronger, it might have been able to absorb 
these shocks-the East Asian NICs, invariably natural resources importers, 
were certainly able to. But South Africa was not, and its structural weak-
nesses were brutally exposed. "It soon became clear that the decline in 
economic growth was structural rather than temporary, as the production 
problems in manufacturing (low productivity and import dependence) were 
made more serious by increasing volatility of mineral exports and of capital 
flows" (Gelb, 2003, 23). 
Internal Factors-Decline in Mining and Manufacturing 
The slowdown was felt in all sectors of the economy, yet a look behind the 
aggregates reveals a more nuanced picture. Primary industries did well in 
patches, driven by temporary mining booms after 197 4 and in the early 1980s 
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1974-94 70-74 75-79 80s 90s 
Primary Sector 0,5 -2,2 3,04 0,47 -0,06 
Secondary Sector 1,4 6,92 2,26 1,53 0,51 
Tertiary Sector 2,42 5,19 1,8 2,76 2,37 
Total Value Added 1,87 4,14 2,12 2,09 1,61 
MEC 1,44 -1,61 3,64 1,47 1,32 
Non-MEC Manufacturing 1,22 6,47 3,5 1,02 -0,59 
Table 2.5: Real Value Added, Average Annual Growth Rates 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
while the secondary sector performed poorly ever after the oil shock. When 
one distinguishes between non-MEC manufacturing and the performance of 
the MEC, it becomes obvious that the former faired even worse. Services 
on the other hand performed relatively strongly and continuously gained in 
importance (see Table 2.5). On the face of it, it might well be concluded 
that in this period, South Africa was already-and probably prematurely-
entering a phase of de-industrialisation. 
I have touched on the changes in global markets that affected the South 
African gold mining industry above, but to complete the picture, one has 
to consider the escalating costs that mining companies were facing at home. 
Two factors were at play: firstly, the average grade of ore steadily decreased. 
An expected trend in a non-renewable resource, it meant that to produce 
the same amount of gold, mines had to treat an ever increasing amount 
of ore, often at deeper levels. Secondly, wages of African miners' wages 
rose sharply after 1973. Political changes in the greater Southern African 
region (particularly the independence of Mozambique) meant that workers 
had to be overwhelmingly sourced within the country, the mining houses 
wanted to steady their work forces, and lastly workers were more militant 
and also, since the 1980s, unionised (Feinstein, 2005, 203ff.). Thanks to 
the rising gold price in the 1970s and early 1980s these developments were 
long concealed, but after the mid-1980s, the gold price stabilized and profits 
plummeted, leading to massive lay-offs. To a certain extent, the expansion 
of coal and platinum mining mitigated the demise of gold, but due to their 
capital intensity, they could not halt overall job losses in mining. 
Looking at the secondary sector, South Africa had a relatively diversified 
manufacturing sector that accounted for over 23% of GDP (up from 13% 
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Figure 2.2: Investment as a Share of GDP 
in 1946) by 1970. The share in output of food, textiles and clothing was 
falling while more advanced sectors such as chemicals and transport equip-
ment grew substantially (Black, 1991, 160). Yet even then the weaknesses 
of the sector were apparent-high import intensity, a lack of international 
competitiveness, and high capital intensity. The period from 1973 onwards 
saw an accentuation of these trends. 
In terms of sectoral development within secondary industries, the activ-
ities within the Minerals Energy Complex outperformed the rest of manu-
facturing, despite the relative decline of mining. Growth was particularly 
strong in petroleum products, chemicals and plastics, non-ferrous metals and 
electricity. The investment pattern reveals an even stronger disparity (Fig-
ure 2.2). Non-MEC manufacturing investment lingered at very low levels 
throughout the period under consideration, while investment in the MEC, 
particularly in the chemicals and related sectors (but also in mining) grew 
strongly until the early 1980s. 
MEC industries benefited from booming commodity prices in the world 
markets and enjoyed full support by the South African government (more 
on this below). Growth was driven by a hefty expansion in coal mining-
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directly exported or for the use of Escom, and by the mega-projects Sasol 
II and Sasol III in chemicals (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 168f.). The new 
Sasol plants dramatically increased its capacity to produce oil from coal-
of enormous value for a government faced with an international oil crisis 
and the threat of economic sanctions-and also allowed it to diversify into 
the production of industrial chemicals. This was often done in cooperation 
with the private sector, notably the conglomerates. Apart from electricity 
and chemicals, the production of non-ferrous metals expanded quickly also 
as can be seen in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Aluminium, platinum and titanium 
smelting operations were invariably carried out by the conglomerates in 
joint ventures with the IDC or international capital. Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996, 174) characterise the 1980s as an era of increased interpenetration 
of the different conglomerates, leading to an erosion of the Afrikaner and 
'imperial' origin. At the same time the six emerging groups diversified their 
activities and controlled large parts of mining, manufacturing and finance, 
which in turn cemented oligopolistic market conditions in South Africa. 
Non-MEC manufacturing developed less dynamically. This is visible in 
slower output growth and lower investment, but even more so in the poor 
export performance. The export-output ratio, albeit improving over time, 
was far lower than for MEC activities, and imports far exceeded exports 
over the whole period. A brief look at two crucial sectors-the motor and 
the machine tool industry-serves to illustrate these developments. In 1960, 
South Africa was the largest developing country producer of cars, leaving 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina or South Korea behind. However, from 
1974 to 1994, transport equipment which is dominated by the motor in-
dustry actually contracted in real terms, leading to substantial employment 
losses. What are the reasons for this decline? The South African automotive 
industry was historically oriented towards the domestic market. This was 
possible only because of the unequal income distribution, allowing parts of 
the population to buy luxury consumption goods at a very early stage of 
economic development. Due to its inward orientation, it was hit hard by 
the domestic economic slowdown. Additionally, the local market was too 
small to achieve scale efficiency, implying low efficiency in production. An-
other typical characteristic of the industry was its import intensity which 
did not change until the 1990s, despite the continuous effort of government 
to reverse this trend. The motor industry remained a significant consumer 
of foreign exchange (Black, 1991, 163ff.). The story of the machine tool 
industry is similar in many respects. By the mid-1970s, South Africa had 
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significant local machine tool production, however since then growth slowed 
down and the sector contracted after 1982 (Kaplan, 1991, 177). It was in-
ward oriented, depending mostly on sales in South Africa and the Southern 
African region, which both did not develop dynamically. Imports remained 
high however, and there was very little domestic research and development, 
leading to poor quality and a failure to penetrate export markets. Kaplan 
(1991, 185ff.) argues that the reasons for the disappointing outcomes lie in 
limited government support for producers, a strongly fluctuating exchange 
rate, and a shortage (and as a result the high cost) of skilled labour. 
To summarize developments, secondary industry in South Africa went 
into crisis mode after 1973 due to a lack of international competitiveness 
which in turn was caused by low productivity levels. The sector was char-
acterised by a high capital intensity, which was not only due to the sectoral 
distribution of activities, but also due to government subsidies on capital 
investment and low interest rates (Kaplan, 1991, 163). The weak growth 
performance, capital intensity and a lack of competitiveness in the manu-
facturing sector contributed to two focal points of the crisis of South Africa's 
economy: the rise of unemployment and the difficulties in the balance of pay-
ments (Feinstein, 2005, 224ff.). These economic difficulties in turn fuelled 
political conflict and led to extreme instability and uncertainty in the 1980s. 
All three aspects of the crisis will be described below. 
The Rise of Unemployment 
Due to a lack of consistent and comparable data, it is very difficult to accu-
rately measure the rates of employment and unemployment in South Africa 
throughout the apartheid era. However, there is little controversy about 
overall trends: while the country was facing labour shortages during much 
of its history and the early after-war years, unemployment rose sharply ever 
after the 1970s and had reached unprecedented levels in the early 1990s 
when the ANC came to power. I will give a brief summary on the reasons 
for this turnaround in the labour market below. 
From the beginnings of European settlement in the Cape colony, the 
shortage of labour to farm the land was one of the main worries of white 
settlers. The advent of the mining industry only exacerbated this problem, 
and the mining companies set up a system of labour recruitment that cov-
ered the Southern African region to find suitable manpower. Growth in 
manufacturing, particularly during World War Two, provided better-paid 
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An. Real Capital/Labour 1 Empl/Output 1 Net Exports 2 Export/Output 1 
Growth 1 
1 Industry 1974-94 1974 1994 1974 1994 1974 1994 1974 1994 
11 Primary, All 0,50 7,27 11,10 16,44 12,40 33536 51126 56,85 44,78 
111 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 1,56 6,52 5,21 41,49 30,45 665 2479 10,15 9,81 
112 Mining and Quarrying 0,14 8,73 26,15 7,55 4,93 32872 48647 73,41 59,25 
12 Secondary, All 1,40 9,33 14,99 5,35 4,82 -64226 -38960 10,06 15,79 
121 Manufacturing 1,65 8,04 14,82 4,95 3,72 -64044 -39172 13,78 19,46 
1210 Food, Beverages, Tobacco 2,33 7,43 11,75 3,92 2,90 1608 1282 13,13 9,09 
1211 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 0,82 2,68 2,27 14,62 9,52 -3404 -1116 8,57 18,46 
1212 Wood/Paper, Publishing, Print 1,72 6,97 7,69 5,02 3,75 -9813 -1153 10,49 16,72 
1213 Petroleum Pr., Chemicals, etc. 5,21 20,85 75,24 3,44 1,71 -10672 -10268 32,56 20,62 
12131 Coke, refined Petroleum Prod. 6,07 74,83 40,18 1,81 0,85 -3762 -2755 106,43 22,61 
12132 Basic Chemicals 4,31 28,77 79,18 2,13 1,24 -4451 -717 23,24 47,14 
12133 Oiher Chemicals 5,14 12,62 20,88 4,15 1,80 -2000 -6723 4,50 7,91 
12134 Rubber Products 2,13 8,84 9,37 6,92 3,85 -233 -727 2,47 10,06 
12135 Plastic Products 7,45 3,64 2,60 6,58 3,11 -226 -780 2,49 9,44 
~ 
1214 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Pr. 0,17 10,16 10,01 7,04 9,71 -769 -667 12,69 10,36 
...... 1215 Metals, Metal Products, Ma- -0,55 10,22 14,57 4,32 3,94 -15386 -285 13,08 35,38 
chinery, Equipment 
12151 Basic Iron and Steel -0,59 21,89 29,84 4,78 2,96 -1842 12570 19,39 56,27 
12152 Basic Non-Ferrous Metals 5,15 18,82 44,10 4,92 2,71 1161 5232 62,24 66,62 
12153 Metal Products excl. Machin- -1,44 3,92 5,47 4,92 5,62 -1362 1306 2,17 12,60 
ery 
12154 Machinery and Equipment -1,06 4,86 6,17 3,17 3,72 -13342 -19394 11,57 22,55 
1216 Electrical Machinery & Appara- 2,23 3,66 3,99 8,44 5,66 -2509 -6520 5,64 12,51 
tus 
Table 2.6: Sectoral Development of the South African economy, 1974-1994 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
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An. Real Capital/Labour 1 Empl/Output 1 Net Exports 2 Export/Output 1 
Growth 1 
1 Industry (cont.) 1974-94 1974 1994 1974 1994 1974 1994 1974 1994 
1217 Radio, TV, Instruments 3,05 5,48 4,69 4,43 3,02 -4664 -10185 13,80 22,28 
1218 Transport Equipment -0,53 6,20 9,19 2,91 2,92 -15099 -11586 1,61 9,96 
1219 Furniture, other Man. 5,193 3,89 2,89 4,44 3,66 -3336 1327 26,48 27,31 
122 Electricity, Gas, Water 4,77 118,47 233,7 3,85 1,69 30 260 0,20 0,73 
1221 Electricity, Gas, Steam 6,21 93,96 215,8 5,53 1,67 30 260 0,36 0,97 
1222 Water Supply 0,61 214,56 286,5 1,76 1,74 0 0 0 0 
123 Construction -1,57 1,30 0,91 6,90 13,54 -212 -49 0,03 0,11 
13 Tertiary, All 2,42 19,29 19,67 9,92 9,21 -7751 -2643 3,35 3,05 
131 Trade, Catering, Accomo- 1,47 5,83 4,54 9,32 12,15 1449 4150 3,50 4,56 
dation Services 
132 Transport, Storage, Com- 2,39 44,90 60,57 9,96 5,33 -2373 -1711 12,47 9,28 
munication 
~ 133 Financial Intermediation, 2,56 100,85 42,93 2,32 5,43 -3775 -839 3,17 2,34 
tv Insurance, Real Estate 
134 Community, Social, Per- 2,93 11,26 14,87 16,31 11,51 -3052 -4243 0,17 0,21 
sonal Services 
1 All Industries 1,87 13,81 16,90 8,90 7 ,88 -38441 9523 13,35 13,14 
MEC 1,44 15,42 40,34 6,21 3,60 20779 55774 50,44 39,59 
Non-MEC Manufacturing 1,22 4,97 6,52 5,08 4,12 -51922 -46039 9,17 14,68 
Table 2. 7: Sectoral Development of the South African economy, 1974-1994 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
"Per Cent 
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urban jobs, so that in the early 1960s, mining and agriculture and even 
parts of manufacturing struggled to recruit workers (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005, 167f.). However, even then, there was urban unemployment, much 
lamented by the government as idleness and work-shyness of the Natives. 
This can only be explained by a highly segregated labour market. There is 
evidence that rural Africans and migrants were actively recruited for low-
paid work that urban Africans refused to take up-they were competing in a 
different labour market, preferring to wait for a better paid job in a different 
sector (Seekings and N attrass, 2005, 171). 
The segregated labour market also helps to understand why real wages 
for African workers started to rise from the early 1960s. The increases were 
first realized in manufacturing, but mining and even agriculture had to follow 
suit to attract labour (Feinstein, 2005, 231). The strikes that started in 
Durban in 1972 and that spread throughout the country afterwards allowed 
African workers to further improve wage and working conditions, albeit 
from extremely low levels. Since wages of white workers did not increase 
at the same speed, the racial wage gap became smaller. Moreover, the 
colour bar that restricted certain professions for whites floated upwards, 
and skilled Africans increasingly entered qualified positions, notably in the 
tertiary sector (Feinstein, 2005, 232). 
At the same time, unemployment became a visible problem. Because of a 
lack of official data, several groups of university-based researchers conducted 
their own surveys, and from the mid-1970s they invariably reported high 
open unemployment, which at the time still was a new phenomenon (Seek-
ings and Nattrass, 2005, 175). 
How can rising wages be reconciled with simultaneously rising unemploy-
ment? The most probable explanation is a change in skills requirements for 
jobs. The biggest employers of unskilled labour, mining and agriculture, 
both contracted. Additionally, there was technological change favouring 
skilled labour and mechanisation. Agriculture followed the general trend of 
higher capital intensity through increased mechanization, and even the min-
ing industry tried to stabilise its workforce, relying less on migrant labour 
and replacing these unskilled workers by machinery (Feinstein, 2005, 240). 
Another important reason for the substitution of labour by machinery in 
mining were the technological changes in extraction related to the deeper-
lying ore. The secondary sector was analysed above and also contributed 
to a steadily decreasing demand for unskilled labour. To make matters 
worse, the apartheid regime deported unemployed Africans from the cities 
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1951 1960 1970 1980 1991 1996 
Total Population 13864 17482 22666 29111 37945 42273 
Working Age Population 8034 9744 12481 16428 22278 25877 
Total Employed 4936 5487 7462 9532 10613 9847 
Total Unemployed 196 457 532 713 2331 4882 
Unemployment Rate 3,9% 7,3% 6,7% 7% 18% 33,1% 
Table 2.8: South African Labour Market (in thousands) 
Source: Feinstein, 2005, 274 
and supported white farmers to do the same on their farms. This so-called 
surplus labour was dumped in the homelands, were subsistence farming had 
long before become unsustainable (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, 186). The 
homelands became places of extreme destitution and poverty, and South 
Africa a place of massive open unemployment. 
To conclude, and with all due caution, it is still interesting to look at 
the time series Feinstein (2005, 274) put together from various sources (see 
Table 2.8). The data reveal pressure from the supply side in the form of a fast 
growing population. So when the number of jobs created by the economy 
virtually stagnated from the 1980s due to slow growth and increasing capital 
intensity, unemployment rates soared, leaving the incoming government in 
1994 with a terribly difficult legacy to deal with. 
The Balance of Payments Crisis 
The problems in South Africa's balance of payments are also linked to the 
particular structure of its manufacturing sector as described above and the 
heavy reliance of its export performance on primary commodities. 
Looking at the current account first, imports in the period under scrutiny 
were dominated by machinery. In 1985, more than half of total expenditure 
on machinery went to imported machinery (Kahn, 1991, 68). Imports there-
fore moved pro-cyclically, rising in importance in periods of high growth, and 
in the case of South Africa, an adjustment of the current account therefore 
had to come from a depression of investment more than consumption. Cur-
rent account problems therefore played a large part in the volatility of the 
economy and motivated the 'stop-and-go' economic policy of the apartheid 
government in the 1980s (described in more detail below). 
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Figure 2.3: Balance of Current Account to GDP 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
In terms of exports, the competitiveness problems in the manufactur-
ing sector led to its failure to substantially increase its share in total ex-
ports. The bulk of exports continued to be from mining and from those 
manufacturing sectors that are close to mining-the MEC (see Table 2.6 
and 2.7). Given the volatility of commodity prices and their dominance in 
South Africa's exports, it is easy to see why the current account was indeed 
vulnerable. 
A current account deficit has to be financed by a surplus in the capital 
account. This was the case until 1977 and then between 1981 and 1984 (see 
Figure 2.3). The composition of capital inflows in South Africa changed 
considerably however, moving away from foreign direct investment which 
dominated until the early 1970s towards private loans. Both the decrease 
in investment and disinvestment of foreign firms in South Africa and easier 
access to international finance since the 1970s are responsible for this trend. 
The increasing importance of loans with ever declining maturity periods 
in the 1980s implied that the capital account became more susceptible to 
short-term reversals of flows (Kahn, 1991, 78). 
South Africa experienced a capital account shock in 1977 (after the 
Soweto uprising). The outflow of capital was accompanied by limited ac-
cess to new loans, rendering deflationary policies and the resulting surplus 
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in the current account the only viable option. Only the sudden increase 
in the gold price in 1979 provided relief for the strenuous external position 
of the economy (Kahn, 1991, 66). The second shock in 1985-provoked by 
the infamous 'rubicon speech' by Prime Minister Botha, which disappointed 
those hoping for reform in South Africa-hit the country even harder since 
existing loans were recalled. The adjustment was achieved through deflation 
which was caused mostly by a slump in private investment and through a 
depreciation of the Rand. Still the government had to declare a moratorium 
on all debt repayments to stop the outflow of capital. Financial sanctions 
against the apartheid regime further limited South Africa's access to for-
eign exchange, so it had to produce a surplus in the current account. As 
a result, when growth picked up in 1987, policies to curb investment were 
set in place immediately (Kahn, 1991, 86). Balance of payments problems 
therefore severely limited the country's options for economic recovery. 
Resistance and Political Crisis 
The economic crisis was accompanied by a political crisis of increasing sever-
ity. The regime came under pressure from inside the country-through a 
revived resistance movement-and from the outside, particularly through 
financial sanctions. The economic policy measures that will be the focus 
of the next chapter can therefore only be understood in the context of the 
overall political climate, which I want to touch on very briefly here. 
In the 1960s, the heyday of apartheid, resistance to the regime was at 
an all-time low. The leaders of the ANC were either in prison or in exile 
after the movement turned to armed struggle. Yet its military capabilities 
were far too weak to seriously challenging the regime (Marais, 2001, 27f.). 
The white population enjoyed the fruits of rapid economic growth, leading 
to a situation of relative political stability. 
It was shattered by the strike wave of the early 1970s that was partly 
caused by rising inflation. The Soweto uprising in 1976, led by students 
who protested against the use of Afrikaans as medium of instruction, finally 
put an end to this 'golden era' of apartheid. Apart from inflationary pres-
sures, the biggest economic factor feeding the political crisis certainly was 
unemployment. Rural destitution forced Africans to seek jobs in the cities, 
undermining the grand scheme of residential segregation of the races. Per-
manent urbanisation of large part of the African population was a reality 
even the regime had to eventually accept, and this group, hit by unem-
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ployment, extremely low wages and political oppression, interpreted "the 
struggle to survive [ ... ] more and more in political terms" (Marais, 2001, 
32). In addition to economic woes, the struggle was galvanised by the inde-
pendence of Southern African neighbour states and the related ideological 
boost provided by the Black Consciousness Movement. The emergence of 
the trade unions and the United Democratic Front, a domestic umbrella 
organisation that brought together thousands of organisations and that had 
close ties to the exiled ANC, bore testimony to this new wave of mobilisation 
and resistance. 
The regime reacted with a strategy of carrot and stick. The dire situation 
on the labour markets-skills shortages on the one hand, high unemployment 
on the other---€nticed it to implement reforms from the late 1970s. Minimum 
wages rose, the colour bar of job reservations was lifted and unions were le-
galised. Finally, in 1986 influx control was abolished (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005, 148f.). The apartheid government also increased spending on welfare 
and social services for the African population, particularly in education and 
urban infrastructure. These reforms reinforced a socio-economic trend that 
was started by the changing skills requirements in the economy: a strati-
fication of the African population. Its top quintile, urbanised and skilled, 
was upwardly mobile and netted "almost all the increased income accruing 
to the African population" (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, 155). So while 
interracial inequality slowly abated, intra-racial inequality rose sharply-a 
development that is usually attributed to the post-1994 regime but that 
actually started much earlier. 
As for the stick, political resistance was brutally repressed to restore sta-
bility. Thousands of activists were jailed, or killed by police and covet third 
forces. The state set up a parallel system of administration, the 'National 
Security Management System' (Marais, 2001, 47, 55f.) which gave over-
whelming power to police and security forces. Often, service and infrastruc-
ture upgrading was delivered directly by the same agencies of the security 
apparatus, combining "repressive force and developmental interventions-
often successfully." (Marais, 2001, 58). 
While the African National Congress and its allies could not threaten to 
overthrow the regime militarily, it was clear that the country had reached 
an impasse. International developments played their role too: economic 
sanctions, particularly on capital flows aggravated the economic crisis. Then, 
during the 1980s, the Soviet Union was pulling out of supporting resistance 
movements all over the world and in Southern Africa. As a result, the 
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Western powers urged the South African government and the ANC to seek 
a negotiated settlement (Becker, 1993, 15f.). 
Inconsistent Policy Reactions 
Economic policy tried to deal with the slowdown in growth in different, 
partly inconsistent ways. The initial macroeconomic response to the crisis in 
the early 1970s-an increase in public spending on infrastructure projects-
only exacerbated the rise in inflation (Gelb, 1991, 24). Moreover, the Soweto 
uprising sparked a massive outflow of foreign capital and thereby compelled 
the regime to adopt a deflationary policy. The budget deficit was reduced 
from more than 6% of GDP in 1977 to 0.14% of GDP in 1981. "As a result, a 
cumulative current account surplus of almost R5 billion was generated dur-
ing 1977-1979 which helped to finance the capital account deficit" (Kahn, 
1991, 66). The 'gold boom' from 1979 to 1981-sparked by soaring gold 
prices-proved to be short-lived. The fall of the gold price in 1981 which 
was caused by the shift in U.S. monetary policy brought back the balance 
of payments problems. The NP reacted by tightened monetary and fiscal 
policy, particularly raising interest rates (Gelb, 1991, 27). The political cri-
sis severely limited South Africa's access to international money markets; 
therefore the deficit in the current account could only be financed by an in-
crease in domestic savings. These developments climaxed in the debt crisis 
in 1985 described above. Macroeconomic policy thus remained mainly reac-
tive from the mid-1970s, constrained by the balance of payments problems 
and mounting expenses on the security apparatus in the face of recession. 
However, there was no shortage of more proactive initiatives to reform 
the country's ailing industrial sector. The changes in the labour regime-a 
stratification within the African population with more rights for urbanised 
Africans; and the legalisation of trade unions-aimed at stabilising the work 
force and ameliorating labour relations. The ultimate goal was to achieve 
higher productivity through a better trained group of skilled African work-
ers (Marais, 2001, 44). At the same time, there were repeated calls for a 
more outward-oriented industrial strategy, focusing on manufacturing ex-
ports and reducing the reliance on commodities. As Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996, 186) show however, these efforts went back to the late 1950s, when 
the Viljoen Commission issued a report calling for higher exports, partic-
ularly in targeted sectors such as the motor industry with linkages to the 
upstream steel and chemical industries. Similar conclusions were reached 
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by the Reynders Commission in the early 1970s and the Kleu report in the 
early 1980s (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 193ff.). All these reports invariably 
called for a· more outward-oriented economy, and increasingly favoured a 
liberalisation of the trade regime to reduce the anti-export bias created by 
high levels of protection. 
Tariffs were brought down slowly from the 1970s and quantitative re-
strictions were all but abolished by 1991 (Feinstein, 2005, 218). In addi-
tion exports were supported through the General Export Incentive Scheme 
(GEIS) which paid a tax-free grant to non-raw-materials exports (Hirsch, 
2005, 131). These reforms were in line with a broader shift in economic 
policy towards a more liberal regime, underlined by the privatisation of 
state-owned companies and attempts to deregulate the economy (Marais, 
2001, 105). 
Yet, trade liberalisation and export support did not bring about diver-
sification but further reinforced the dominance of the MEC. Partly, such a 
development was to be expected due to the competitive strength of these 
sectors. However, industrial policy played its part too. GEIS, despite its 
contrary intents, disbursed most of its budget to capital intensive firms that 
would have exported anyway. And the IDC continued to focus on projects 
within the confines of the MEC, best exemplified by the Mossgas mega-
project to exploit South Africa's offshore gas reserves. 
For these reasons, Fine and Rustomjee conclude that "[t]he MEC has 
remained the key component of the economy. [Trough its policies] the 
apartheid regime has sought to guarantee the interests of the large-scale cap-
itals even as it has released the reins of immediate political power." (Fine 
and Rustomjee, 1996, 206f.) In other words, there were no consistent and 
decisive interventions to facilitate a diversification of manufacturing to non-
MEC activities. The liberalisation drive towards the end of the 1980s only 
reinforced long-standing patterns of growth and investment and cemented 
South Africa's reliance on the MEC and its capital-intensive growth path. 
Legacy of Apartheid-a Summary 
At the risk of repetition, I want to conclude this chapter with a balance 
sheet of the economy (see Hirsch, 2005, 27 for a comparable exercise) that 
was to be taken over by the incoming ANC government in 1994. The focus 
lies on manufacturing. 
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The legacy of apartheid was certainly mixed, with some items on the plus 
side as well. Among these were a well developed infrastructure, particularly 
in white residential areas; a well-developed and modern financial sector and 
capital market; pockets of skilled labour and research and science expertise; 
and an internationally competitive group of firms in the mining and related 
sectors (Hirsch, 2005, 27). On the downside, the macroeconomic situation 
was dire. The country was in a prolonged recession, the fiscal deficit was 
unsustainably high, and so where real interest rates. Manufacturing produc-
tion was very capital intensive, and in combination with a declining primary 
sector, this resulted in high unemployment. Additionally most firms were 
not internationally competitive (with the above mentioned exceptions) but 
inward-oriented. A large part of the population was disadvantaged by a 
dismal education system which failed to equip them with adequate skills for 
a changing labour market. And lastly, large sections of the economy were 
controlled by a few dominant groups-so that oligopolistic collusion was the 
rule and smaller and medium companies faced huge obstacles (Joffe et al., 
1995, 62). 
2.3 Democracy-The First Decade of ANC Rule 
The negotiated settlement between the ANC and the government included 
a liberal-democratic system with universal suffrage, a separation of powers 
and, on the economic front, a guarantee of property rights and the indepen-
dence of the Central Bank. The ANC had quietly and quickly dropped its 
earlier and more radical calls for nationalisation of core industries. 
Yet, the crucial question remaining was which macroeconomic and in-
dustrial strategy the ANC would adopt to address the country's huge eco-
nomic problems. At the time, macroeconomic issues took precedence. In 
line with the policy emphasis of the early years of democracy, I will analyse 
macroeconomic developments and policy first and come back to industrial 
development and policy in the second part of this chapter. 
2.3.1 The Macro-Economy 
The incoming government was first and foremost concerned with stabilising 
the crisis-ridden economy. The structural crisis outlined above manifested 
itself in a number of indicators (100£. Marais, 2001, see also Figure 2.4): 
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• The feeble GDP growth rate, down from an average 6% p.a. in the 
1960s to close to 2% in the 1980s and negative rates in the early 
1990s-the very period the negotiations over the shape of transition 
were happening; 
• Declining levels of gross fixed investment, high rates of capital flight 
and low rates of private investment. Total (public and private) invest-
ment as share of GDP fell from more than 25% in the early 1980s to 
15% in 1993/1994 (Gelb, 2005, 385); 
• Correspondingly low levels of domestic savings ( corporate, household 
and government), down from 25% of GDP in 1982 to just above 16% 
in 1994 (Gelb, 2005, 388); 
• A sharp increase in the fiscal deficit-close to 8% of GDP in 1993-due 
mostly to increased spending on the suppression of African resistance; 
• High levels of inflation-around 15% in the early 1990s, which de-
creased to single-digit figures in 1994, though, thanks to the recession; 
• And chronic balance of payment difficulties. 
In order to better understand the eventual strategy adopted by the 
ANC, it is necessary to look back at the negotiations between the ANC, 
the apartheid government, business and the unions on South Africa's future. 
During this process, a number of macroeconomic strategies were developed 
by the participants. Many of them took the form of 'scenarios' which were 
supposed to filter realistic and feasible strategies from 'populist' ones (see 
for example: Le Roux, 1993). Leaving aside some of the smaller differences 
and details, I will try to present two exemplary strategies--one favoured by 
the left and best summarised under the header 'Growth through Redistri-
bution' and one favoured by big business and international actors, such as 
the international financial institutions, here named 'Redistribution through 
Growth'. 
Growth through Redistribution-Social-Democratic Options for 
the ANC 
The following presentation uses comments on two documents published in 
the early 1990s-the 'Discussion Document on Economic Policy' issued by 
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the party in 1990 and 'Making Democracy Work', a report compiled by a 
group of international and South African economists (Macroeconomic Re-
search Group, MERG) and published in 1993, to outline the basic ingredients 
of the strategy (see: Marais, 2001, 124ff., Nattrass, 1994, Gelb, 2005, 367f.). 
At the core of the model was-not surprisingly-an active state which 
intervenes in both the supply and the demand side of the economy. Domestic 
demand was to be spurred by redistributing income to the poor. The main 
vehicle to achieve this was a national minimum wage set at "approximately 
two-thirds of the minimum living level for a household of five" (Nattrass, 
1994, 222). This was over double the wage of a full-time farm worker at the 
time. Assuming that the poor consume wage goods with a relatively high 
labour and low import content, their spending would be accompanied by 
a high multiplier, generating income and employment for the very people 
targeted in the first place. Parallel to this, it was hoped that the introduc-
tion of the minimum wage would lead business to develop the skills base of 
their work force and thereby increase productivity. The state was going to 
contribute to this by public investment in housing, infrastructure, education 
and basic health, all to add to the human and social capital of the economy. 
Moreover, higher productivity would allow South African industry to pen-
etrate export markets over time. This first phase of public investment-led 
growth was going to re-establish investors' confidence in the potential of the 
economy, and after a period of an estimated five years private investment 
would kick in and sustain economic growth. 
In terms of supply side activity, additional to the improvement in in-
frastructure the authors envisaged an unbundling of the big conglomerates 
and / or state control over new acquisitions and mergers in order to ensure 
competition. The financial sector was to be restructured, enabling domestic 
savings to be channeled into productive investment. 
In 'Making Democracy Work', the economists involved also tried to ad-
dress one of the core structural problems of South Africa: the looming for-
eign exchange shortage particularly in a phase of high and sustained growth 
(through rising imports in machinery and consumption goods). Avoiding 
this bottleneck to hamper growth was to be achieved by using the existing 
capital stock more efficiently-through better qualified and motivated work-
ers and through the restructuring of industry, e.g. by channelling private 
investment into targeted sectors. Both were crucial regarding the success 
of the model, and both were equally contentious among economists at the 
time. 
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Redistribution through Growth 
The alternative model, and the one the ANC chose to adopt to a very large 
extent in its later policies, was laid out in a number of publications. Here 
I draw on the growth strategy proposed by big business in South Africa, 
the South Africa Foundation (1996). Instead of an inward industrialisation 
strategy, it focused on export-led growth-in remarkable continuity to pro-
posals voiced since the 1950s. Considering the foreign exchange restriction 
South Africa was facing, economic policy was geared to increase capital in-
flows (both portfolio and foreign direct investment) and to boost exports. 
This could be achieved by a broad based liberalisation of the economy. Lib-
eralised capital markets would attract FDI and capital inflows in general; 
a liberalised trade regime with a gradual abolition of import tariffs and 
local-input requirements in exports would raise the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing industry and thereby improve the export performance. 
An economic climate conducive to growth was seen as another prereq-
uisite for FDI and local private investment. This included low inflation 
rates-achieved by an independent central bank, low budget deficits, the 
privatisation of 'non-essential' state assets and a commitment to moderate 
wage increases in flexible labour markets. Additional aspects of this strategy 
that are closer to the first scenario include tax incentives to stimulate pri-
vate investment, budget spending reforms targeting the poor and increased 
public investment in social infrastructure, particularly training and skill en-
hancement of workers. 
Choosing Orthodoxy 
The former scenario, exemplified in 'Making Democracy Work', drew heavy 
criticism for a number of its features. First, increased domestic demand 
through redistributive policies would only spur the growth of labour-intensive 
industries in South Africa if those goods were not imported from abroad. 
Judging by the competitiveness problems of these industries in South Africa, 
this could only be achieved by further protecting them from international 
competition. At the same time, the planned 'channelling' of private invest-
ment hinted at protected capital markets as well. Gelb (2005, 368f.) argues 
that at that point in history South Africa simply had to open its economy to 
address the trade and balance of payments problems. Experiencing net cap-
ital outflows throughout the late 1980s and sluggish export growth, South 
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Africa needed to attract foreign capital and boost its export performance 
to access foreign exchange. There are two underlying assumptions in this 
argument: foreign direct investment and portfolio investment will only flow 
when capital markets are liberalised, and exports will become competitive 
only in an open environment where imports are cheaper. 
Secondly, in another contribution, Geld stresses that focusing on the do-
mestic wage goods sector omits addressing issues of profitability and import 
dependence. "Because the economic crisis was a crisis of production and 
the supply-side, to be sustainable macroeconomically, a new growth model 
could not be based simply on the expansion of aggregate demand through 
income redistribution" (Gelb, 2003, 28). Rather than redistributing con-
sumption, Gelb suggests a redistribution of investment to slowly transform 
the existing capital structure. 
Nattrass (1994, 222f.) in her assessment also targeted the potential for-
eign exchange shortage. As described above, growth in the MERG-model 
was compatible with a sustainable foreign exchange position thanks to the 
more efficient use of existing capital. Nattrass doubted whether the proposed 
reforms would lead to the desired outcome. Leaving aside less controversial 
measures such as training, land reform and the promotion of small business, 
she warned that the increase of the minimum wage might simply lead to 
shedding of labour instead of an upgrading of skills. Secondly, the inter-
vention of government into the investment decisions of business was more 
likely to cause capital flight and weaken business confidence then to improve 
efficiency in capital use. 
A probably less substantiated critique was offered in the so-called 'lkarus 
scenario' developed within the 'Mont Fleur' scenario exercise. The authors, 
a group of South African economists, warned that an overambitious gov-
ernment that "embarks on a massive spending spree" (Le Roux, 1993, 14) 
would cause macroeconomic instability in the form of high deficits, inflation 
and balance of payments problems. The 'MERG'-report however explicitly 
rejected such inflationary increases in government spending (Nattrass, 1994, 
219). 
The latter scenario, 'Redistribution through Growth' was not without 
its critics however. The focus on an improved export performance and the 
attraction of foreign capital did formally address the foreign exchange prob-
lems South Africa was facing. Yet, there was no mechanism to ensure that 
private investment would indeed take place (Gelb, 2005, 370). Given the his-
tory of South African capital disinvesting and shifting capital abroad, this 
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was indeed a risky strategy. The fiscal straitjacket limited the possibility of 
public investment, so success depended on local and foreign capital taking 
advantage of the new, more favourable economic and political environment. 
Notwithstanding these doubts, the ANC chose orthodoxy. Whether it 
decided to drop the 'Growth through Redistribution' approach due to its his-
torical roots as a party of the African middle-class, because it was 'selling-
out' its working-class constituency or because of the economic arguments 
presented above is now a moot point. In one convincing interpretation, 
Gelb describes the adoption of the export-oriented strategy as one side of 
an "implicit bargain" that delivered white business' support for the new 
democratic dispensation in exchange for a racial restructuring of asset own-
ership (Gelb, 2005, 369). Nevertheless, this choice remained heavily disputed 
within the ANC and its alliance partners in government, the South African 
Communist Party and the trade union federation COSATU. In chapter six, 
I will come back to this conflict and review its recent developments in the 
realm of industrial policy. 
RDP and GEAR 
The ANC went into the 1994 election campaign with the 'Reconstruction 
and Development Programme' (RDP) which became the cornerstone of gov-
ernment economic policy. It was scrapped only two years later though and 
replaced by GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) in June 1996 
(see Department of Finance 1996). There is disagreement over how different 
those two documents and the underlying strategies are, but it is undisputed 
that GEAR is modelled along the 'Redistribution through Growth' line. Its 
adoption drew heavy criticism from the ANC's leftist alliance partners in 
government and remains contested up until today. 
GEAR promised to lift the South African economy to new heights, push-
ing the annual growth rate to 6% in 2000 and creating 400 000 jobs a year. 
"The higher growth path depends in part on attracting foreign direct invest-
ment, but also requires a higher domestic saving effort. Greater industrial 
competitiveness, a tighter fiscal stance, moderation of wage increases, accel-
erated public investment, efficient service delivery and a major expansion 
of private investment are integral aspects of the strategy. An exchange rate 
policy consistent with improved international competitiveness, responsible 
monetary policies and targeted industrial incentives characterise the new 
policy environment. A strong export performance underpins the macroeco-
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nomic sustainability of the growth path. Private sector employment creation 
is reinforced by small business promotion, land reform and emergent farmer 
support, greater labour market flexibility and labour-based public sector 
infrastructural development projects." (Department of Finance , 1996) 
Ten Years into Democracy-Evaluating Macro-Performance in the 
First Decade 
More than a decade later there is ample literature evaluating the perfor-
mance of the South African economy. The ANC government achieved (a 
narrowly defined) macroeconomic stabilisation and was widely applauded 
for that, but many of the problems of the economy remained unresolved. 
Overshadowing all else was an ever rising unemployment rate of around 
40%. 
GEAR stressed the importance of a sound macroeconomic environment 
and defined macroeconomic stability mainly as reduced budget deficits and 
low inflation. The government certainly achieved the former, so that "[f]iscal 
policy must be regarded as one of the major successes in the post-apartheid 
era, in terms of meeting its own objectives" (Gelb, 2005, 373). The budget 
deficit has been below 3% of GDP ever since 1999 (see Figure 2.5), and 
total government debt amounts to a managable 36.1 % of GDP in early 
2005 (South African Reserve Bank, 2005). 
One important factor contributing to the decreasing deficit is a much 
improved and more efficient tax and revenue collection. Tax revenue as 
a share of GDP is now just below the ceiling of 25% of GDP specified in 
GEAR (Gelb, 2005, 375). In terms of spending, social services make up close 
to 60% of government's non-interest expenditure (Department of Finance, 
2004, 56). This includes spending on education, social security, health and 
other social services and is in line with the overall strategic aim of improving 
service delivery for the poor. Whether increased spending has actually led 
to better access to housing, water, electricity or grants is an ever-returning 
issue of political debate (see Marais, 2001, 190). I will return to it in Chapter 
6. Public investment remained at low levels in this period however, rising 
from 3.7% of GDP in 1994 to just below 5% in 2003. 
Although the government maintains that fiscal policy was and will re-
main expansionary, there is a lot of scepticism in the literature. Davies and 
van Seventer (2004, 147) conclude that the public sector's stance was ex-
pansionary, but its effect relatively small. Tight fiscal policy also led to a 
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Figure 2.5: Budget Deficit, Percent of GDP 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
drop in public sector employment. Close to 150.000 jobs were lost in the 
public sector in the past ten years (Seidman Makgetla, 2004, 274). 
Two decisions taken during and shortly after the transition to democracy 
shaped the monetary policy regime in post-apartheid South Africa: the 
independence of the South African Reserve Bank which is now enshrined in 
the Constitution and the liberalisation of the capital account in March 1995. 
The sole responsibility of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the 
achievement and maintenance of price stability. Since 2000, the SARB uses 
a formal inflation targeting approach. The Ministry of Finance establishes 
a target range (currently between 3% and 6% of increase of the CPIX). 
The SARB tries to keep inflation within that range mainly by adapting the 
repurchase interest rate (Epstein, 2002, 21). 
Before the capital account liberalisation, exchange controls and the dual 
exchange rate ( commercial rand and financial rand, the latter applying solely 
to capital account transactions of non-residents) limited the outflow of cap-
ital. The financial rand was abolished in March 1995, and restrictions on 
residents' foreign investments were gradually removed (Gelb, 2005, 378). 
In this open environment, the attempt to achieve both low inflation and a 
stable nominal exchange rate proved to be overambitious. In the wake of 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank 
the Asian crisis in 1998, the SARB gave up its interventions to target the 
nominal exchange rate and focused solely on price stability. 
Inflation did come down and was within the target ranges from 1999 
to 2001. In 2002, the depreciation of the Rand led to a temporary rise in 
inflation, but in 2004 it was back at just above 4% (see Figure 2.6). 
High real interest rates were the price to be paid for relative price sta-
bility. According to calculations by SARB economists, South Africa's real 
short term interest rate rose from negative rates in the 1970s and 1980s 
(-3,2% and -0,8% respectively) to an average 5,6% between 1990 and 2000. 
These rates are extremely high not only in historical perspective but also in 
international comparison (Kahn et al. 2002, cited in Epstein 2002, 14). In 
addition to high repurchasing rates (the main lending rate of the SARB), 
the opening of the South African capital markets and the perceived risk of 
investing in South Africa also contributed to high real interest rates. 
The impact of high real interest rates is contentious in economic theory. 
If they lead to higher saving levels and higher savings in turn induce higher 
investment, then they might contribute to higher growth, but there is little 
empirical evidence for this. In South Africa another aspect seems more 
relevant: firms repeatedly claimed in surveys that the high cost of credit 
is one of the major reasons hindering investment-second only to crime 
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(Epstein, 2002, 17). Furthermore, the capital account liberalisation led to 
increased volatility in financial markets. This can be seen in both capital 
flows and the exchange rate (Figure 2. 7). 
Capital inflows allowed the Reserve Bank to rebuild its foreign currency 
reserves by 2004. Importantly, this removed the foreign exchange constraint 
from the economy and also led to a narrowing of the differential between 
US and South African yields (Gelb, 2005, 383). Yet, openness has led to 
extreme volatility in the exchange rate (see Figure 2.7). 
This means "inconsistent signals from the exchange rate to producers of 
tradables, increasing uncertainty and encouraging waiting in production and 
investment decisions" (Gelb, 2005, 383). The inflow of capital was indeed 
and direly needed to finance the growing deficit in the current account. Fig-
ure 2. 7 quite strongly indicates that with economic growth, South Africa still 
experiences balance of payments problems. The acceleration of growth in 
the new millennium is reflected in an ever increasing deficit in the current ac-
count. Soaring imports were driven mostly by high-value capital goods, but 
also by imports of (predominantly luxury) consumer goods (South African 
Reserve Bank, 2005, 31). 
Looking back at the targets specified in GEAR, the government only 
partly achieved what it aimed for. The effects of both a "faster fiscal 
deficit reduction programme" and a "consistent monetary policy to prevent 
a resurgence of inflation" (Department of Finance , 1996) can be seen in 
low inflation and budget deficit numbers. Yet, these are not socioeconomic 
achievements in their own right, but they are supposed to lead to higher 
savings, investment and capital inflow-preferably foreign direct investment 
and thereby contribute to economic growth. I will later show that none 
of these have come through despite the sound macro-environment. Leaving 
aside other arguments for now, it is possible that the policies themselves con-
tributed to low investment rates through high real interest rates, a volatile 
exchange rate and relatively low public investment. 
2.3.2 Sectoral and Industrial Development 
Industrial development was obviously shaped by the macroeconomic frame-
work conditions. Yet, there were significant sectoral variations, and they 
corresponded to the pattern observed in previous periods. Sectors close to 
the country's resource endowment continued their strong performance, while 
broader manufacturing performed poorly. I will start this section with a de-
51 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
Share of Value Added Employment 2004 
1990 1995 2000 2004 Thousand Share 
Agriculture 3,67 2,87 3,27 2,82 1.258 11,04 
Mining 9,34 8,9 7,56 7,28 558 4,9 
Manufacturing 20,04 19,41 18,98 17,98 1.594 19,99 
Electricity 2,57 2,84 2,72 2,36 106 0,93 
Construction 3,29 2,81 2,52 2,75 659 5,78 
Retail Trade 13,69 13,78 14,64 15,24 2.355 20,67 
Transport 7,16 8,12 9,65 10,78 582 5,11 
Financial Intermediation 16,42 17,36 18,64 20,34 1.070 9,39 
Community Services 23,48 24,29 2,02 20,35 2.158 18,94 
Table 2.9: Sectoral Development, an Overview 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Statistics South Africa 
scriptive analysis of sectoral performance, then focus on industrial policy 
initiatives in the decade under scrutiny, and conclude with an assessment 
of the main problems still facing the economy after a decade of democratic 
government. 
Sectoral Development 
A look at the sectoral composition of output and employment confirms struc-
tural patterns observed throughout South Africa's modern history (see Ta-
ble 2.9). 
The agricultural sector is comparatively small and highly industrialised. 
This of course goes back to the Land Act of 1913 which all but destroyed 
independent black farming (Terreblanche, 2002, 260). The end of apartheid 
brought an end to heavy subsidies for white farmers and a move towards 
free markets. This led to increased concentration and further job losses in 
the sector (Seidman Makgetla, 2004, 274). 
Mining's share in output also clearly declined since 1990 but this does 
not adequately reflect the job losses in the sector. While in 1987 more than 
760.000 people worked on the mines, this number was down to just above 
402.000 in 2002 (Seidman Makgetla, 2004, 273). A major reason for this 
development is the relative shift from gold exports to platinum. Platinum 
mining is far less labour intensive than gold mining. 
Turning to manufacturing, the overall performance of the sector re-
mained weak. Its share in the economy further declined and growth rates 
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Figure 2.8: Sectoral Value Added, in Constant 2000 Rand 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
have been disappointing. In addition, labour intensive branches have grown 
even slower than the average. This includes food and beverages, textiles, 
clothing and footwear. "Low rates of growth in the labour intensive sectors 
have combined with overall rising capital intensity resulting in consistent de-
clines in manufacturing employment" (Kaplan, 2003, 10). Edwards' (2001) 
decomposition shows that ultra-labour intensive sectors such as wearing ap-
parel and leather products are particularly affected by both weak export 
performance and growing import penetration. Briefly looking at the rest of 
the sectors we observe that construction lost in importance, most probably 
due to the slump in state investment in construction (Seidman Makgetla, 
2004, 274) and that services overall become more important. 
A more detailed analysis of the manufacturing sector reveals that the 
MEC concept continues to be relevant for South Africa. In terms of value 
added, expansion is clearly concentrated in a small number of sectors close to 
mining-i::oke and petroleum, basic metals, and chemicals (see Figure 2.8). 
Overall, MEC sectors grew at 1,92% annually between 1990 and 2006, while 
non-MEC manufacturing sectors grew significantly less at 1,11 % annually 
(see Table 2.10 and 2.11). The notable exception to this trend is transport 
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equipment. Positive results in this sub-sector are driven by the automotive 
industry which will be the focus of more detailed attention in the next sub-
chapter on industrial policy. 
A number of case studies find the following recurring pattern in the 
chemicals and plastics, metal products and other sectors: While upstream 
industries located in the MEC are well developed and internationally com-
petitive, downstream sectors with linkages to the former-and which are 
potentially more labour-intensive----are not developed accordingly (Machaka 
and Roberts, 2003, Roberts, 2006). In both iron and steel and chemicals, 
South Africa profits from its mineral endowment. As described above, earlier 
governments built up these scale-intensive industries through state owned 
companies (Iscor and Sasol). While each of these was privatised before 
1994, they continue to dominate their respective sectors. This dominance 
results from scale effects but also from continued investment ( often with 
government support) and ongoing technological development. However, the 
comparative advantage of South Africa's resource endowment is not passed 
on to downstream producers. Both steel and basic chemicals producers en-
gage in import parity pricing. They charge local customers an import parity 
price that is just below the one they would have to pay for the imported 
product. Firms in the metal products and plastics sectors then struggle to 
become internationally competitive and perform disappointingly in terms of 
investments and job creation. 
In both the metal products and the plastics sector, development was also 
restricted by the poor overall growth performance of the economy, since most 
of their output is directed at the intermediate domestic market. In metals, 
the two main types of products, structural steel and fabricated metals, are 
inputs in infrastructure related activities and a variety of other industries, 
and so depend heavily on investment spending of the state and mining com-
panies (Roberts, 2006, 160). Plastic products are also rarely sold to private 
households, but serve as inputs to various other industries. 
Another parallel is export performance. While the upstream products-
iron and steel and basic chemicals-are internationally competitive, the 
downstream sectors are not. Again, this is indicative of a broader pattern in 
the South African economy, a pattern well known from earlier periods. The 
export-output ratio of MEC sectors is almost double the ratio of non-MEC 
sectors (see Table 2.10 and 2.11). Overall, more than 30% of South African 
exports continue to come from mining itself, particularly gold and platinum. 
This is down from the early 1990s, where mining still accounted for more 
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An. Real Capital/Labour 1 Empl/Output 1 Net Exports 2 Export/Output 1 
Growth 1 
1 Industry 90-2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 
11 Primary, All 0,21 11,15 13,53 14,25 8,78 48894 53584 48,92 49,10 
111 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing -0,06 5,97 5,79 32,56 19,36 576 9644 4,50 22,56 
112 Mining and Quarrying 0,31 21,05 36,00 6,87 3,39 48318 43940 66,82 62,48 
12 Secondary, All 2,10 14,82 19,39 4,79 2,40 -21073 -168789 11,75 15,34 
121 Manufacturing 1,99 12,89 19,47 3,87 1,91 -21205 -168893 14,49 18,36 
1210 Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0,57 9,36 13,96 3,06 1,86 2567 -4430 6,36 6,54 
1211 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 0,32 2,44 2,62 10,57 5,74 24 -14906 12,34 8,35 
1212 Wood/Paper, Publishing, Print 1,79 7,83 9,62 3,92 2,65 -33 -4608 13,73 9,88 
1213 Petroleum Pr., Chemicals, etc. 3,92 63,56 97,30 2,03 0,76 -11764 -21361 14,42 14,86 
12131 Coke, refined Petroleum Prod. 5,18 302,63 494,8 1,19 0,30 -5787 -1021 24,27 12,97 
12132 Basic Chemicals 2,89 80,60 186,5 1,29 0,44 -658 -3944 24,99 31,03 
12133 Other Chemicals 3,62 17,89 25,34 2,20 0,88 -4405 -12133 4,08 7,22 
12134 Rubber Products 0,63 8,46 11,88 3,44 2,08 -493 -2113 4,81 15,71 
Cl1 
12135 Plastic Products 4,72 3,54 4,75 4,24 1,90 -421 -2149 2,93 5,21 
Cl1 1214 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Pr. 0,44 11,99 16,22 7,74 4,15 -651 -3103 6,23 7,45 
1215 Metals, Metal Products, Machin- 2,19 10,73 16,08 4,04 2,12 5998 -16455 28,63 38,48 
ery, Equipment 
12151 Basic Iron and Steel 4,62 22,33 42,82 3,34 0,74 11770 27786 47,84 49,12 
12152 Basic Non-Ferrous Metals 5,29 16,85 78,46 3,95 1,20 6043 2466 76,26 37,22 
12153 Metal Products excl. Machinery 0,23 4,52 4,87 5,32 4,13 870 -1806 8,31 14,13 
12154 Machinery and Equipment -0,42 6,30 5,39 3,57 3,57 -12685 -44901 11,79 45,58 
1216 Electrical Machinery, Apparatus 1,95 4,17 5,66 6,36 2,07 -4629 -6760 8,25 8,04 
Table 2.10: Sectoral Development of the South African economy, 1990-2006 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
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An. Real Capital/Labour 1 Empl/Output 1 Net Exports 2 Export/Output 1 
Growth 1 
1 Industry (cont.) 90-2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 
1217 Radio, TV, Instruments -0,50 5,19 7,37 2,67 2,06 -5861 -35372 11,65 33,63 
1218 Transport Equipment 2,52 7,12 16,44 3,13 1,11 -8404 -55882 5,48 21,77 
1219 Furniture, other Man. 1,59 3,10 6,57 2,90 3,15 1548 -8016 19,16 19,11 
122 Electricity, Gas, Water 2,16 193,58 258,0 2,50 1,01 183 362 0,57 0,68 
1221 Electricity, Gas, Steam 2,37 174,77 240,6 2,59 0,94 183 362 0,75 0,87 
1222 Water Supply 0,91 261,53 303,5 2,22 1,24 0 0 0 0 
123 Construction 2,71 1,11 2,37 11,42 6,48 -51 -258 0,03 0,05 
13 Tertiary, All 3,37 20,03 19,49 9,46 5,88 -2424 29315 2,82 4,11 
131 Trade, Catering, Accomo- 3,43 4,75 4,52 11,30 8,74 2862 13885 3,50 6,04 
dation Services 
132 Transport, Storage, Com- 5,36 50,26 82,22 6,95 1,79 -1184 6435 8,88 8,09 
munication 
CTI 133 Financial Intermediation, 4,47 55,53 28,91 4,43 4,37 -615 10093 2,49 3,37 
0:, 
Insurance, Real Estate 
134 Community, Social, Per- 160 14,27 17,06 12,81 8,17 -3487 -1098 0,21 0,58 
sonal Services 
1 All Industries 2,71 16,97 18,59 8,08 4,79 25396 -85890 11,76 12,08 
MEC 1,92 33,80 55,79 4,58 1,70 53899 55774 39,75 32,78 
Non-MEC Manufacturing 1,11 5,86 8,64 4,21 2,43 -26039 -46039 9,89 15,49 
Table 2.11: Sectoral Development of the South African economy, 1990-2006 
Source: Quantec, own calculations 
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than half of total exports. The share of manufacturing in total exports 
rose, but interestingly, manufacturing exports became increasingly capital-
intensive. "The leaders of the export boom were chemicals, metals, metal 
products, and machinery. Motor vehicles and paper were also important 
contributors, while food, clothing, and footwear suffered absolute declines 
in exports" (Lewis, 2001, 7). Given the large number of unskilled and un-
employed workers in South Africa, it "has a 'paradoxical' export structure 
with a remarkably low and declining share of exports that use unskilled 
labour, and a relatively high share that use more skilled labour." (Nattrass, 
1998, 20). 
Imports in general are dominated by manufactured goods. They com-
prise more than 80% of total imports. While slow growth in the 1990s meant 
that imports of machinery rose relatively slowly, the imports of labour-
intensive manufactured goods were growing sharply (Nattrass, 1998, 20). 
With growth accelerating in the new millennium, South Africa is again faced 
with a current account deficit of significant proportions. 
Numerous authors tried to assess the overall impact of changes in trade 
flows on the labour market. Higher import penetration and export growth 
concentrated in capital-intensive sectors certainly imply that the opening of 
the economy did not lead to a reduction in unemployment (Edwards, 2001). 
In fact, South Africa might find itself "being squeezed from both ends of 
the skills spectrum" (Lewis, 2001, 16). As a middle income country, it 
has to compete with low-income countries in labour-intensive sectors and 
developed countries in capital-intensive sectors. 
Industrial Policy 
South Africa's production structure as a capital intensive biased minerals 
economy with relatively weak and inward-oriented light manufacturing in-
dustries would clearly have an impact on policy choices after 1994. How-
ever, an analysis of the development of the South African economy should 
also take into account the ANC's broader economic strategy. As described 
above, macroeconomic stabilisation loomed large in policy makers' minds 
and certainly took precedence over any sector-specific interventions. An 
'inward industrialisation' path, geared towards a growing domestic mar-
ket, and financed domestically by fiscal expansion and / or redistribution 
of income, was thus never seriously considered. Quite to the contrary, the 
ANC took early measures to open the economy through tariff reductions 
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in an attempt to foster the global competitiveness of South African firms. 
Increasing exports from manufacturing would address both unemployment 
and the chronic balance of payments problems that plagued the economy. 
Within this framework, the ANC was faced with the choice between an 
industrial policy that supported either "smaller businesses and pre-reform 
uncompetitive labour-absorbing sectors [or] policies designed to exploit ex-
isting comparative advantages and bigger projects" (Hirsch, 2005, 122). As 
a clear and coherent vision is considered vital to industrial policy, it is telling 
that the actual outcome was more of an "unresolved compromise" (ibid.). 
Indeed, authors assessing trade and industrial policy in this early phase 
place emphasis on the liberalisation drive in trade policy. South Africa was 
a founding member of the WTO in 1995 and implemented a simplified tariff 
structure and an overall reduction of tariffs. Trade liberalisation was com-
bined with a range of general-i.e. not sector-specific-supply side measures 
in order to boost international competitiveness and exports. These included 
export credit guarantees and support in market, innovation, research and 
development. However, firms do not appear to have frequently taken ad-
vantage of these measures and this has limited their effectiveness (Kaplan, 
2004, 626). 
One notable exception to this pattern is the automotive industry. The 
Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) managed to retain pro-
duction in South Africa amidst a significant reduction of tariffs, helping 
producers achieve international competitiveness. Moreover, there are sig-
nificant linkages to other sectors due to local sourcing incentives (Roberts, 
2005, 28). The success of this sector, however, is exceptional and has not 
been repeated in other sectors where firms place little importance on the 
Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) strategies (Kaplan, 2004, 627). 
At the same time, there has been well-funded support in MEC sectors. 
The Strategic Industrial Projects programme, implemented by the DTI be-
tween 2002 and 2005, provided tax relief for large investment projects which 
were mainly concentrated in heavy industry (Roberts, 2005, 25). The same 
is true for the lending of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), 
South Africa's main development bank and holding company. It has his-
torically supported industries close to mining and continued this pattern 
throughout the 1990s (ibid.). 
Not surprisingly, most assessments attribute limited success to industrial 
policy. As seen above, South Africa has certainly failed to significantly 
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develop manufacturing capacities outside the MEC and limited pockets such 
as auto components. 
I would like to conclude this review of the first ten years of industrial 
policy with a self-assessment by Alan Hirsch, the former Chief Director of the 
DTI: "It is probably fair to say that government is haunted by the nagging 
feeling that we could have and should be doing more. Surely we know enough 
to be able to identify some key sectors that can grow faster with effective 
policies" (Hirsch, 2005, 160). This statement must be understood within 
the context of a gradual shift in emphasis towards a more interventionist 
policy that targets sectors explicitly and on a broader basis. This shift will 
be analysed in Chapter 6. 
Taking Stock after Ten Years 
Overall, the growth performance of the economy has been disappointing. 
Given the population growth rate of 2% per year, an average GDP growth 
rate of2.77% between 1994 and 2003 (Gelb, 2005, 367) is clearly not enough 
to address the manifold problems of the economy, particularly high unem-
ployment (Figure 2.9). 
Why is South Africa trapped in a low-growth path? Low investment 
certainly plays a major part in any explanation. Davies and van Seven-
ter (2004) argue that while government saving was consistently lower than 
government investment, the gap steadily decreasing thanks to the rise in 
the public savings rate. This attempt of "reversed crowding out" did not 
bring about the desired increase in private investment though. Instead, the 
private savings rate fell accordingly (Figure 2.9). 
Indeed, low gross savings (14.4% of GDP in 2004) and low gross capital 
formation (16.5% of GDP in 2004) are identified by most authors as major 
constraints on growth in South Africa. Overall savings are still far below 
the levels achieved in the 1980s. One possible explanation is the parallel 
opening up of the economy. "A downward trend in private sector savings 
is often observed when financial or trade liberalisation takes place. Prior to 
liberalisation, limited spending outlets might lead to an artificial propping 
up of savings." (Davies and van Seventer, 2004, 142). 
What other reasons might be responsible for low investment? Fiscal 
policy is of course dampening public investment which remains below 5% in 
2003 ( albeit growing slightly since a shift in policy priorities in 2001) ( Gelb, 
2005, 387) and FDI never reached expected levels. A number of surveys 
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Figure 2.9: Growth, Savings and Investment 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
have been conducted to find out more about the restrictions companies make 
responsible for their low investment. Chief Executive Officers of large (more 
than 50 employees) manufacturing firms named the following obstacles to 
their business' growth (cited in Lewis, 2001, 21): crime and theft; cost 
of capital and credit; volatility of the Rand; impact of labour regulation; 
corruption and administrative costs; shortage of skilled labour ( ordered by 
importance). 
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Crime tops the list in another survey conducted by Gelb as well ( cited 
in Epstein, 2002, 18). It seems to be a big obstacle to smaller firms in 
particular. Second only to crime, the high cost of capital severely constrains 
investment. As described above, high real interest rates prevail in South 
Africa due to restrictive monetary policy which focuses on attracting foreign 
capital inflows. While CEOs rank high interest rates highly, econometric 
studies do not always support this conclusion. Yet when considering the 
effect of tight monetary policy and high interest rates on both the cost 
of capital itself and the amount of retained earnings ( after paying interest 
costs), it is highly significant (ibid., 19). 
The volatility of the Rand particularly hits exporters and thus the very 
core of the growth model. The impact of the other three factors mentioned 
is less clear. Labour regulations are a highly contested issue and the impact 
on firms is far from obvious. For now it suffices to note that 30% of firms 
in the same survey claimed that the new regulations had actually improved 
labour relations (Lewis, 2001, 23). Bhorat and Cassim (2004, 18) come 
to the conclusion that "manufacturing firms on the whole do not view the 
labour legislation environment as a significant constraint on employment 
expansion". Looking at corruption, only 1 % of firms reported that they 
were asked to pay bribes. Finally, 80% of firms said that it was extremely 
or moderately hard to find managerial or professional staff. 
Authors focusing on industrial development and policy are skeptical 
about the value of surveys with existing firms however. If one wants to find 
out about binding constraints for growth, it indeed does not seem appropri-
ate to ask existing firms-they might well reflect the bias in an economy's 
structural features that prevent diversification and faster growth. In South 
Africa's case, the development that sticks out is its premature deindustri-
alisation, or, as Rodrik puts it, "the shrinkage of the non-mineral tradable 
sector since the early 1990s" (Rodrik, 2006, 3). Non-mineral tradables 
include the manufacturing sector that performed so disappointingly. This 
sector uses unskilled labour intensively, and its recovery would provide ma-
jor relieve on the labour market. Rodrik identifies the structural shift away 
from manufacturing and tradables as the main cause of the unemployment 
crisis. He observes three related developments in the last 15 years: there 
was firstly a substitution process towards skilled labour within industries, 
secondly, capital intensity within sectors rose, and thirdly, low-skill intensive 
sectors lost importance (Rodrik, 2006, 10). While the first two are common 
features of economies opening up to global competition, the third is surpris-
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ing given South Africa's factor endowment and requires explanation. He 
finds a strong decline in the relative profitability of manufacturing activities 
to be its main cause. Although he does not distinguish between MEC and 
non-MEC sectors, this differentiation would in all likelihood accentuate his 
analysis, given that the few positive outliers in manufacturing development 
are almost exclusively in the confines of the MEC. 
So why did profitability decline? The opening of the economy and in-
creased import penetration played a role, as did the fluctuating real exchange 
rate. A large part of the decline remains unexplained in his regression, but I 
would agree with Rodrik's speculative answer that South Africa is "caught 
between more advanced countries at the high end and China at the low 
end" (Rodrik, 2006, 22). Historically strong sectors close to the mineral en-
dowment and those with sufficient policy support (automotive) could avert 
this trend, but the large majority of manufacturing could not. What this 
means in terms of policy conclusions will not be discussed here but will be 
addressed in Chapter 6. 
Not surprisingly, slow growth and unfavourable shifts in the sectoral 
composition of output aggravated South Africa's major economic problem, 
unemployment. South Africa now has an extremely high unemployment rate 
historically and also in comparison with other middle income countries. The 
numbers (see Figure 2.10) are taken from Altman (2005, 425) who based 
her calculation on data from Statistics South Africa. The strict definition 
includes only those actively looking for jobs, while the broad definition ad-
ditionally accounts for discouraged workers. Since the Labour Force Survey, 
which provides the numbers, asks for any economic activity, the numbers 
should not be overstating the problem and cater for work in the informal 
sector as well (Altman, 2005, 427). 
Unemployment is unevenly distributed among different groups of the 
population. Africans are at a much higher risk of being unemployed than 
Coloureds, Indians or whites. Using the strict definition, the unemployment 
rate for whites was 6% in 2002, compared to 37% for Africans (Altman, 2005, 
426). This reflects the skills composition of the different population groups. 
Much in line with international figures, women have higher unemployment 
than men, while unemployment in rural areas atypically is higher than in 
urban areas (Lewis, 2001, 75). This is caused by the much smaller role of the 
agricultural sector in South Africa. Since there is no subsistence sector to fall 
back on and since the state provides no special support for the unemployed, 
it is closely correlated with poverty (Seekings and Nat tr ass, 2005, 317f.). 
62 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
45.0 ·,-----------------------
25.0 ··f---------~ ; 
lO.O · ······~~"'~ ~~ 
15.0 ··t---.------,-----,--,-----.---~--...---,----
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
- strict Definition ---Broad Definition 
Figure 2.10: Unemployment Rates 
Source: Altman (2005, 425) 
Virtually all sectors contributed to the employment crisis, including agri-
culture and mining, the public sector, and manufacturing. The decrease in 
jobs in the public sector and mining can be attributed to specific factors 
(fiscal constraints and the decline in the gold price respectively), but over-
all, rising capital intensity in production certainly was the crucial factor. 
While this was partly due to a shift in activities, authors such as Lewis also 
note that unions managed to push up wages particularly for semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers (Lewis, 2001, 14) and thereby increased the relative 
price of (most notably unskilled) labour. Considering that these groups 
are by far the hardest hit by unemployment, he states that "the neoclassi-
cal conclusion that unskilled and semi-skilled labour has to a large extent 
been priced out of the market seems unavoidable" (ibid.). The opening of 
the economy to international competition in the 1990s has accelerated this 
trend through both higher import penetration in labour-intensive sectors 
and higher capital-intensity in exports. This analysis is shared by policy 
makers in South Africa. Back in 1996, minister of finance Trevor Manuel 
stated that "as South Africa proceeds with trade liberalisation and adapts 
to international competition, downward pressure will be placed on unskilled 
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wages. If this is not accommodated by the labour market, then unemploy-
ment will rise." (cited in Marais, 2001, 182). 
So would lower real wages for the unskilled ease the unemployment crisis? 
Apart from the fact that the trends observed by Lewis are not undisputed 
(see Marais, 2001, 183; Bhorat and Cassim, 2004, 25; Seidman Makgetla, 
2004, 265) there are a number of concerns with such a strategy: firstly, in 
an environment of extreme poverty and inequality, a strategy of lowering 
wages of the unskilled risks a further deterioration of the situation of poor 
households. Considering South Africa's long history of exploitation of cheap 
African labour, it is indeed questionable whether such a strategy is politically 
viable for the ANC whose political raison d'etre lies in overturning historical 
inequalities. Secondly, it is unreasonable to expect that structural trends 
such as the mechanisation of commercial agriculture and the switch to deep-
ore mining which requires higher capital intensity for technological reasons 
will be reversed by a decrease in the relative price of labour (Bhorat et al., 
2002, 25). 
To conclude, given South Africa's factor endowment, job creation on 
a significant scale will most likely come from an improved performance of 
labour-intensive manufacturing sectors that predominantly employ unskilled 
labour. These sectors have performed poorly over the last decade, indeed 
over the last 30 years or so. At the same time, MEC sectors continued 
their dominance and thereby bear testimony to the path dependence of the 
economy's evolution over time. These trends have been reinforced by an 
industrial policy strategy that continued to openly support these sectors 
and did not do enough to actively encourage diversification. 
After a theoretical interlude in Chapter 3, I will try to shed more light on 
this path dependence and the role of linkages between sectors-particularly 
between mining and MEC sectors-to corroborate these findings. In this 
vain I will conduct a simulation of a linkage-based New Economic Geog-
raphy model based on South Africa's economic structure (Chapter 4) and 
an econometric analysis of linkage strength between sectors ( Chapter 5). In 
Chapter 6, I will come back to the historical analysis and complement it with 
the most recent shift in policy priorities-the making of a South African de-
velopmental state. A core part of this developmental state consists of a more 
interventionist industrial policy, and I will use both the historical and the 
quantitative assessments of South Africa's manufacturing sector to evaluate 
the new policy and its chances for success. 
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Chapter 3 
Linkages in Economic Theory 
One prominent aspect of South African industrial development is the contin-
uing strength of sectors close to its mineral endowment. There are numerous 
potential explanations for this fact, but one I want to shed more light on in 
this dissertation is the role of linkages between sectors. I interpret linkages 
narrowly, as the flow of intermediate goods between sectors as recorded in 
input-output tables (a more elaborate definition of forward and backward 
linkages follows below). They certainly played a crucial role in South Africa's 
early economic development, when mining activities created backward link-
ages to upstream industries such as chemicals and explosives, and forward 
linkages to industrial buyers of their output, so called downstream indus-
tries. In post-war economic development, the mining boom again galvanised 
the manufacturing sector. Linkages certainly played a role in industrial pol-
icy discussions as well, and the state's strategic involvement in sectors such 
as basic chemicals or iron and steel was partly motivated by facilitating link-
ages between primary extractive industries and downstream manufacturing. 
The extent of such effects of course has to be evaluated empirically, which I 
attempt in later chapters. 
Before that, a theoretical foundation is necessary. In economic theory, 
the concept of linkages is an old one which came to prominence thanks to 
the rise of development economics after World War Two. I will briefly cover 
this literature (Section 3.1) before turning my attention to a more recent 
reformulation of the concept: linkages have been formalised in models of the 
New Economic Geography (NEG)(3.2). I will use such a model to describe 
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South Africa's industrial development in Chapter 4 and therefore introduce 
NEG in a second part of this chapter. 
3.1 Linkages in Development Economics 
Development Economics is here used as a catch-all to subsume those authors 
dealing with the long run development of economically backward countries. 
German economist Friedrich List may be better known for his arguments 
on infant industry protection, yet the underlying idea presented by him is 
equally interesting: in his main work, first published in 1841, he stresses the 
importance of productive capabilities that are built up in the development 
process, and how the pursuit of certain industrial activities calls forth pro-
duction and is productivity enhancing in other sectors of the economy (List, 
1950). For him, there is an important difference between a nation using its 
resources in agricultural production, and one that focuses on manufacturing. 
The latter is preferable since manufacturing activities lead to productivity 
increases in all other sectors. Moreover, they trigger processes of institu-
tional, infrastructural and political progress (ibid., 230). Diversification and 
the emergence of new industries is not a 'natural' phenomenon that can be 
relied on happening in a market economy however. He argues that protec-
tive tariffs are necessary to protect 'infant industries' from competition-the 
underlying argument being that productivity increases over time and with 
scale (ibid., 415ff.). So I find two ideas here that are still very relevant more 
than a century later: the emphasis on the structural composition of produc-
tion and linkages between sectors, and the crucial role the state is playing 
in shaping and influencing this structure. 
After 1945, the impending independence of colonies sparked an interest 
in questions of development that was answered by the nascent discipline of 
development economics. Often, the concept of linkages was at the very core 
of these works. In addressing challenges of industrialisation in the European 
periphery, Rosenstein-Rodan argues for a "large scale planned industrializa-
tion" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, 205) in order to enable the exploitation of 
complementarity of industries. He explicitly refers to external economies as 
introduced by Marshall (1938) here: the social marginal product of an ac-
tivity exceeds the private marginal product since it creates linkages-both 
directly by pushing suppliers of inputs over a certain profitability thresh-
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old, and indirectly by raising aggregate demand due to the employment of 
formerly idle manpower. 
Another major contribution came from Myrdal (1957). Rather than 
perceiving the economy as a system that tends toward a stable equilib-
rium, he introduced the notion of a vicious (or virtuous) circle where ex-
ogenous shocks lead to a self-reinforcing process of cumulative causation. 
In terms of economic development these processes lead to regional inequal-
ities where certain regions boom thanks to external economies and others 
decline. Again, policy implications are clear: the state has to provide leader-
ship in identifying projects or industries that can spark positive cumulative 
processes. 
Albert 0. Hirschman then went on to explicitly define backward and 
forward linkages, the former inducing local production of inputs once de-
mand for these inputs reaches a critical scale, the latter providing inputs 
locally for downstream producers (Hirschman, 1966). He also enriched the 
concept by stressing two necessary conditions for linkages to work: scale 
effects-without economies of scale the concept of linkages would be mean-
ingless since every economic activity is linked to many others-and private 
entrepreneurial or public responsiveness to incentives. Linkages can also be 
understood as providing investment opportunities and therefore act as guid-
ance for private and state investment (Hirschman, 1981). Here, Hirschman 
comes very close to ideas of 'unbalanced growth' (see for example Streeten, 
1959). Hirschman also stresses the importance of transport costs. Linkage 
effects would not be relevant in their absence, since inputs in production 
could always be imported without a disadvantage. However, transport costs 
are significant, particularly for developing countries that often face long dis-
tances to large markets. In this formulation, the core elements of a linkage-
driven model are already assembled: input-output links between industries, 
scale economies and significant positive transport costs. A bit later, these 
effects will be shown to form the core of the NEG model with linkage effects. 
Before turning to the model, I want to complete this survey by dis-
cussing more recent contributions, even at the risk of over stretching the 
notion of development economics here. Authors that analyze the rapid rise 
and industrialisation of East Asia and other developing countries from an in-
stitutionalist perspective often stress the role of industrial development and 
diversification of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, in policy discussions, 
the East Asian effort is often evoked as a role model for South Africa. 
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In detailed and empirically rich accounts Wade (1990), Amsden (2001) 
and others described the interventionist and sector specific industrial policy 
of East Asian countries that deliberately discriminated between sectors and 
'got the prices wrong' to steer industrial development. Policy makers used 
protective trade policies, subsidised credit and export support as carrots to 
promote investment in certain sectors while at the same time monitoring and 
evaluating performance with the credible threat of withdrawal of support as 
stick. Within a neoclassical theoretical framework, economies of scale and 
scope, learning effects, information and coordination externalities provide 
justification for targeted intervention and support for specific manufacturing 
sectors (Chang, 1994; Rodrik, 2004). 
The sectors singled out for support were chosen according to dynamic 
factors. So countries were trying to create (rather than exploit existing) 
comparative advantage in industries with prospects of "long-term growth 
in output, profits, and wages" (Wade, 1990, 355). Amsden cites the case 
of Taiwan, where the government picked industries "based on six criteria: 
large linkage effects; high market potential; high technology intensity; high 
value-added; low energy intensity; and low pollution" (Amsden, 2001, 137). 
The importance of structural dynamics within developing countries has 
also resurfaced in recent debates. Ocampo (2005) stresses the importance of 
a dynamic production structure capable of constantly generating new activ-
ities. The importance of sectoral diversification in the long-run development 
process has also recently been empirically shown in an important paper by 
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). Rodrik (2007), in a related effort, then goes on 
to deduce the necessity of industrial policy to support entrepreneurs, since 
innovators usually do not reap the full benefits of their risky investments in 
developing countries. 
Very recently, Hausmann and Klinger (2006) and Hausmann and Ro-
drik (2006) derived a concept they call the product space, where products 
are positioned to each other according to their closeness. The underlying 
theoretical assumption is that the production of each good requires specific 
inputs (skills, intermediate goods). Now some goods are closer to each other 
than others because the specific inputs required in one's production can rel-
atively easily be transferred and used in the neighbourly good. The actual 
pattern of the product space is calculated by evaluating goods exported by 
more than 100 countries. Two goods are close when their joint exporta-
tion by one country occurs frequently. The emerging structure shows that 
there are products in the core, closely linked to many others, and peripheral 
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goods that are only weakly connected to other goods. In terms of industrial 
policy, the implication the authors draw is that governments have to choose 
which sectors to support by providing those sector-specific inputs that are 
not made available by markets. Ideally, they choose sectors which are close 
to the existing production pattern and which move the economy closer to 
the core of the product space, facilitating further diversification. 
To summarise a wide and rather dispersed range of authors, I would ar-
gue that both theoretical and empirical work has shown that linkages play 
a crucial part in the path industrialisation is taking in a country. They 
provide opportunities for further activities-in the case of a minerals econ-
omy such as South Africa these opportunities naturally appear around the 
resource endowments. This corresponds to the actual development experi-
ence of South Africa. Yet linkages alone cannot be relied on to generate 
investment. Following Hirschman, I understand them more as an opportu-
nity still to be exploited by some agent. Usually this role is taken over by 
private business, but-and this is what can be learned from the East Asian 
experience--government should and can play a guiding role in the sectoral 
allocation of investment when the market cannot be relied upon. It should 
do so by forging a vision of which path the economy is supposed to take (see 
for example Chang, 1998) 1; and by picking sectors for support that are on 
the one hand strongly linked to existing activities, and that on the other 
hand display dynamic potential as described above. 
One last note regarding mineral endowments is necessary at this point. 
There is a significant body of literature dealing with the particular role 
natural resources play in the development process. Auty (1993) provides a 
comprehensive account of the so called resource curse thesis, according to 
which natural resources are at best a mixed blessing for developing coun-
tries. An overvalued exchange rate, high volatility in earnings, and a skewed 
production structure are all cited as possible and detrimental consequences 
of a large mining sector. Hirschman argued that the primary sector, includ-
ing mining activities, is usually weakly linked to the rest of the economy 
and therefore was skeptical about its role in the industrialisation process as 
well (Hirschman, 1981, 86). Yet, in a cross-country study of 91 develop-
ing countries, Davis (1995) does not find evidence supporting the resource 
curse thesis-mineral economies did on average outperform the remainder 
1 Rodrik and Hausmann go even further in calling their paper on industrial policy 
Doomed to Choose (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006) 
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of countries. Still only one country in his panel managed to lose its status as 
mineral economy over the observed time period by sufficiently diversifying 
its export base. "This indicates that [ ... ] it is difficult if not impossible to 
force diversification of a resource-endowed economy contrary to comparative 
advantage." (Davis, 1995, 1772) The South African experience as described 
above does partially corroborate these findings: the Minerals Energy Com-
plex is rather self-contained in terms of input-output linkages, yet at the 
same time its very existence gives evidence to the fact that linkage effects 
were at play in the rise of South Africa's capital intensive industries. 
A linkage-based approach to industrial policy tailored to suit South 
Africa's needs would therefore have to take into account the critical role of 
the mining sector and the Minerals Energy Complex. In a similar vein, Ramos 
(1998) describes production clusters that develop around initial resource 
endowments in developing countries. While this is partly a market-based 
(or natural) process, the theoretical arguments mentioned above also justify 
government promotion and support for these clusters (see also Porter, 1990). 
3.2 Linkages in the New Economic Geography 
Natural resources and factor endowments of regions can only partly explain 
the spatial distribution of economic activities. It is easy to see why Johan-
nesburg was founded virtually on top of the rich South African gold fields, 
yet this alone will hardly be enough to account for the enormous density 
of economic activity witnessed in Gauteng (the province Johannesburg is 
located in) today: taking up just 1,4% of the total surface of South Africa, 
Gauteng accounts for about one third of its GDP (and 8% of the conti-
nent's for that matter!). A large and long standing tradition of geographical 
economics tries to explain phenomena of 'second nature', defined as endoge-
nous forces, brought about by human action, that influence and shape the 
economic landscape and lead to large regional imbalances and clustering of 
economic activities (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, 2565). Yet, this branch of 
research played no role in mainstream economic theory. As Krugman (1997, 
33) notes, ideas of economic geography do not feature in standard economics 
textbooks at all. To him, this is due to technical diffulties with modeling 
economies of scale and the resulting imperfect competition. In brief reviews 
of this literature, Krugman (1997) and Fujita et al. (2001) argue that ideas 
of von Thiinen, Christaller, Losch and others did provide insight into is-
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sues of spatial economics, but all fell short in terms of the methodological 
and theoretical rigour expected in mainstream economic analysis ( see for 
example Fujita et al., 2001, 33). 
The New Economic Geography (henceforth NEG), a now more or less 
consolidated area of research work that was started and brought to promi-
nence by authors such as Fujita, Venables and Krugman (the seminal ref-
erence being Krugman 1991a) provides for a treatment of spatial questions 
within the framework of neoclassical general equilibrium models. Whether 
it does justice to the rich tradition of geographical economics is a disputed 
question that I will not try to answer here (for a critical discussion see for ex-
ample Martin, 1999). This omission is justifiable because I will concentrate 
on one particular family of NEG models-the vertical linkages (henceforth 
VL) models. While being very close to the core NEG work in terms of 
model structure, they owe a lot of intellectual debt to development eco-
nomics as discussed in Section 3.1. Many papers in NEG cite the classics 
of development economics such as Hirschman and Myrdal almost as if they 
were a canon one has to refer to. Krugman himself dedicates one whole 
book (Krugman, 1997) to this cause. He explains how the ideas of devel-
opment economists and economic geographers-interesting and relevant as 
they were-failed to influence the mainstream of economic theory. The argu-
ment is essentially identical to the explanation why geographical economics 
remained at the periphery of the discipline. Taking Hirschman's forward 
and backward linkages as an example, Krugman argues that they only mat-
ter if combined with increasing returns to scale in production. Hirschman 
was aware of this, yet then, economies of scale were difficult to model in 
a general equilibrium context because they are irreconcilable with perfect 
competition. Once mathematical modelling became a standard device of 
economics, the linkages and related arguments involving complementarities 
or circularity were pushed to the margins of economic theory (Krugman, 
1997, 25ff.). Only the innovations introduced in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
allowed economists to return to these questions within a general equilib-
rium model framework. NEG models-which are essentially based on the 
Dixit/Stiglitz framework-allow their reintroduction because they assume 
economies of scale in production and because they add a spatial dimension 
( transport costs) to the economy. The two factors combined lead to math-
ematically told stories that do have a close resemblance to arguments in 
development economics reviewed above. 
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I will start this exposition of NEG by briefly presenting the original 
contribution of Krugman (1991a) verbally. The so-called core-periphery 
(CP) model is outlined in more detail in Fujita et al. (2001, chap. 4 and 5) 
and Baldwin et al. (2003, chap. 2). I will then go on to depict the basic 
VL model in detail-the logic of the model being very close still to the CP 
model. In the next chapter the multi-industry VL with exogenous growth 
is presented, complete with parameter values for a minerals economy and 
simulation results. This model is an extension to the basic model that 
allows integrating a specific technological structure in the form of input-
output tables. An exogenous growth process is then introduced to study 
the effect of growth on the development and location of industries. 
3.2.1 The Logic of NEG: The Core-Periphery Model 
The logic of NEG models is probably best explained by starting where it all 
started: with Krugman's first core-periphery (CP) model (Krugman, 1991a). 
It constitutes an attempt to understand how and why the manufacturing sec-
tor within a national economy might come to be locally concentrated in a 
core of the economy, a core which then provides the rest of the economy or 
the periphery with its manufactured goods. Krugman assumes that there 
are two sectors, the agricultural or traditional sector and the manufacturing 
or modern sector. The traditional sector is characterised by constant returns 
to scale and perfect competition. There are no transport costs and the sec-
tor produces a homogeneous good. The manufacturing or modern sector 
displays decreasing average costs and firms produce a variety of differenti-
ated goods. Transport costs are positive in manufacturing, and decreasing 
average costs will lead to a limited number of manufacturing production 
sites. Agriculture on the other hand will be evenly spread. Demand comes 
from farmers, who are dispersed across the country, and from workers in 
manufacturing. Since the prevailing technology in manufacturing leads to a 
concentration in production, final demand from manufacturing wages will be 
equally concentrated-and a pattern of circular causality emerges. Workers 
(firms) will move to the core because demand is high, and their very move 
to the core further increases demand in the core. 
The actual spatial distribution of manufacturing activity depends on 
the parameters of the model: if the manufacturing sector is small and trans-
port costs are high, then manufacturers will locate close to where farmers 
live, leading to a structure of small towns serving local markets. If then, 
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over time, manufacturing increases in importance, transport costs fall and 
economies of scale become stronger, it is easy to see how "the tie of produc-
tion to the distribution of land will be broken. [ ... ] Population will start 
to concentrate and regions to diverge; once started, this process will feed on 
itself" (Krugman, 1991a, 487). 
Technically, increasing returns to scale are difficult to model, yet a mo-
nopolistic competition type market structure as introduced by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) provides a tractable if very specific formulation. Utility of 
consumers is of a two-tier structure. They have Cobb-Douglass utility for the 
two types of goods (agricultural goods and manufactured goods) which of 
course implies that they spend a constant share of their income (µ and 1 - µ 
respectively) on agricultural goods and on the aggregate of manufactured 
goods. Krugman then goes on to define a sub-utility function for manufac-
tured products. It is of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, 
so that individuals' utility increases with the number of varieties offered. 
The critical parameter here is the elasticity of substitution c,, where c, > 1. 
If c, is close to 1, consumers have great love for variety, if c, increases, dif-
ferentiated manufactured products become better substitutes and the desire 
for variety decreases. 
Production in manufacturing on the other hand involves fixed costs, so 
together with the specific form of demand this market structure implies that 
each firm will produce only one good-a slightly differentiated product-in 
one location. The big advantage and simplification of the Dixit/Stiglitz 
framework is that there is no strategic behaviour of firms. One must assume 
an infinite ( or very large) number of competitors in the market to achieve 
this result. Then, optimal pricing does not depend on one competitor's 
behaviour but is simply a constant mark-up over marginal costs. Since 
market entry is free, profits will be driven down to zero-the mark-up will 
just be high enough to cover fixed costs. The constant mark-up has another 
convenient yet unusual implication: there is one unique level of sales at 
which operating profit equals fixed costs. Therefore the equilibrium output 
of a single firm does not depend on market size. A bigger market will 
lead to an increased number of firms only (Baldwin et al., 2003, 41). One 
last addition to this technical cook book are iceberg transport costs. It 
is assumed that a constant fraction of goods 'melts away' in transport, in 
other words transport costs are proportional to marginal production costs. 
The desirable implications are that no separate transport sector needs to 
be modelled and firms will engage in mill pricing. They will charge the 
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same producer price for both consumers in the local and in the remote 
market, transport costs incurred in the latter are paid for by consumers. 
With all these features in place, one can analyze the model with numerical 
simulations. 
In the short run, labour is assumed to be immobile. Depending on its 
initial distribution, real wages will differ in the two regions due to the home 
market effect (a larger market implies higher sales and higher profits, these 
are passed on to workers through higher wages) and the market crowding or 
competition effect (firms in the smaller manufacturing sector face less com-
petition and so pay higher wages). In the long run, workers are mobile, and 
the migration equation describes workers' movement to regions with higher 
real wages. When workers move, manufacturing production in the destined 
region increases--decreasing the cost of living (because more varieties are 
available locally without incurring transport costs) and thereby further en-
larging the gap in real wages. The home market effect is at times referred 
to as a backward linkage, the cost of living effect as a forward linkage (see 
for example Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2006, 114). 
The eventual outcome-that is the geographical distribution of manu-
facturing production, be it a core periphery pattern or a symmetric spread 
of activity------obviously depends on the initial distribution of the manufac-
turing sector and on the choice of parameters, particularly the magnitude 
of trade costs. When trade costs are high, dispersion forces are strong and 
manufacturing production will take place in both regions. With low trade 
costs, agglomeration will occur in the region that had some initial (histori-
cal) advantage. 
3.2.2 Vertical Linkages Models: An Exposition 
Since Krugman's initial contribution, a host of different models with similar 
features and applications have been presented (for an overview and exten-
sive summaries see Fujita et al., 2001; Baldwin et al., 2003). In the context 
of industrial policy and industrial development, models with vertical link-
ages (VL) are particularly interesting. The original contributions in this 
sub-field are from Krugman and Venables (Krugman and Venables, 1995; 
Venables, 1996). Fujita et al. (2001, chap. 14-16) and Baldwin et al. (2003, 
chap. 8) present text book versions and, recently, Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud provided a synthesis of VL models (Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 
2006). 
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What the VL models have in common is that the spatial dynamics result 
not from movement of labour between regions as in the CP model, but from 
"intersectoral reallocation of factors within the same location" ( Ottaviano 
and Robert-Nicoud, 2006, 114). These models are set in an international 
context where labour is assumed to be immobile between regions, yet will 
move according to wage differentials between the traditional and the man-
ufacturing sector within one location. Firstly, this implies that permanent 
real wage differentials between countries are possible. Secondly, the driving 
force of agglomeration now is the manufacturing sector itself which not only 
produces but also consumes manufacturing goods as inputs. The produc-
tion function closely resembles the consumption function in the original CP 
model, which implies that firms spend constant shares of their total pro-
duction costs on labour and on manufacturing products respectively, with 
the latter entering in a CES form so that a greater locally available input 
variety of manufacturing products reduces costs. 
It is then possible to redefine the linkage effects. If more firms settle in a 
region, firms in the region profit from a greater local variety of inputs which 
are bought without transport costs-a forward linkage. At the same time, 
more firms in a region imply a higher demand for manufactures as inputs-
a backward linkage. While these linkage effects act as agglomerative force, 
the rising manufacturing wage level in the core relative to the periphery 
acts as dispersion force which at some point might incite firms to establish 
themselves in the periphery. 
The Formal Model 
I will now present in more detail the basic version of the VL model as 
published in Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita et al. (2001, chap. 14). 
The main difference to these outlines is that I work in a discrete setting from 
the beginning. For a detailed representation of all derivations the reader is 
referred to Chapter 4 where a modified and extended version is applied to 
the research question of this dissertation. 
The basic VL model presented here is very close to the original CP model 
sketched above. There are two regions which are identical-there are no 'first 
nature' or geographical differences between them. Following the literature I 
will call them North (region N) and South (region S). In each region, there 
is a manufacturing sector M which is characterised by increasing returns to 
scale and positive transport costs ( of the iceberg form) between regions, and 
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a traditional sector A with constant returns to scale in production and zero 
transport costs. Goods of both sectors are traded between the two regions. 
Consumer Behaviour 
The representative consumer's utility is described in a two-tier function. 
She has a Cobb-Douglass utility function dividing her income between the 
two types of goods, manufactured and agricultural goods (Mand A respec-
tively). 
(3.1) 
A constant share of income µ is spent on M, the composite of manufactured 
goods, and a constant share 1 - µ is spent on agricultural goods. As in 
the CP model, manufacturers produce slightly differentiated products. The 
composite of these goods is defined as the quantity index M-a sub-utility 
function that takes the following form: 
[ 
n l 1/p 
M= Lmf , 
z=l 
0 < p< 1 (3.2) 
where n (the number of varieties) is large. This is a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function. p is indicative of the love for variety 
of consumers for the different available products mi. If p is close to zero, 
consumers value variety greatly, if it is close to one, then the differentiated 
products become better substitutes and variety is less important. n repre-
sents the number of firms and equals the number of available varieties due to 
the fact that there are increasing returns in manufacturing-implying that a 
profit-maximizing firm will produce only one variety. To better understand 
the CES form, I calculate the elasticity of substitution a of two varieties. 
MRS stands for marginal rate of substitution and can be derived as the 
fraction of marginal utilities of goods m1 and m2. Utility maximisation 
implies that the resulting (~)l-p can be substituted by the price ratio 
(~)- Then 
a=&(~)~ (m2) 1-p 
&(~) m1 
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As indicated above a is big when p is close to one. In this case, the differen-
tiated manufacturing products are near perfect substitutes and consumers 
do not value variety highly. When a is small pis close to zero and consumers 
display a great love for variety. 
Assuming that consumers' income is Y and pA and Pi are the prices for 
agricultural and manufactured goods respectively, the budget constraint can 
be written as follows: 
n 
Y = pAA + LPimi (3.3) 
i=l 
The utility maximization problem is solved in two steps. First I derive de-
mand for manufactured goods (equations 3.4 to 3.9), in a second step I will 
divide income between manufacatured goods and agricultural goods ( equa-
tions 3.10 to 3.11). For manufactured goods, the representative consumer 
wants to minimize expenditure for achieving a certain utility level M. So 
the optimisation problem becomes 
n 
min LPimi s.t. 
i=l 
[ 




The marginal rate of substitution equals El. 
PJ 
(.!!!i.) 1-p. From this an 
ffij ' 
expression for mi can be derived. 
p· 1 
mi = m1 ( -1.) 1-p 
Pi 
I substitute 3.5 into the constraint to get compensated demand for m1 
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This is the compensated demand function for mj. It depends negatively on 
Pj and positively on the other varieties' prices. There is another, insightful 
way to describe mj. Multiplying mj by its price Pj and integrating over all 
varieties, we get total expenditure on the left and a price index on the right. 
M 
Summing up over all varieties j=l to n: 
M 
Simplifying yields 
M (3. 7) 
M being the quantity composite, the expression on the right can be thought 
of as a price index. Following Fujita et al. (2001, 47) I name it G. 
(3.8) 
The price index relates income to utility. It represents the minimum expen-
diture required to buy one unit of M. It is therefore not an average price but 
derived from the utility function-and it displays its characteristics as well. 
To illustrate this, I assume for a moment that all prices are equal. Then, 
1 1 
G becomes (np;-a) 1-u or n 1-u p. Once the number of varieties n increases, 
the price index G will fall-leading to an increase in consumers' utility. 
Compensated demand can now be rewritten using G. 
(3.9) 
The second step of utility maximization consists of dividing total income 
between expenditure on manufactured and on agricultural goods. Using 
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equation 3.1 and rewriting the budget constraint with G results in the max-
imisation problem 
max s.t. (3.10) 
This standard Cobb-Douglass utility function leads to well known results 
of agricultural demand A being (1 - µ)Y/pA and demand for manufactured 
goods M = µY/G. To get consumer demand for each variety of manufac-
tures, this expression for M is substituted into 3.9 to get 
m· - y -17_1_ - y Pj/7 
1 - µ Pj GG-17 - µ G-(17-l) (3.11) 
In a last step, indirect utility can be written down by substituting demand 
for agricultural and manufacturing goods (terms A and M) into 3.1: 
(3.12) 
As established further above, an increase in the number of varieties of man-
ufactured goods on offer n reduces G, and 3.12 shows that this will increase 
utility. Varietas delectat. 
Transportation Costs 
As in the CP model, transportation costs in the manufacturing sector are 
modelled in the iceberg form. That is, a fraction of the good shipped to 
its destination melts away in the process. So there is no need for a sepa-
rate transport sector in the model. Crucially, iceberg transport costs also 
ensure that a firm charges the same price for locally consumed goods and 
for exports-it engages in mill pricing (Baldwin et al., 2003, 18). 
I will come back to the issue of mill pricing in the section on producer 
behaviour. For now, it suffices to illustrate the concept and its implications 
for delivery prices. Assume that a manufactured good is produced in N. 
When consumed in the region, there are no transport costs, so the price in 
the North will be PN• Yet, when it is exported to S, only a fraction l/TNs 
of the good arrives. TNs stands for the amount of the manufactured good 
that has to be shipped for one unit to arrive in S. In terms of prices, a 
mill price of PN for one unit implies a delivery price of PNTNs = PNS in the 
South. 
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These costs will obviously affect the price index, which has to be re-
written for each region. The price index in S in a discrete setting with R 
regions would look as follows: 
(3.13) 
It is assumed here that all varieties have the same price (this assumption will 
be shown to hold later). Then nr equals the number of firms (i.e. varieties) 
in each region, and transport costs are taken into consideration for all goods 
that are shipped in from other regions. So demand in the South for a product 
from another region, e.g. N can be derived by adapting 3.11: 
v- ( T )-<Ic(<I-l) mjs = µIs PN NS s (3.14) 
Due to the nature of transport costs, this level of consumption is not equal 
to the amount that has to be produced in order for mjs to arrive. The 
parameter T has to be considered. So total sales of a single variety produced 
in N, QjN can be expressed as 
R 
QjN = µ LYr(PNTNrr{Ic~-lTNr (3.15) 
r=l 
3.15 is the sum of demand for the variety j in all regions r = 1, .. , S, N, .. R 
and includes the fraction of the good that melted in transport (TNr ). 
Producer Behaviour 
As in the CP model, there are two sectors in each region. The agricultural 
sector is characterised by constant returns to scale in production, hence 
perfect competition, and no trade costs between regions. The single input 
in agriculture is labour l. To produce one unit of agricultural products A, 
aA units of labour are needed. The cost function in agriculture therefore 
equals 
(3.16) 
where w stands for wages of workers, and it needs aA units of labour l to 
produce the agricultural good. Perfect competition leads to marginal cost 
pricing, so the price of the agricultural good pA equals waA. Since trade 
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in agriculture is free, prices in the sector will equalise over regions, which 
under certain conditions ( as long as there are both sectors in both regions) 
leads to an equalisation of wages as well. 
The manufacturing sector produces a variety of manufacturing products 
qi and uses both labour l and intermediate goods as inputs. In the CP 
model, the manufacturing sector used skilled labour only. Note that there is 
no differentiation between agricultural labour and manufacturing (or skilled) 
labour in the VL model-in marked contrast to the CP model. Labour 
therefore can move freely between these two sectors. Additionally, firms in 
the manufacturing sector face increasing returns to scale. Add to this the 
preference for variety of consumers and it becomes clear why no firm will 
produce a variety that is already supplied by one of its competitors. Each 
firm will produce one distinct variety at one distinct location. 
Decreasing average costs are expressed in a fixed cost component F in 
the cost function. Both inputs, labour and a CES aggregate of interme-
diates (identical to the utility formulation of consumers), are used in this 
fixed input requirement F -in equal proportion to their use in the variable 
input requirement aM. Technology is identical for all varieties and in both 
regions. One crucial simplification of this version of the VL model is that 
intermediates stem from the manufacturing sector itself, so basically "man-
ufacturing uses itself (in addition to labour) as an input, that is, that the 
same aggregate of manufacturing varieties demanded by consumers is also 
an input into the production of each variety" (Fujita et al., 2001, 241). Link-
ages effects exist despite there being only one industrial sector! Specifically, 
inputs are divided in a fixed share 1 - a of labour and a of intermediates 
(the manufacturing composite M). The latter is the same as the aggregate 
of manufacturing varieties demanded by consumers. 
Assuming for now that fixed costs are covered, then the production func-
tion in the manufacturing sector in North equals 
(3.17) 
o:-0 (1- 0:) 0 - 1 are constants necessary to derive a cost function as simple as 
the one below, lN represents labour input, on which 1 - a of total costs is 
spent, and [Er nrx~N] l/p represents inputs stemming from intermediates, 
which takes up a constant share a of all expenditure. Firms have to spend 
an equally partitioned amount on the fixed cost component F. n is the 
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number of varieties of manufacturing goods produced in each region, XrN 
the input of each variety produced in region r and p again indicates the 
extent of preference for variety, this time of firms. 
The cost function of the manufacturing sector takes the form 
(3.18) 
where GN is the price index in N: 
(3.19) 
Due to the specification, the price index for intermediates corresponds to 
3.13, the price index for consumers. This is due to the fact that input 
demand from firms can be derived in two steps-in line with consumer de-
mand. The demand for a single variety of manufactured goods equals 3.9, 
and a constant share of costs of firms o: is devoted to manufacturing goods. 
So intermediate demand for a single variety (INT) becomes 
Tc -(jc(j-1 muNT = a: Pi (3.20) 
To arrive at total sales of a variety produced in North, consumer demand 
3.15 plus the fraction T lost in transport have to be added. I get 
R R 
QiN = [µ~Yr+ 0: ~ TCr] (pNTNs)-(jc~-lTNr (3.21) 
Firms maximise profits by equating marginal revenue with marginal costs. 
Marginal revenue can be expressed as p( 1 + ¼). So the elasticity of demand 
Eq,p has to be calculated. 
oqp 
f - --q,p - opq 
Firms take the price index Gas given. This is an important feature of Dixit/ 
Stiglitz: there is no strategic interaction between competitors. Then it is a 
matter of simple derivation to get -a as the elasticity of demand. To arrive 
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I replace a with l~p to get the profit maximizing price 
(3.23) 
Firms set prices by charging a constant mark up over marginal costs. 
Analysing 3.21 also helps to understand the concept of mill pricing. The 
elasticity of demand will be -a for domestic demand as well as for demand 
in other locations since transport costs enter proportional to the value of 
goods. For this reason, firms will charge the same mill price p for local and 
foreign consumption. The end price in the remote region corresponds to the 
respective marginal costs and therefore has to include transport costs and 
can be written as pT. 
The technology of firms stated in the production function 3.17 already 
constitutes the first source of linkage effects. Since intermediates enter in a 
CES form, firms profit from a greater variety of intermediates available to 
them locally-it will lead to a decrease in their price index. One can think 
of this linkage as a forward linkage. A greater number of suppliers of inter-
mediate goods in a region reduces costs for firms using these intermediates 
in their production. 
In Dixit/Stiglitz, there is free entry into markets, so profits are driven 












Note that 3.25 implies that equilibrium firm size does not depend on the size 
of the market, but only on cost parameters and consumers' love for variety. 
So an increase in market size leads to an increase in the number of firms in 
the market only (and thereby further diversifies manufacturing supply) but 
leaves firm size unaffected. 
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It is now possible to re-write expenditures on manufactures E in a par-
ticular location. It consists of demand from consumers and of intermediate 
demand by firms. 
(3.26) 
The zero profit condition ensures that the total value of a firm's production 
(pq*) equals its total costs. So with o: the part of costs devoted to inputs, 
the second term on the right is simply all firms' expenditure on intermedi-
ates. This expenditure represents the second source of linkages, so called 
backward linkages. The more firms operate in one location, the higher their 
intermediate demand, and this demand raises total demand for manufactur-
ing products. 
To find the number of firms in the market, one has to define the size of 
the market~in other words, labour supply. For simplicity, let labour supply 
equal 1 in both countries. As described above, labour is intersectorally 
mobile, so farm workers can move into manufacturing and vice versa, but 
labour is internationally immobile. Take ,X to be the share of labour that is 
engaged in manufacturing. Above, I defined the value of total manufacturing 
in a country, and since a constant share (1 - o:) of costs is spent on workers, 
the total wage bill in manufacturing can be derived. 
w.X = (1 - o:)npq* (3.27) 
From 3.25 we know equilibrium firm size, so n *, the equilibrium number of 
firms, becomes 
n* = A wp 
(wl-o:Qa)F(a - 1)(1 - o:) (3.28) 
Using n* and the profit maximizing price 3.23, the price index for region 
North 3.19 in a 2-region setting can be rewritten as 
[ 
a 1-a l cl-a = A 1-a(l-o:)c-ao: p aM + 
N NWN N F(a - 1)(1 - o:) 
[ 
a 1-a l A 1-a(l-o:)c-ao: p aM Tl-a 
sws s F(a -1)(1 - o:) 
(3.29) 
This equation is not very handy, so following Fujita et al. (2001, 242f.) I 
introduce some normalizations. I choose units so that the marginal input 
requirement aM equals p and equilibrium output ofa firm q* equals 1/(1-o:). 
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Then the profit maximizing price and the price index can be reformulated 
to get 
(3.30) 
for a much simplified price and 
G l-11 _ , l-11(1-o)G-11°' + , l-11(l-o)G-<1°'Tl-11 N - "NWN N /\SWs S (3.31) 
as the simplified price index for the region N in a two-regions setting. 
Short Run Equilibrium 
I can now define the short run equilibrium. It is important to understand 
that entry is free even in the short run, so profits will still be zero. Yet in the 
short run, labour is immobile, so wages can differ between the two regions. 
Using the normalisations introduced above, the price indices for regions 
N and S become 
G l-11 _ , l-11(1-o)G-11°' + , l-11(1-o)G-11°'Tl-11 N - "NWN N "SWs S (3.32) 
and 
G l-11 _ , l-11(1-o)G-11°' + , l-11(1-o)G-11°'Tl-11 S - "SWs S "NWN N (3.33) 
respectively. 3.32 and 3.33 are crucial expressions and embody central as-
pects and features of the model. If for example .X, the share of manufacturing 
in a region, increases in N, then the price index GN will fall-and firms profit 
from cheaper intermediate inputs. This is what I defined above as a forward 
linkage. Also, these equations show how the price indices depend on both 
wages and, via intermediates, on the price indices themselves. 
Now that both consumer and producer behaviour are known, it is time 
to look at market clearing conditions. Market clearance is ensured in an 
indirect way by defining the so-called wage equations. They determine the 
level of wages manufacturing firms are allowed to pay for them just to break 
even-in other words, the wage level at which the zero profit condition is 
fulfilled. To arrive at the wage equations, I first equate q*, equilibrium 
output by firms, with demand for a particular manufacturing variety as 
described in 3.21. 
R R 
q* = [µ~Yr+ Ct~ TCr] (pNTNs)- 11G~- 1TNr 
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Using the normalisations introduced above, E for total expenditure on man-
ufactured goods, and bringing wages (which are directly linked to prices via 
mark-up pricing) to the left I get the wage equations for regions N and S: 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
For firms to break even, they have to charge a certain price. This price 
depends on both the wage level and the price index, the latter coming into 
the picture due to the existence of intermediate inputs. Together with the 
normalisation for q* this accounts for the left side of the wage equation. On 
the right, it is obvious that spending on manufactures comes from consumers 
and firms (both included in E), from the home market and, additionally, 
from exports to the other region. 
The wage equation implies that increased spending in a region will push 
up wages since demand for a single variety will increase--a backward linkage. 
The expansion of a sector also leads to a greater variety of industrial goods 
on offer, which decreases the costs of industrial inputs. This effect shows 
up in G on the left side of the wage equation and leads to higher wages as 
well~it can be interpreted as a forward linkage. A countering effect is the 
increased competition that follows a larger variety on offer. This effect is 
represented in G on the right hand side of the equation and tends to reduce 
the manufacturing wage. Changes in the manufacturing wage in relation to 
changes in the regional distribution of manufacturing activity as described 
here will be the driving force of the adjustment process from the short-run 
to the long-run equilibrium. 
Total expenditure E is defined as 
E v aws>.s s = µIS +-1--
-Q 
(3.36) 
where expenditure comes from consumers (first term) and from the indus-
trial sector itself via intermediate demand. Consumers spend a share µ of 
their income on manufactured goods, while firms' respective expenditure is 
of the share a, derived from the cost function. From 3.27 we know that the 
value of manufacturing output is npq* and that it can be expressed as 1~~, 
leading to the second term of the expression. 
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Income Y comes from both sectors. The total labour force equals 1, so 
income generated in manufacturing is simply w>-.. Turning to income gen-
erated in agriculture, we know that labour is the sole factor of production. 
For reasons of simplicity we assume an extremely simple and linear produc-
tion function: qA = (1 - >.), where (1 - >.) is the amount of labour used in 
agriculture. aA from equation 3.16 is set to unity. Since the agricultural 
good acts as the numeraire, the marginal product of labour in the sector 
and hence the agricultural wage are also unity. 
(3.37) 
The wage gap v between sectors is 
VN = WN - 1, VS = WS - 1 (3.38) 
Together, equations 3.32 to 3.38 characterise the short run equilibrium. 
Long Run Equilibria 
In the short run, wages will differ between sectors, so there is an incentive 
for workers to move to the sector with higher wages. The assumption is 
simply that workers move out of agriculture and work in the manufacturing 
sector when wages in manufacturing are higher or v > 0. The law of motion 
is defined as follows: 
.X = v(>-.(1 - >.)) (3.39) 
So there are three possible long run equilibria in a region, in which there 
is no incentive for workers to leave their sector: wages are equalised across 
sectors-both sectors will operate; all production is concentrated in manu-
facturing and manufacturing wages are higher or equal to (a virtual) agricul-
tural wage; or lastly all production is concentrated in agriculture and wages 
are higher or at least equal to (a virtual) manufacturing wage. 
w=l, >.E(0,1), 
w 2'. 1, ).. = 1, 
w ~ 1, ).. = 0 
(3.40) 
These equilibria depend on the initial distribution of manufacturing activ-
ities and on parameter values. The most common representation of the 
model is to look at equilibria depending on the significance of transport 
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costs. High transport costs usually lead to a symmetric long-run equilib-
rium, meaning that manufacturing production takes place in both regions. 
This also means that both countries are active in the traditional and in the 
modern sector, meaning that wages all over are unity. The reason for this 
spatial distribution is that in the case of high transport costs, it pays to 
be close to consumers, and farmers----equally spread over the regions-are a 
significant part of final demand. 
When transport costs fall, the importance of being close to these 're-
mote' consumers erodes and the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. 
So if manufacturing production increases only slightly in one region, this will 
increase the manufacturing wage in the region, leading to a further move-
ment of workers into manufacturing in the region. Put more technically, 
forward and backward linkages ( outweighing the competition effect) trigger 
an agglomeration process and lead to industrial concentration in one region, 
while the other specializes in agriculture---the core-periphery outcome. 
3.2.3 A Simulation Exercise 
To illustrate the characteristics of the model, I will present some results 
from a numerical simulation done with Mathematica. First, equations 3.32 
to 3.38 are numerically solved in a two-regions setting to arrive at the short 
run equilibrium. Then, workers' movement (triggered by wage differentials) 
is simulated as a discrete adjustment process. 
The short run equilibrium depends critically on parameter values which 
are set as follows: 
a=5 
a= 0.5 
µ = 0.4 
'Y = 0.5 
Setting T = 3 means that the simulation starts in a situation where 
transport costs are high. If AN and >.s are set to 0. 7 and 0. 12 respectively 
(representing an initial spatial distribution of manufacturing of the core-
2Were the initial values O and 1, there would be no movement of workers. However, 
this turns out not to be a stable equilibrium. To test for stability, I use starting values 
slightly different from the extreme values. 
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periphery type) then the wage gap VN is negative and vs positive. There is 
an incentive in the North for workers to leave the manufacturing sector and 
move into agriculture and vice versa in the South. 
The law of motion is formulated as follows in the simulation3: 
.X = ,v(A(l - A)) 
Movement of workers leads to a symmetric long run equilibrium-AN and 
As are both 0.4, so manufacturing production is equally split between the 
two regions. This result is not sensitive to the initial values of Ar but driven 
by high transport costs. This becomes obvious when one lets transport costs 
fall. Using the symmetric outcome as starting values for Ar, the symmetric 
equilibrium remains the long run outcome up until T = l.95. Once T falls 
below this threshold (the so-called break point), the symmetric equilibrium 
becomes unstable. The region that gains a slight advantage in manufactur-
ing will experience specialisation in the modern sector, the other region will 
deindustrialise. The outcome is the core-periphery equilibrium. As laid out 
above, the strength of linkages causes the concentration of manufacturing 
activity in one region. 
With very low transport costs (T = 1.5) any initial distribution will lead 
to a core-periphery outcome in the long run. Which region ends up as the 
industrialised core, and which one as the periphery depends on the initial 
conditions. A slight advantage for the North in the beginning suffices to 
lead to total agglomeration of manufacturing in the core in the long run. 
Interestingly, the core-periphery outcome remains the long run equilibrium 
up until a level of transport costs of T = 2.2. Only at T = 2.25 will an 
initial core-periphery patttern become unsustainable and the two regions 
move to a symmetric outcome. This latter level of transport costs is called 
the sustain point in the literature (Baldwin et al., 2003, 30f.). Break and 
sustain points can also be derived algebraically. A detailed derivation can 
be found in Fujita et al. (2001, 248f.). 
To describe the model, we can therefore identify three different outcomes, 
depending on the level of transport costs. Given the parameter values as-
sumed in this simulation, the core-periphery outcome will always be the long 
run equilibrium for low transport costs (1 < T < 1.9). At an intermediate 
3The slight difference to Equation 3.39 is the inclusion of parameter I which-set at 
0.5-slows the movement of workers. It is necessary in a discrete simulation exercise such 
as this one to prevent overshooting. 
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Manufacturing Shares, T = 1. 5 
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Figure 3.1: Manufacturing employment at T = 1.5 
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level (1.95 < T < 2.2), the long run equilibrium depends on the initial condi-
tions. A core-periphery structure will give rise to a core-periphery long run 
equilibrium, a symmetric distribution of activities will lead to a symmetric 
long run equilibrium. With high transport costs (T > 2.25), the equilibrium 
will always be symmetric, no matter the initial conditions. 
There are various ways to graphically present the results of such a sim-
ulation exercise. The best known is the Tomahawk diagram which displays 
stable equilibria in relation to transport costs. I choose a different way here, 
depicting the share of each region's labour force active in manufacturing 
were the manufacturing wage to be unity in one of the regions, hence equal 
to the agricultural wage. In a situation of low transport costs-from above 
we know that this implies a core-periphery outcome--------the stable long run 
equilibria are the corner solutions, when either WN = l or ws = l intersect 
with the axes. 
To interpret Figure 3.1, consider WN = l first. This curve depicts all 
combinations of >w and >.s at which manufacturing wages in the North 
are unity, or at which there is no incentive for workers in the North to 
leave the sector they are active in at the moment. This is the case when 
all manufacturing is concentrated in the North, but also in the symmetric 
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equilibrium (AN = As = 0.4) and all other combinations on the curve. At 
any point to the right of w N = 1, the manufacturing wage is less than 
unity and AN would decrease because of wage incentives, at any point to 
the left AN is higher than unity and workers would move into the modern 
sector. The same is true for the South (where any point above ws = 1 
implies manufacturing wages below unity and leads to a fall in As), and 
it becomes clear why only the corner solutions are stable equilibria: any 
point to the left ( to the right) of both lines would lead to an increase ( to a 
decrease) of manufacturing activity in both regions. If the two regions are 
on a hypothetical point AN = 0.7, As = 0.1 (on WN = 1), then wages of 
manufacturing workers in the South are below unity and they would move 
into agriculture. As would decrease, AN would increase further until the 
two regions arrive in the core-periphery solution. The same would hold 
for a comparable situation close to the other corner solution. Finally, the 
symmetric equilibrium is not stable since a slight movement of A in any 
region would trigger a specialisation process and lead to one of the two 
corner solutions. 
In the case of high transport costs (T = 3) we already know to expect the 
symmetric equilibrium. The graphic representation of wage developments 
confirms this (see Figure 3.2). Only the symmetric equilibrium is stable, an 
inspection of any other point in the graph will confirm the tendency of work-
ers to move in a way that leads to an equal distribution of manufacturing 
activity. 
The latter case is certainly the most interesting. At intermediate trans-
port costs (T = 2.15 in this simulation) we saw above that the outcome 
depends on the initial distribution of manufacturing activity-it might be 
symmetric or a core-periphery pattern. Figure 3.3 shows the results in terms 
of wages. There are five equilibria overall now, the two corner solutions, the 
symmetric equilibrium and two intermediate solutions. Only the first three 
turn out to be stable. To see why, take the curve ws = 1. If the regions 
are situated on the left-most part of the curve (As between O and 0.2), then 
Northern workers have an incentive to leave manufacturing since manufac-
turing wages are below unity. In this case (and at very low levels of As) the 
corner solution-the core-periphery pattern-will prevail. 
In contrast, if we presume that the two regions are on the second from 
left part of ws = 1, then workers in the North earn wages in manufacturing 
that exceed agricultural wages. This will lead them to move into the mod-
ern sector, increasing AN and decreasing As. The economies move towards 
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Figure 3.2: Manufacturing employment at T = 3 
the symmetric equilibrium. This exercise can easily be continued, but the 
outcome should be clear by now: depending on the starting position, the 
two regions will either end up in a core-periphery pattern (with the core in 
the North if it has a strong initial advantage or vice versa) or in a symmet-
ric equilibrium (if the initial position is sufficiently close to the symmetric 
position). 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
This simple vertical linkages model reestablishes the results of the Core-
Periphery model: depending on initial conditions, the geographical distri-
bution of economic activity changes endogenously, potentially leading to 
processes of industrialisation and de-industrialisation respectively. The ulti-
mate cause for such specialisation processes4 are the backward and forward 
linkages that manufacturing firms create locally once they set up shop in a 
region. This is the crucial difference to the Core-Periphery model, where ag-
4The term specialisation seems more appropriate then the term agglomeration in this 
case, since both regions concentrate on one particular activity in the core-periphery out-
come, rather than one region taking up all economic activity. 
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Manufacturing Shares. T =2. 15 
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Figure 3.3: Manufacturing employment at T = 2.15 
glomeration processes are driven by the geographical movement of workers 
and their purchasing power. 
Since linkages play an important role in South African industrial devel-
opment, the vertical linkages model provides an entry point into a discussion 
of its industrial development. However the limitation of the model to one ho-
mogeneous industrial sector would not permit to take the specific structure 
of South African industry into consideration. Therefore, the next chapter 
introduces a vertical linkages model with multiple sectors and also provides 
simulation analysis that takes into account some of the peculiar features of 
the South African economy that were described in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 
A Simulation of Linkage 
Effects 
South African industrial development has led to an economic structure 
that is rather peculiar given its factor endowments: production is capital-
intensive and concentrated to a large extent in capital-intensive sectors. 
This pattern is even stronger when one looks at international competitive-
ness and the country's exports. This is surprising and requires explanation 
when considering that South Africa has an abundance of unskilled labour 
at its disposal. 
In Chapter 2 I argued that its mineral endowment, and the industrial de-
velopment that was triggered by it, are responsible for this structure. Link-
ages between the mining sector and closely related industrial sectors shaped 
the economy while labour-intensive manufacturing sectors remained weakly 
developed throughout history. Almost from the beginning of the mining 
operations, input sectors such as explosives and chemicals, electricity gener-
ation and even mining machinery were started in the country. Equally im-
portant, the foreign exchange earned through the export of minerals allowed 
policy makers to support the emergence of an inward-oriented manufactur-
ing sector that produced consumer goods for the growing domestic market. 
While this pattern was established in the period between the First and the 
Second World War, it continued (and became more accentuated) after 1945 
and can serve to describe even today's economy to a large extent. 
The tight links between mining and a range of other sectors-electricity, 
which is overwhelmingly based on coal mining, chemical industries, and basic 
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metals such as steel-has led Fine and Rustomjee (1996) to the coining of the 
term Minerals Energy Complex. It is a notion that is picked up in this work 
and is useful when thinking of the South African industrial development 
process as driven by linkages between these sectors. 
A second notion that is often evoked is South Africa's intermediate posi-
tion in international trade relations. It struggles to compete with developed 
countries in the export of high-tech and skills-intensive goods, and it faces 
equally stiff competition in labour-intensive goods, where low-wage regions 
particularly from Asia undercut its competitiveness. The former is caused 
by a shortage of skills, the latter by relatively high wage costs. South Africa 
is a middle income country with a corresponding cost structure, its history 
of oppression and exploitation of African labour make wage cuts a politically 
extremely sensitive issue, and its minerals exports also put an upward bias 
on the exchange rate of the Rand. 
I take these two core features of the economy-linkages between mining 
and certain industrial activities shaping industrial development, and South 
Africa's intermediate position in the global economy, where it faces compe-
tition from both ends of the skills spectrum-and try to reproduce them in 
a vertical linkages model with multiple sectors (that allow to model linkages 
between them) and three regions (that can cater not only for a core and a 
periphery, but also an intermediate region). 
4.1 The Multi-Industry Model 
The logic of vertical linkages models was explained above. For the model 
presented here, I will mostly draw on work done by Puga and Venables (1996, 
1999). They provide a particularly interesting framework that lends itself to 
applications on development economies and industrial development. They 
set up a multi-country and multi-industry framework where each industry is 
imperfectly competitive and industries are linked by an input-output struc-
ture. Starting with an initial core periphery distribution of manufacturing, 
they then add an exogenous growth process that expresses itself in increased 
demand for manufactured goods. At first, strong linkage effects let new firms 
in the core satisfy additional demand, driving up wages and increasing in-
equality between regions. At a certain wage level, it becomes profitable for 
firms to forego benefits from linkages in the centre, and take advantage of low 
wages in the periphery by moving there. They thereby create linkages and 
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trigger a self-sustaining industrialisation process in the periphery-a story 
reminiscent of old ideas like circular causality and cumulative causation. 
In the 1996 paper, Puga and Venables simulate this process for a set of 
hypothetical scenarios where industries differ in terms of labour intensity, 
upstream and downstream position or linkage strength and then look into 
which industries leave an existing agglomeration first. In the 1999 appli-
cation, they aggregate their input-output structure from the actual South 
Korean input-output matrix. Forslid et al. (2002) provide an application 
in a European context, albeit with a focus on changing trade costs rather 
than growth, and Fujita et al. (2001, Chapter 15) have an exposition of the 
Puga/Venables model in their overview as well. 
4.1.1 Logic of the Model 
One striking feature of world economic development in the last few decades 
is the rapid growth of Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan. 
Much of their success is attributed to the formidable performance of their 
manufacturing firms which managed to penetrate world markets and export 
increasingly sophisticated goods to the rest of the world. Often, their growth 
is analysed in terms of national policies, and their experience has influenced 
discussions on industrial and more broadly economic policy in developing 
countries. In chapter 6, which tackles very recent industrial policy changes 
in South Africa, this influence will become very visible. However, the vertical 
linkages model as presented here aims to provide a different explanation. 
Rather than looking at country differences, it is assumed that countries are 
similar in their technology and their factor endowments. The differences in 
industrial activity are explained by agglomeration effects that result from 
some initial advantage and forward and backward linkages. 
There are multiple regions, and each of the regions possesses a tradi-
tional and a multitude of manufacturing sectors. These sectors are linked to 
each other via an input-output matrix. A by now well known combination 
of factors allows for agglomeration processes: the existence of positive trans-
port costs, increasing returns to scale in production and linkages between 
sectors. Because of positive transport costs, it is important for firms to be 
located close to consumers ( which in this setting can be both final consumers 
or households, and other firms that use their product as an input) and to 
the producers of input that they themselves use in production. In combi-
nation with increasing returns to scale, this ensures that firms will choose 
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a singular location close to the main market, rather than spreading pro-
duction geographically as they could with constant returns to scale. Lastly, 
input-output linkages represent the sectoral connections that reinforce ag-
glomeration. Once an upstream industry is located in a certain region, it 
becomes very attractive for downstream sectors to set up shop close by. 
One region has-for some historical region that is not necessarily ex-
plained in the model-an initial advantage and therefore becomes the core 
of manufacturing activity. All manufacturing production is concentrated 
in the region because of the backward and forward linkages at play. The 
other regions represent the periphery and are specialised in agriculture. The 
existing agglomeration and the linkages are a strong incentive for any new 
manufacturing firms to settle in the core. However, there is an opposing 
force: wages in the core will be higher than in the periphery. As in the 
model laid out above, wages rise with manufacturing activity in a region. 
These two opposing tendencies provide for interesting developments once 
a growth process is introduced. It is modeled very simply as an increase 
in demand for manufacturing goods that results from exogenous technical 
progress and a related increase in labour productivity. With higher demand 
for manufacturing goods, additional firms will come into operation. At first, 
they will locate in the core because of linkages. However, more activity 
widens the wage gap, and at one point it will pay for a firm to start its busi-
ness in the periphery, where it forgoes proximity to suppliers and customers, 
but employs labour at lower wages. Unsurprisingly, firms in labour-intensive 
sectors and firms with weak linkages to other firms will move first. With 
growth continuing, the region that attracted these first movers will develop 
a manufacturing sector over time, creating its own linkages, but also expe-
riencing rising wages-it will turn into a second core. This process repeats 
itself with the other regions, describing a development process where one 
region after the other experiences development spurts which lead to indus-
trialisation and higher wage levels. 
In order to represent South Africa's situation as closely as is possible 
in this model framework, I will introduce a number of variations below. 
There will be three regions, one representing the core with a concentration 
of manufacturing activity, and two peripheral ones. Out of five different 
manufacturing sectors, one will use an additional input in production-it can 
be thought of as minerals. This sector therefore represents the mining and 
mineral beneficiation sectors. The minerals good will be exogenously priced, 
and is only available in one of the two peripheral states. Apart from this 
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differing minerals endowment, the regions will be identical as was the case 
above. Starting from this position, I will try to show how a growth process 
that causes additional manufacturing production will lead to a particular 
pattern in the emergence of manufacturing activity in the periphery: firms 
in sectors that are closely linked to mining through input-output linkages 
will set up shop in the region which disposes of minerals-a trivial result. 
However, firms in labour intensive sectors that have little connections to the 
mining industry will evade the mineral-rich region because of higher wages, 
and they will rather settle in the third region, which thus starts a process 
of labour-intensive industrialisation. 
As a result, the resource-rich country remains caught in a development 
path that is not labour-intensive. Linkage effects and wage differentials 
prevent the attraction of more labour-absorbing industries. This seems to 
be a reasonable, albeit by necessity extremely simplified, representation of 
South African industrial development. 
4.1.2 The Formal Model 
The model resembles the one presented in Chapter 3, but there are a number 
of important differences. I will therefore present it in detail and step by step, 
following the overall structure of the earlier presentation, but with a focus 
on those aspects that have changed. 
Consumer Behaviour 
The representative consumer draws utility from the consumption of a homo-
geneous agricultural good, and from industrial goods of five different sectors 
s. A minimum amount of the agricultural good has to be consumed-this 
amount Y can be thought of as a subsistence level of food consumption. All 
income Y up to Y is spent on the agricultural good by the representative 
consumer. For income above Y, she allocates constant shares of her income 
to each of the six sectors. The utility function is thus a linear expenditure 
system as developed by Stone (1954). 
Moreover, within each of the five manufacturing sectors s = 1...5, con-
sumers display a preference for variety: they draw utility from consuming 
different varieties of the manufactured good produced in the sector. mi is 
the quantity of a variety consumed, and there is a range of n varieties on 
offer in a sector, which is determined in the model. 
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Composite index of the quantity of consumption of man-
ufactured goods produced in sector s 
Consumption of a variety i of the manufactured good pro-
duced in sector s 
Consumption of the agricultural good 
Price of the agricultural and the manufactured good re-
spectively 
Income of the representative consumer 
Subsistence level of consumption of the agricultural good 
Share of income above Y spent on sector s 
Indicator for the love for variety; the smaller it is, the 
greater is the preference for variety 
Elasticity of substitution between varieties, the bigger it 
is, the greater is the preference for variety 
Price index in sector s 
Transport costs for shipping a good from region N to re-
gion S 
Share of workforce in a region employed in sector s 
Land used in agricultural production 
Labour 
Share of intermediates stemming from sector s used in 
production 
Wages in region r and sector s 
Wage differential in region r between agricultural sector 
and manufacturing sector s 
Total expenditure in region r on goods of manufacturing 
sectors 
Mineral input into mining sector 
Share of mineral input used in the mining sector 
Table 4.1: Variables and Parameters in the Model 
As a result, the utility function consists of two tiers. The upper tier 
defines expenditure allocation to the six sectors and is a variation of the 
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This utility formulation implies that a share 1 - I: µ8 of income above 
the subsistence level will be spent on the agricultural good, and µ8 on the 
manufacturing sector s. The lower tier expresses the consumer's preference 
for variety within the subsectors. It defines M 8 as a constant elasticity 
of substitution function and is equivalent to the subutility function in the 
simple VL model above, 3.2. 
[ 
n l 1/p 
M= Lmfs ' 
i=l 
0 < p< 1 (4.2) 
p is the indicator for the strength of a consumer's love for variety for the 
different available products mis• n represents the number of firms and va-





A large a (pis close to one) indicates that the differentiated manufacturing 
products are near perfect substitutes and consumers do not value variety 
highly. When a is small p is close to zero and consumers display a great 
love for variety. 
The budget constraint looks as follows: 
5 
Y =paA+ LG8 M 8 ( 4.3) 
s=l 
where G is a yet to be defined price index. In order to derive demand 
functions, it is necessary to maximize utility in two steps. The lower tier 
is addressed first to determine demand for a variety of a manufacturing 
good within any sector s. Total expenditure on varieties within the sector 
is minimised subject to the constraint that overall utility equals M 8 • 
n 
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Setting up the Lagrangian function and differentiating for mi and mj re-
spectively yields a price ratio of varieties mi and mj 
Pi _ mf-1 
PJ. - p-1 mj 
From here, it is easy to find an expression for mi 
(Pj) 1~P mi= - mj 
Pi 
Plugging this result back into the constraint yields 
Simplifying yields 
Demand for an individual variety mj therefore turns out to be 
(4.5) 
This is the compensated demand function. By rearranging terms, it can be 
rewritten to include a so-called price index G as is shown in equations 3. 7 
and 3.8. G thus equals 
(4.6) 
G represents the minimum cost of obtaining one unit of the quantity index 
M. Not surprisingly, G also reflects consumers' desire for variety. If a 
larger number of varieties is available at a correspondingly lower price, G 
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will fall. The compensated demand function for mj can thus be rewritten 
by substituting the price index G into 4.5. 
(4.7) 
Or equivalent, if pis replaced by the elasticity of substitution a: 
mj = M(~)-a 
Once the demand for a variety within a sector s is known, the attention is 
turned to the upper tier of the utility maximisation problem. We maximise 
4.1 subject to the budget constraint 4.3. Again, we set up the Lagrangian 
function: 
Differentiating the Lagrangian function for Ms, A and >. and setting them 
to zero yields local maxima: 
8LA U 
"'M : µs M = >.Gs 
U s 8 
8LA U 
"'A : (1 - L µs)----= = APA 
u A-Y 
8LA 
a>. : y =PAA+ L GsMs 
Take the sum of G8 M8 over all industrial sectors plus the traditional sector 
to get 
LGsMs + (A-Y)PA = Lµs + (1- Lµs)(~) = ~ 
s=l s=l s=l 
In a next step, rewrite this expression and substitute Y as derived above 
- u 
Y -YpA = "I 
It is now possible to derive demand functions for the agricultural good and 
for manufacturing goods in each of the five sectors. Starting with the tradi-
tional sector and replacing ( f{) in the local maximum above, I get 
(A - Y)PA = (l - L µs)(Y - YpA) 
s=l 
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The demand for agricultural goods A then is 
A= (1- Es=lµs)(Y - YpA) + Y 
PA 
(4.8) 
The representative consumer spends a fraction of income above the mini-
mal consumption requirement on the traditional good. Additionally, this 
minimal consumption requirement is spent on the traditional good as well. 
The demand for industrial goods is derived in a similar manner. First, I 
derive demand for the composite of one industrial sector M 8 • Substitution 
equivalent to the procedure in the traditional sector yields 
Ms= µs(Y - YpA) 
Gs 
(4.9) 
The consumer spends a fraction µs of income over and above Y on sector 
s. However, we are interested in demand for a single variety produced by a 
firm within the sector. To achieve this, I replace Ms in Equation 4.7 by 4.9. 
Then, demand for a single variety becomes 
- 1 
. _ µs(Y - YpA) (Psj) p- 1 
msJ - Gs G 
Simplification yields the demand function for a single variety j in sector s: 
(4.10) 
Expressed in a, the elasticity of substitution, rather than in p, demand can 
be rewritten as 
(y Y ) -CTGCT-1 msj = µs - PA Pj s (4.11) 
Demand for a variety obviously depends on expenditure by consumers on 
the sector as established above. Within the sector, demand depends nega-
tively on the price of the variety, and positively on the price index Gs-an 
increase in the price index indicates fewer varieties, hence less competition 
and therefore a larger share for one variety. It is also easily checked that the 
price elasticity of demand equals a and is therefore constant. 
As a last step in describing consumer behaviour, we can derive indirect 
utility V(Y, PA, Gs) by substituting demand for A and Ms in the utility 
function 4.1. 
(4.12) 
8 s s 
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The indirect utility function is useful when stressing once more the core 
feature of the particular formulation of utility and demand: consumers' 
love for variety in the industrial sector. To formally re-establish this result, 
assume for now that prices Psj for all varieties j = 1, .. n in a sector s are 
equal. Then the price index G as expressed in 4.6 becomes p8 n(p-I)/P. If 
n increases, the price index G falls and utility increases. The extent of this 
preference for variety clearly depends on the parameter p---if it is close to 
one, a change in n has little effect, if it is close to zero, then more varieties 
strongly affect G and preference for variety is relatively larger. 
Many Regions 
So far, there has been little geography in this NEG-model. However, the 
purpose of this exercise is to analyse a country's industrial development in 
a three-region setting. I will assume that consumers have identical pref-
erences in the three regions, however one important adaption is necessary 
nonetheless: both agricultural and industrial goods will be tradable, allow-
ing countries to import or export them corresponding to their specialisation 
in production. 
For the sake of simplicity, it is generally assumed that trade in the agri-
cultural good is costless to keep this sector as simple as possible. In the 
industrial sectors on the other hand trade is not free but generates transport 
costs of the iceberg-form. The NEG owes this formulation to von Thiinen 
who introduced the concept already in the 19th century. What it assumes 
is that a fraction 1 - 1 /T of the transported good melts on the way to its 
destination, so that only 1/T of the good arrives. This formulation has two 
major advantages: firstly, it is not necessary to formulate a separate trans-
port sector. Secondly, firms will charge the same mill price to domestic and 
to foreign consumers. 
To see why it is necessary to look at firm behaviour and their profit-
maximising price setting. For now, it suffices to understand the basic concept 
of iceberg transport costs. Assume that a manufactured good is produced in 
the North-region N. When consumed in the region, there are no transport 
costs, so the price of the good in the North will be PN · Yet, when it is 
exported to the South-region S, only a fraction l/TNs of the good arrives. 
TNs stands for the amount of the manufactured good that has to be shipped 
for one unit to arrive in S. In terms of prices, a mill price of PN for one unit 
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implies a delivery price of PNTNs = PNS in the South. Note also that TNN 
equals one. 
Transport costs will impact on the price indices in various regions and 
sectors, so they have to be reformulated. There are three regions R = l, 2, 3 
in this formulation. Moreover, it is necessary to assume that prices for 
individual varieties within a sector are equal, which is indeed the case here 
and will be shown later. Then, the price index in sector s of region 1 becomes 
3 .e.=l 
G1s = [L nrs(PrsTtr) i6] P (4.13) 
r=l 
and might vary over locations. If a large proportion of goods are produced 
locally, the price index will be relatively low, in the opposite case (one might 
think of such a region as periphery) it will be relatively higher. Due to the 
nature of transport costs, demand has to be reformulated, and total sales of 
a variety have to include T, the amount of the good lost in transport. So 
total sales of a single variety q in location 1 are 
3 
q1 = µs L (Yr - YrPA)(pjT1r)-o-c~- 1T1r (4.14) 
r=l 
They depend on total income in all regions available for the consumption 
of manufacturing goods, consumers' preferences with regard to the different 
manufacturing sectors, the variety's price and transport costs. With regards 
to the demand elasticity, as above it is constant and equal to er. Note that 
it does n!)t depend on transport costs either. As indicated above, this will 
be convenient at a later stage when we look at the price setting of firms. 
Producer Behaviour 
With consumer behaviour and demand established, we can look at the be-
haviour of firms. In the traditional sector, there is perfect competition, 
trade between regions is costless and its output will be used as numeraire. 
In the manufacturing sectors, the market form is monopolistic competition, 
as introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
Turning our attention to the agricultural sector first, we assume a pro-
duction function that is increasing in the input labour, yet with diminishing 
returns. Following Fujita et al. (2001, 257) it takes the following form: 
qA = ~ ((I - fs bs)r (4.15) 
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K can be thought of as an agriculture-specific input into production such 
as land. The other input factor of course is labour. A share of (1 - Ls J3 ) 
of the total labour force in a region ( which is set to one for simplicity) work 
in the agricultural sector. The rest of workers are distributed over the five 
manufacturing sectors, with sector s employing 68 workers. 
The marginal product of labour in agriculture is positive yet diminishing. 
If a region industrialises-in other words if workers are drawn out of agri-
culture and move into manufacturing-then the marginal product increases 
and so does the agricultural wage. Since workers move freely between sectors 
within a region, the industrialisation process also increases the equilibrium 
manufacturing wage. This is a core feature of the model which is primely 
responsible for the setting up of new industries in the periphery. 
Since the agricultural good acts as numeraire, the agricultural wage will 
equal the marginal product of labour in the sector. Formally, 
(4.16) 
In each manufacturing sector, firms will produce with increasing returns 
to scale since there is a fixed-cost component involved in the production 
process. Because of this, each firm will produce one variety only. Because of 
consumers' love for variety, we also know that each variety will be produced 
by only one firm. The number of firms in a sector will thus equal the 
number of varieties on offer. The inputs used are labour and intermediate 
goods that come from the five manufacturing sectors. The formulation is 
thus equivalent to the simple VL model-equation 3.17. The production 
function for a typical firm in sector s then equals 
( 4.17) 
s s 
To put the production function in this manner immediately points to one of 
its crucial attributes: the inputs, labour and intermediate goods, are used 
in both the fixed and the variable component of production. In other words, 
to set up the factory, the firm incurs fixed costs F, of which a proportion 
1 - I; O:s is spent on workers, and the rest (shares o:8 ) on inputs from the 
different manufacturing sectors. The same proportionality applies to vari-
able costs. On the right hand side, the first two terms are constants that 
ensure a simple cost function (see below). l represents the labour input in 
production, Ms the intermediate input from a particular sector s. 
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Ms again represents a manufacturing goods composite for a specific sec-
tor and consists of a number of differentiated varieties. Firms display a love 
for variety in their input demand equivalent to consumer preferences. For 
the sake of simplicity, the formulation will be exactly equivalent. Reformu-
lating, we get 
s s s r 
The CES aggregator [Er nr8 X~s] l/p shows how a firm uses differentiated 
inputs x stemming from sectors s = 1, .. 5 and from all three regions. It has 
a preference for variety, and the strength of this preference depends on p. 
To arrive at profit maximization and price setting of an individual man-
ufacturing firm, we need to know the cost function first. This involves some 
tedious algebra, but the result is a rather intuitive cost function. Starting 
with the production function 4.17 the Lagrangian function can be set up: 
LA= wl+ L G8 M8 +A[q-(1-Lns)Ea,-l II a 8 -aszl-Ea, II M~•~+ ~] 
s s s s 
Then 
ai: :w=A(l-I::ns)L-E 0 •(1-I::ns)E 0 •-1IIns-a•IIM~•~ 
s s s 
From this, by division we arrive at much simplified price ratios: 
wlasl = G8 1Ms1(l - L ns) 
Gs2Ms2ns1 = Gs1Ms1ns2 
If we want to express input demand for l and Ms in terms of output and 
prices, these ratios have to be plugged back into the production function. 
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Input demand for labour l can be derived by inserting Ms =wlat in Gs(l- o) 
the production function. The relevant term IL Mf• becomes 
and l turns out to be 
l - (F + cq)(l - L Os) n G~• 
- wE 0 s 
The equivalent procedure produces input demand for the composite Ms 
of one industrial sector. I insert l = Gs1Ms1(l - Las)/(was1) into the 
production function which turns out to be 
F + _ II -Os 1:os-1 LOs-1 II M°'•MI-EoscI-Eos cq - 0 s 0 5 1 W s sI sl 
With a further substitution, this expression can be greatly simplified. The 
product of manufacturing composites TT Mf• can be split up, extracting 
M':t and replacing the remaining sectoral composites s2 to s5 by Ms2 = 
Gs1Ms10s2/(Gs20s1) and so forth. Then 
2-5 2-5 
F+cq = II a-Os II a°'•aL°'s-Ia - L 2 - 5 °'swL°'s-IcI-EoscL2 - 5 Os II c-as MI-Ens 
s s sI sl sl sl s sI 
Simplication yields 
2-5 
F + cq = a-1 M wL°'•-tct-0,1 II c-as 
sl sl sl s 
From this, I derive an expression for Ms1 
M _ (F + cq)as1 
sl - wEo,-1cI-Os1 n2-5 c-as 
sl s 
Lastly, factor demand is inserted into the total cost function TC = wl + 
L G8 M 8 • Then, TC can be expanded to 
TC= w((F + cq)(l - Las) n G~•) +"Gs (F + cq)as 
wL°'s L., wEos-IG!-Os n2-5 G-;°'• 
Simplify to get 
TC= (F + cq)w1-L°'s [(1 -"a) IIG°'• + "G Os ] L., s s L., s c!-°'• n2-5 G~• 
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This simple and intuitive cost function shows how production costs (both the 
fixed cost component and variable costs) depend on wages and price indices 
of intermediate inputs, impacting according to the share of expenditure that 
goes towards their use. 
We can now formulate the profit maximization problem of a manufac-
turing firm. 
II= pq - (F + cq) [ w 1-I:Os II G~•] (4.20) 
where total demand q is taken from equation 4.14. The firm will set pro-
duction so that marginal revenue equals marginal costs or p(l +¼)=MC. 
The monopolistic competition formulation implies that the firm-producing 
a distinct variety-acts as a local monopolist and does not consider its com-
petitor's reaction. It thus takes the price index G as given, which in turn 
implies that the elasticity of demand is a. 
Algebraically, 
Replace a by p and reformulate to arrive at the price set by the producer of 
a variety: 
p = [ w1-~as II G~•] ~ ( 4.21) 
Prices are set at a constant mark-up ~ over marginal costs. On the other 
hand, entry into the market is free, and profits will be driven down to zero 
accordingly. We use the zero-profit condition to determine the size of an 
individual firm. 
Setting II = 0 and using 4.21 we get 
Simplifying yields equilibrium output of a firm 
q* 
Fp 
(1 - p)c 
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Firm size thus depends on the cost parameters (positively on fixed costs, 
negatively on variable costs) and on the prefence for variety of consumers. 
The higher the representative consumer's love for variety as expressed in a 
or in p, the smaller the output of an individual firm-more firms will offer 
more varieties in smaller quantities. Note also what does not affect firm size: 
the overall size of the market. If total demand increases, it will not change 
supply behaviour of a single firm. What it does cause however is the entry 
of new firms-a larger market then leads to a larger choice of varieties and 
thereby reduces the price index G in the market. More formally, to express 
the number of firms as a function of market size, equate the total wage bill in 
a sector s with the share of total revenue in that sector that goes to wages: 
68 w = (1 - L a 8 )npq 
Thus, the equilibrium number of firms becomes 
* 6sw n =-----
(1 - "£, as)pq 
( 4.23) 
Before writing down the short run equilibrium, we have to reformulate total 
demand for goods because we now know that firms also demand industrial 
products as part of their input demand. Total demand from consumers in-
cluding the amount of goods lost in transport was recorded in 4.14. Now 
demand from firms has to be added. Due to the formulation of their pro-
duction function 4.17 they spend a fixed proportion a 8 of their total costs 
on products stemming from sectors. Within sectoral demand, they have a 
preference for variety equivalent to consumer behaviour, depending on the 
parameter p. 
So total demand for a variety i in sector s can be written as 
'°' [ -{I(G)<I-1] Qsi = ~Ers Pi T 
r 
( 4.24) 
where expenditure on sector s, Es in one particular region is defined as 
Es= µ8 (Y - YpA) + LClz8 npq (4.25) 
z 
Consumers spend a share µ8 of income above the minimum agricultural 
good requirement Yon the sector, and firms from sectors z = 1...5 spend an 
according share azs of their total sales-reflecting the input-output linkages 
between sectors. 
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Short Run Equilibrium 
We are now in a position to write down the short run equilibrium of the 
model. It is expressed in the price indices, the so-called wage equations, 
expenditure and income. In order to simplify notation, a number of normal-
izations are introduced. 
PA= l 
c=p 
* 1 q = 
1- I::o:s 
We start by defining expenditure Ers in a region r on products of the man-
ufacturing sector s. Use the normalisations above and transform 4.25 ac-
cordingly to get 
- ~ 88 w 
Ers = µs(Y;. -Y;.) + 7 0:zs (l - LO:s) ( 4.26) 
The first term on the right hand side is consumption expenditure on a sec-
tor (dependent on µ8 ), the second term intermediate demand from firms 
( dependent on O:zs). 
Income Yr in a region r comes from workers' wages in manufacturing 
and from income in the agricultural sector. Thus 
Y, _ ~ b K ((1- L 8 8s))'Y 
r - L.., Ws s + K 
s "( 
( 4.27) 
Turning to the price indices, we reformulate 4.13 to get the price index in 
region r 1 and sector s 
Gl-11 ~ ( T )l-11 r1 s = L.., nrs Prs r1r 
r 
After the normalisations introduced above, the price p as in 4.21 and the 
number of firms n (see equation 4.23) can be simplified and rewritten as 
p = Wl-I:;os IT G~• 
8sw n=------
(1 - I: o:s)pq* 
8sw n = -----==-----
wl-I:; os I] G~• 
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Plug these into the price index to get 
cI-(1 = '""' OsW ( WI-L:Os IT G°'•) 1-u TI-(1 
TjS L..., wl-I:<>s IT G<>s 
T 




Equation 4.28 shows that the price index in a region first of all depends 
on transport costs to the region-the higher they are, the higher the price 
index will be. Also, this implies that a remote region that imports a larger 
share of its manufactured goods will face higher price indices. The term 
08 Lw is an indicator of the market size of respective regions. Lastly, the 
price index depends on prices of individual varieties, and since prices are set 
as a mark-up over marginal costs, wages and input prices enter the equation 
as well. 
Lastly, we define the so-called manufacturing wage equations. Manu-
facturing wages are crucial since they will determine the dynamics of the 
model. Yet they are intuitively hard to grasp since there is no closed form 
expression for them. We arrive at them by using what Baldwin et al. (2003, 
19) call the "market clearing conditions". From 4.22 we know the output 
a firm produces at which it can exactly recover its fixed costs and so has 
zero profits. From demand by consumers and firms, we thus know that this 
output level q* must equal 
* '""'E [ _"(G)"-1] q = L..., TS P; T 
r 
Rearrange to bring the price on the left hand side. This price Pi is the break 
even price that a firm must charge in order to achieve zero profits. If it sets 
its price at a lower level, it will go out of business because it operates at a 
loss, if it sets its price at a higher level, competitors will enter the market 
and drive the price down. 
pf= q~ ~Ers[(~)"- 1] 
Lastly, price setting is linked to manufacturing wages due to mark-up pric-
ing. Thus, we can indirectly define the manufacturing wage at which firms 
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achieve zero profits, given income, price indices and transport costs in all 
locations. 
( 4.29) 
This is the so-called wage equation. We can use it plus the price indices 
to illustrate the main forces at work in the model: backward and forward 
linkages and the market-crowding or competition effect. The question to 
be asked is whether any given short run equilibrium with resulting income, 
expenditure, price indices and wages in all regions represents a stable equilib-
rium. In order to find out, assume that a small number of workers move into 
manufacturing in one region and Os changes accordingly-will that trigger 
further specialisation in manufacturing (in other words: will manufacturing 
wages increase further) because of linkage effects? Or will the competition 
effect prevail and thus prevent further specialisation? 
• Backward Linkages: Backward linkages stem from the increasing size 
of the local market that results from more manufacturing production 
in the region. This increase works through both input demand by 
manufacturing firms and through additional final demand by workers 
and is relevant because of the existence of positive transport costs. In 
equations 4.26 to 4.29 the backward linkage shows up in expenditure 
on manufacturing goods E. If Os increases, so does expenditure in the 
region. This shifts up demand curves for local producers and leads to 
an increase in wages. 
• Forward Linkages: Forward linkages represent the cost reduction for 
downstream producers that is associated with the local availability of 
intermediate inputs. In the model, this effect relies on the preference 
for variety of firms: if more varieties of an input good are available 
locally, the price index of that input will decrease. When 08 increases 
in 4.28, the regional price index in the respective sector falls. In terms 
of wages, this reduction in input costs tends to increase the equilibrium 
wage further, as can be seen in Gs on the left hand side of the wage 
equation. 
• Competition Effect: The competition effect provides an opposing ten-
dency. The increase in 08 that reduces the price index also implies that 
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the demand for each firm's variety shifts down. This will tend to re-
duce the equilibrium wage and is represented in the model in Gs on the 
right hand side of the wage equation. Lastly, an increase in 88 simul-
taneously leads to a decrease in agricultural employment (1 - Ls t5s)-
This raises the marginal product of agricultural labour and thus agri-
cultural wages. Competition for workers thus puts another break on 
industrialisation. 
Wages are the reward for the mobile factor, labour. The short run equi-
librium as defined above in equations 4.26 to 4.29 yields a wage rate in each 
of the manufacturing sectors. They might and will in all likelihood differ, 
depending on the respective forward and backward linkages and the compe-
tition effect. These differing wages in the manufacturing sectors, or, more 
precisely, the wage differential between the agricultural sector and manufac-
turing sectors, then determine the sectoral movement of workers in the long 
run and thus the dynamics of the model. If wages are higher in manufactur-
ing, workers will move there and the region amasses industrial production. 
In the opposite case, they will leave the modern sector and the region dein-
dustrialises. Note that firms always operate at zero profits, which means 
that they immediately move into or out of a sector according to the profit 
signal. Workers on the other hand do not move in the short run but only 
switch occupation in the long run equilibrium. 
On Dynamics 
The wage differentials in the short run trigger movements of workers to 
those industries that offer higher wages. In the long run equilibrium, wages 
will equalise across sectors. Note that they do not equalise across regions 
since labour is not interregionally mobile. This is one of the core differences 
between the core-periphery and the vertical linkages driven NEG models. 
Therefore it is important to define the mobility equations that describe 
the movement of workers. The incentive to move is provided by the wage 
differential between the traditional sector and a particular manufacturing 
sector. We define the wage differential in region r and sector s Vrs as 
- ((1-I:st5s))"Y-1 
Vrs - Wrs - Kr (4.30) 
If Vrs is positive, agricultural workers will leave their sector and move into 
manufacturing sectors thereby increasing its size and triggering above men-
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tioned adjustments. The mobility equation is then defined as 
( 4.31) 
The change over time in a sector's workforce depends on its wage differential 
to the agricultural sector. The formulation in 4.31 ensures that the move-
ment stops in the corner solutions-if all workers are working in sector s, 
(1 - brs) is zero and movement stops, if the sector does not exist (brs = 0), 
the same applies. 
Long run interior equilibria can be established with simulation analysis-
results will depend on parameter values chosen. Both will be described in 
detail in the sections below. Before that, one last building block of the model 
has to be introduced however-the exogenous growth process. We are not 
so much interested in the causes of growth in this model, but in its effects on 
the sectoral composition of output. Therefore, the formulation will be very 
simple: technological progress steadily increases the productivity of labour. 
Following Fujita et al. (2001, 264), labour is denoted in efficiency units L. 
Thus Lbrs is the number of efficiency units operating in country r and sector 
s, and Wrs is the wage per efficiency unit. So if the economy grows thanks 
to an increase in L, workers' income through wages increase. 
The short run equilibrium has to be reformulated to accommodate for 
these changes. 
( 4.32) 






The growth process is relevant because of the particular form of utility and 
demand: once income exceeds Y, a fixed proportion is spent on manufac-
turing goods. In total, this implies that the demand for manufacturing 
goods grows faster than the demand for agricultural goods. These shifts are 
responsible for sectoral changes: additional manufacturing production will 
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happen in regions where it is most profitable, either due to linkage effects or 
due to lower wage costs. The development of this growth-induced process 
over time and the various forces that drive these results will be analysed 
below. 
4.1.3 The Mining Sector 
The first of the non-traditional sectors will represent the mining sector. In 
addition to inputs from all other sectors, it also uses a mineral input in 
production. I call it g. A constant share o:9 of total costs is spent on the 
mineral input in the mining sector. In all other sectors, o:9 equals zero. 
From this follows the production function1 for the mining sector: 
( 4.36) 
s 
I further assume that the price of the mineral input is exogenously given. 
This simplifies my analysis considerably and is not an unreasonable assumption-
given the size of South Africa's economy and the global market for natural 
resources. It is denoted p9 . Total costs in the minerals sector in the region 
profiting from being endowed with it thus are 
( 4.37) 
In the other regions, the mineral input has to be imported. Its import bears 
iceberg transport costs of the magnitude T, so the input cost accordingly is 
p9T. 
Just as in the rest of the sectors, firms in the mining sector set prices as 
a mark-up over marginal costs, which-thanks to the normalisations intro-
duced above--<lisappears. The price set in the mining sector Pmin therefore 
lS 
P . _ WI-:[; 0 8 -0gp°'g IT G°'• mm - g s (4.38) 
Returning to the short run equilibrium, the price indices and the wage equa-
tions have to be adapted to cater for the special role of the mining sector. 
The price index of the sector as described in 4.34 changes to 
cl-a=~ Lo p-agawJ-a(l-:[;a.-ag)rrc-aarI-a 
r1s L s 9 rs r1r (4.39) 
r 8 
1 This is a simplified version, omitting the constants 
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in the region with the mineral endowment. In the other regions, the price 
of the mining input enters as (Tp9 )-aga_ The wage equation is adapted 
accordingly. Again, in the mineral-rich region, I replace the price set by 
firms in the mining sector in the wage equation to get 
[ ag I-Eo: 8 -o:9 IT cas] a= 1 "'"'E [(G)a-1] Pg w s l _ "o: L.., TS T 
L._; 8 T 
(4.40) 
In the other regions, transport costs for the mineral input will be considered 
on the left hand side again. Now that the special features of the minerals 
sector are established, numerical simulation will shed more light on the 
model and its characteristics. The focus of attention will lie on the role of 
the mineral endowment and its consequences on sectoral growth in the three 
regions. 
4.2 Simulation Results 
In this section, I present results for two simulations. The first uses a very 
simplified input-output matrix to illustrate the features of the model, par-
ticularly the effect of the mineral endowment on sectoral industrial devel-
opment and wages in the respective regions. In the second simulation, I 
attempt to use a more realistic input-output matrix that more accurately 
describes the South African case. 
4.2.1 Three Regions, Five Industries: a Simple Case 
The simulation presented here uses parameter values that are standard in 
the literature and describe a situation of low transport costs where a core-
periphery outcome is expected. They are described in more detail in the 
appendix. 
The crucial aspect that needs to be highlighted and that differs from work 
done before is the input-output matrix that links the five manufacturing 
sectors. Table 4.2 displays all values of o:8 for industry 1 in column 1, for 
industry 2 in column 2 and so forth. So each column presents the total 
of intermediate inputs from other modern sectors for the respective sector. 
Sector 1, the mining sector, additionally uses the mineral good as input. o:9 , 
the share of the mineral resource in the production of the mining sector is 
set to o:9 = 0, 5 to represent its dominance in this sector. 
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MEG Non-MEG 
Ct1s Ct2s Ct3s Ct4s ass 
Ctsl 0,11 0,12 0,02 0,02 0,02 
Cts2 0,1 0,1 0,02 0,02 0,02 
Cts3 0,02 0,02 0,08 0,09 0,1 
Cts4 0,02 0,02 0,07 0,09 0,09 
Cts5 O,Ql 0,01 0,07 0,08 0,09 
Table 4.2: Input-Output Matrix 
The matrix is constructed so that industries 1 and 2 are heavily linked. 
So the second industry represents those activities that use the mining in-
dustry's output heavily and also provide significant inputs to the mining 
industry. In terms of the South African economy that provides the under-
lying reference for this simulation, the second sector can be identified as 
those manufacturing sectors that together with mining itself make up the 
Minerals-Energy Complex; that is base chemicals, petroleum products, and 
plastics, non-metallic mineral products, base metals, and electricity. Sectors 
3 to 5 on the other hand are weakly linked to the resource-intensive core of 
the economy-both in terms of forward and backward linkages. However, 
they display strong linkages among themselves. They represent non-MEC 
manufacturing sectors in the simulation. 
The simulation is done with Mathematica. For an initial value of L = l, 
the short run equilibrium price indices, wages, expenditure and income are 
calculated. From this, the wage differentials Vs are gathered in all three 
regions and their respective sectors. Workers then move according to the 
law of motion as defined in 4.31. A long-run equilibrium is reached once they 
have no more incentive to leave their sector. In the graphic representations 
below, I display subsequent long run equilibria for increasing values of L-
thus a simulation of the growth process. 
Region 1 represents the core region, region 2 profits from the minerals 
endowment, and region 3 is the periphery. In the starting position, the core 
region specializes in activities 3 to 5, the second region in those activities 
close to the mineral endowment, and the third region is the periphery, ac-
counting for no modern production at all. When the economy starts to 
grow, the first two regions start to amass sectoral activity according to the 
initial sectoral distribution. Country 3 remains peripheral. At a critical 
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level however, incentives change and it becomes attractive for some manu-
facturing firms to leave the core region and set up shop in the periphery. 
The simulation results show that-despite a small hike in region 2-region 
3 establishes itself as a manufacturing region (see Graph 4.1). The mineral-
rich region keeps its competitive advantage in the first two sectors, but the 
other industries are now more equally divided between region 1 and region 
3. Firms in these sectors do not set up shop in region 2. 
What are the driving forces of these results? The linkage structure im-
posed on the model clearly plays a decisive role. Strong linkages between 
industries 1 and 2 explain why they are tied in the second region. These 
linkages also explain the closely correlated development of industries 3 to 5. 
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Figure 4.2: Regional wages 
However, the input-output matrix cannot explain why the growth pro-
cess triggers industrialisation in region 3-without any manufacturing ac-
tivity and thus without any benefits accruing from linkage effects-and not 
in region 2. The reason for this are wage costs (see Graph 4.2). Not sur-
prisingly, the core is the high wage region initially. Higher economic activity 
drives up manufacturing wages through the channels discussed above. The 
growth process further increases manufacturing wages in the core, until, at 
the break point, the wage costs are so high that it pays for some firms to 
establish themselves in the periphery. 
Between the two peripheral regions, the mineral-rich region has some 
manufacturing activity-thus there will be linkage-related advantages for 
firms that emerge there. However, as can be seen in Graph 4.2, the presence 
of firms in sectors 1 and 2 implies that wages in the region are higher than 
in region 3 that is fully specialized in the traditional sector. The wage 
differential between them is large enough to overshadow linkage advantages 
and therefore manufacturing activity in sectors 3 to 5 emerges in region 3, 
the low-wage region. 
Once some firms have made that step, the region profits from local link-
age effects as well and quickly industrialises. Wages will rise accordingly 
and the country soon reaches the level of the industrialised core in terms of 
wages. Region 2 grows continuously in terms of wages, but fails to attract 
a broader set of industries: its development is clearly tied to the mineral 
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endowment. Albeit an advantage initially, it puts an upper limit on sectoral 
growth and eventually also on wages and thus welfare in the region, because 
it prevents a diversification process. 
4.2.2 Three Regions, Ten Industries: South Africa 
The results obtained above stem-to a good extent-from the peculiar form 
of the input-output matrix chosen above. In order to reestablish the results 
with an industry structure closer to what we observe, I run a simulation 
with 3 regions and 10 industries that uses an input-output matrix modelled 
on South Africa's industrial structure. 
The derivation of the matrix is explained in the Appendix. The outcome 
is a lOxlO matrix as presented in Table 4.3. Sector 1, mining and quarrying, 
represents the mining sector from above and uses the mineral as additional 
input again. Apart from this, parameter values are very similar to those 
chosen above (see Appendix), that is we are in a setting of low transport 
costs. The three countries are identical in all respects except the minerals 
endowment. Region 2 has access to the mineral without transport costs, the 
other regions have to import it and thus have to bear additional transport 
costs. 
With regards to the input-output matrix, it is clear the sector 'petroleum 
products, chemicals, rubber and plastic' is the one that is most closely linked 
to the mining sector. A share of 0, 145 of its total production costs is spent on 
inputs stemming from the minerals sector. This corresponds to the empirical 
literature that identifies this sector as crucial component of the MEC. The 
other manufacturing sectors that are usually subsumed under the label MEC 
are basic metals, a sub-group of the sector-grouping 'metals, metal products, 
machinery and equipment' in the table. However, its backward linkage to 
the mining sector (0, 086), albeit larger than that of the rest of sectors, is 
less important than the linkage of the chemicals sector. 
A major difference to the hypothetical 5 industries-case presented above 
is that 'the rest of the economy', that is the sectors that are not considered 
part of the MEC, are not in a systematic way closely linked with each other. 
This was an artefact above and will be visible in the results below. One 
does observe stronger linkages between certain sectors however, notably the 
importance of metal products in the transport equipment sector and, to a 
lesser extent, in the electrical machinery sector. 
122 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
Min Food Tex Wood Chem NMM Metals ElecM Trans Furn 
Min 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,145 0,018 0,086 0,000 0,002 0,033 
Food 0,000 0,079 0,005 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Tex 0,001 0,001 0,039 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,010 0,004 
Wood 0,005 0,022 0,001 0,105 0,006 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,016 
Chem 0,035 0,029 0,D18 0,032 0,276 0,007 0,024 0,017 0,026 0,014 
NMM 0,003 0,006 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,010 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,000 
Metals 0,039 0,018 0,005 0,010 0,024 0,007 0,253 0,028 0,065 0,024 
ElecM 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,031 0,011 0,001 
Trans 0,014 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,321 0,000 
Furn 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,007 
Min Mining and Quarrying 
Food Food, beveroges and tobacco 
Tex Textiles, clothing and leather 
Wood Wood and paper; publishing and printing 
Chem Petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastic 
NMM Other non-metallic minerol produc4 
Metals Metals, metal products, machinery and equipment 
ElecM Electrical machinery, radio, TV, instruments 
Trans Transport equipment 
Furn Furniture and other manufacturing 
Table 4.3: Input-Output Matrix 
Results of the simulation show a similar pattern of sectoral industrial 
development. However it differs from the simulation above in important 
aspects. Turning the attention to the development of the 10 sectors in the 
three regions first (see Figure 4.3), it is obvious that the growth process is 
more continuous for the majority of sectors in the three regions than be-
fore. The one major exception is the 'Chem' sector, that is initially located 
in the core region and relocates to the minerals-rich region once a certain 
growth level is attained. This relocation is triggered by the wage differential 
becoming big enough for some firms to relocate, and happens in this par-
ticular sector because of the strong linkages to the minerals sector that is 
overwhelmingly located in region 2. These changes lead to a familiar pattern 
of sectoral development in the region: mining and the closely related sectors 
dominate the economy. Given the input output structure of South Africa, 
this applies for the petroleum products, chemicals and plastics sector. The 
rest of the economy virtually stagnates, there is no significant growth in any 
of the other sectors despite a continuous increase in world wide demand for 
manufacturing products. 
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This additional demand is satisfied by firms that emerge either in the core 
region, where they build on existing advantages of agglomeration--expressed 
in the form of linkages that render intermediate inputs cheaper in this model, 
or in region 3, the periphery. The core, while loosing activity in the 'Chem' 
sector, grows strongly in the metal products sector, and this growth pulls 
along transport equipment and electrical machinery, that are both strongly 
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linked to metal products. Less intuitive is the strong performance of the 
food sector in the core. 
With regards to the periphery, its growth is concentrated predominantly 
in the wood and paper and in the textiles industry. Those two sectors ex-
ceed their counterparts in the mineral-rich region in size. The periphery 
unsurprisingly does not engage in mining or closely linked industries at all. 
Intuitively plausible as well, there is no metal products and transport equip-
ment production in it either. 
The major difference to the first simulation is that region 3 does not 
fully industrialise and thus overtake the minerals-rich region. The reason for 
this difference lies in the more realistic input-output matrix. Inter-industry 
linkages in the 'non-mineral' sectors (sectors 3-5 above) are nowhere near as 
strong and therefore do not trigger a rapid industrialisation process in all of 
them once activity emerges in one of them. 
This difference is also visible in the development of wages. In the early 
stages of the growth process, the wage gap widens between the core region 
and the two peripheral regions. The relocation of the 'Chem' sector then 
strongly increases economic activity and wages in the minerals-rich region, 
bringing it to a wage level much closer to the core region. Region 3 remains 
a low-wage region. As a result of the wage difference between regions 2 and 
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3 however, most sectors outside mining and chemicals are more important 
in the periphery than region 2. 
So while the second simulation does not replicate the strong welfare re-
sults of the first exercise ( an overtaking of the minerals-rich region by the 
peripheral region in terms of wages), it does retain the sectoral implications 
of input-output linkages and the mineral endowment: it is the sector closely 
linked to mining that will relocate to the mineral-rich region, and this in-
creased economic activity in one sector, by driving up wages in the economy 
as a whole, dampens economic activity in a host of other sectors. Given 
the parameter values chosen here, these results are strongest for the sectors 
'wood and paper; publishing and printing', 'textiles, clothing and leather' 
and 'electrical machinery, radio, TV, and instruments', that all develop more 
dynamically in the peripheral region. 
The core region retains its high wages mostly through dominance in 
'metals, metal products, machinery and equipment', 'transport equipment' 
and, certainly less intuitive, 'food, beverages and tobacco'. 
At this point, it is important and necessary to stress the limits of this 
analysis. Many, if not most, important factors influencing sectoral devel-
opment have been abstracted from, not least additional production inputs 
in other sectors (for example in the wood and paper sector). Regarding 
the simulation, it is therefore apparent that one cannot speak of an empiri-
cal application proper of an economic geography model. I therefore second 
Forslid et al. (2002) who called simulations of a similar kind "theory with 
numbers" (Forslid et al., 2002, 281). What the simulation does provide 
though is a theoretical argument that justifies further investigation into the 
importance of linkages and thus 'real' empirical work. 
In the next chapter, I will attempt to do just this and provide some 
empirical evidence for the importance of linkages in the context of South 
African industrial development and the growth performance of its various 
sectors. 
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Chapter 5 
Linkages at Work? Empirical 
Results 
The history of South African industrial development and the results of the 
simulation both provided evidence that linkages between different sectors 
might influence industrial development in the country. However, neither 
provide 'hard' empirical evidence about their actual strength and impact. 
In order to rectify this omission, I propose to use a structural vector auto-
regression model (SVAR) to assess sectoral development in South Africa 
from 1970 to 2006. The model explicitly tests for the impact of input-output 
linkages on the growth performance of sectors. 
The chapter starts with an overview of existing empirical work in the 
New Economic Geography field and on linkage effects, particularly those 
studies with direct relevance for South Africa. In the second part, the SVAR 
methodology is introduced in detail. The third part presents the model and 
estimation results. I conclude with an interpretation of the results. 
5.1 Empirics of Linkage Effects 
Existing empirical applications of NEG models are reviewed briefly below. 
Since there are a number of problems in these applications and since this 
study has a broader focus on linkage effects that does not limit itself to the 
model results, I also add a brief description of studies that attempt to assess 
linkage effects in South Africa. 
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5.1.1 Empirics of the New Economic Geography 
Turning to empirical applications of NEG first, it is noteworthy that they 
still lag their theoretical counterparts in terms of quantity and coherence, de-
spite a recent surge in publications (Head and Mayer, 2004, 2611 and Brak-
man and Garretsen, 2006, 569). In his critical assessment of NEG, Martin 
finds this to be embedded in the very nature of the models that to him "[ ... ] 
do not lend themselves easily to empirical estimation or application, since 
they are typically too abstract, over simplified and too idealised." (Mar-
tin, 1999, 70) Empirical work therefore mostly limits itself to the testing of 
certain properties of the models. 
Krugman offered first insights into agglomeration effects by calculating 
locational Gini coefficients as an index of industry concentration (Krugman, 
1991b, 54ff.). These coefficients compare the incidence of particular indus-
tries in regions to total manufacturing production. Krugman finds high con-
centration for most US industries. Ellison and Glaeser substantially enrich 
this concept in two contributions (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, 1999). They 
measure industry concentration against an accidental distribution and still 
find concentration in most sectors. Yet they caution that often, agglomera-
tion will result from natural advantages (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997). In their 
second paper they try to empirically isolate the effect of natural advantages 
(or first nature) on concentration and find that "about 20% of observed 
geographic concentration can be explained by a small set of advantages." 
(Ellison and Glaeser, 1999, 315). Apart from indices of concentration, Head 
and Mayer (2004) provide an exhaustive overview of empirical tests on var-
ious propositions of the New Economic Geography. 
Regarding linkage effects in particular, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) mea-
sure coagglomeration of industries with strong upstream-downstream rela-
tionships. For the constructed pairs of industries 77 out of 100 downstream 
industries that are heavily using one input are locally coagglomerated with 
the upstream producer (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, 917) which is a strong 
indication that vertical linkage effects are indeed at play in spatial agglom-
eration processes. Building on the multi-sector VL model presented in Puga 
and Venables (1996) and in Fujita et al. (2001 ), Forslid et al. (2002) cal-
ibrate a 14 sector model with a complete input-output structure derived 
from IO-matrices to study the effects of economic integration, which they 
simulate by a fall in trade costs over time, on industry concentration for four 
European regions. 
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However, these results have to be interpreted with care. Hypotheses 
derived from NEG models are often equivalent to hypotheses derived from 
other theories-thus their empirical testing and corroboration is "not nec-
essarily evidence of the relevance of NEG, but could support competing 
theories and hypotheses." (Brakman and Garretsen, 2007, 99) Ottaviano 
(2007) points to a second identification problem: the 'within-equivalence' 
of vertical linkages models and those NEG models based on factor mobility 
(e.g. the core-periphery model). He shows that the 'footloose entrepreneur' 
(FE) model, a variation of the core-periphery model, has the same struc-
tural features and equivalent equilibrium properties to the vertical linkages 
footloose entrepreneur (VLFE) model, a variation of the vertical linkages 
models. Thus, observed agglomeration could stem from either labour mo-
bility as predicted in the core-periphery setting or from linkages, but it is 
not possible to uniquely attribute it to one of the two effects (Ottaviano, 
2007, 64). 
To my knowledge, there is no empirical work investigating agglomeration 
due to linkage effects in South Africa. However, a number of contributions 
try to estimate concentration tendencies with respect to manufacturing in-
dustries in South Africa and the Southern African region, in particular the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). McCarthy provides a 
qualitative assessment of the potential effects of a free trade area established 
in SADC and suggests that some polarisation in favour of South Africa due 
to agglomeration effects as described in the new economic geopgraphy is to 
be expected (McCarthy, 1999). For a similar purpose, Petersson (2002) cal-
culates centrality and concentration indices for SADC countries and South 
African provinces. He finds strong evidence for a core periphery structure 
( with South Africa as the regional core and the Gauteng region as core region 
of South Africa) and concentration of production in industry, particularly 
in labour and scale intensive sectors. In more recent work, Hess (2005) uses 
the locational Gini coefficient to establish that while some industries tend 
to concentrate in the core of SADC, there is also some concentration in 
peripheral countries (e.g. textiles and wearing apparel). Heavy industries 
such as industrial chemicals, iron and steel and non-ferrous metals are in-
creasingly located in South Africa however (Hess, 2005, 52). Fedderke and 
Szalontai (2005) re-establish these results for manufacturing sectors within 
South Africa and also find that the high levels of concentration are harmful 
for output and productivity growth. 
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5.1.2 Linkage Effects in South Africa 
While there is a shortage of empirical work on South Africa with explicit 
reference to the NEG framework, that cannot be said about linkage effects 
in general. 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) base their seminal work on industrial devel-
opment on detailed examinations of input-output linkages, particularly with 
reference to the MEC. They show that mining and closely related manu-
facturing industries are a cohesive unit, with almost 60% of MEC-inputs 
stemming from the MEC itself and close to 30% of its output returned to 
the MEC (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 81). Non-MEC manufacturing on the 
other hand displays only weak linkages to the MEC. 
The importance of linkages has also been stressed in a number of sectoral 
case studies recently. Roberts (2006, 166) analyses the metal products sector 
and finds that the most important input-basic iron and steel from within 
the confines of the MEC-is largely supplied by Iscor, the South African steel 
monopolist. Thus, the competitiveness of firms in the sector depends to a 
large extent on the pricing of this key input. Studies of the chemicals and 
plastics sector (see Roberts, 2001; Dobreva, 2006) reach similar conclusions: 
the downstream sector, in this case plastic firms, are strongly using chemicals 
as an input, and again suffer from the market power of large upstream 
producers. 
The most recent and also most exhaustive work in this vain, which is not 
limited to sector case studies but aims to provide an overview over the whole 
economy is Tregenna (2007). Her study shows total backward linkages are 
strongest in the manufacturing sector (using a standard-type classification), 
thus the provision of an additional unit of output of manufacturing goods 
would require the production of 2, 14 additional units of total output. Back-
ward linkage effects for agriculture, mining and services are significantly 
lower (1, 89, 1, 76, and 1, 81 respectively) (Tregenna, 2007, 105). Tregenna 
also calculates employment multipliers (how many jobs would be created if 
final demand for a sector's output increases by one million Rand) and finds 
them to be higher in services than in manufacturing. These results have 
to be interpreted carefully however due to the well-known problems in the 
measurement of employment in South Africa. Unfortunately she does not 
report results for more deeply disaggregated data, which would be interest-
ing from the perspective of this study. She also uses the standard distinction 
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between manufacturing and mining activities, and thus does not distinguish 
between MEC and non-MEC manufacturing. 
5.2 Testing for Linkage Effects-A SVAR Approach 
Rather then testing for agglomeration effects, and thus inviting the identifi-
cation problems referred to above, I choose a different, indirect strategy to 
analyse the significance of linkage effects. Following a paper by Abeysinghe 
and Forbes (2005), who engage in a similar exercise with regards to interna-
tional trade relations, a structural VAR is developed that tests the effects 
of a shock in one sector on the other sectors in the economy. In the trans-
mission of shocks, the role of linkages is explicitly catered for. 
I will first introduce the vector auto-regression (VAR) and the structural 
VAR method, and then describe the specific model, data and results in 
detail. 
5.2.1 Structural VARs 
Originally, econometricians treated time series data not any different from 
other data and formulated traditional regression models. However, non-
stationarity of many economic variables led to 'spurious' results and trig-
gered the development of a different approach based on time series analysis-
the Box-Jenkins approach (Kennedy, 2003, 319f.). Instead of relying on ex-
planatory variables deducted from economic theory, the past values of the 
variable in question were used to predict its future development. "Thus in 
essence it is a sophisticated method of extrapolation." (ibid.). 
The dependent variable is first differentiated sufficiently to render it sta-
tionary. Then it is expressed in its own past values and current and past error 
terms-leading to the acronym ARIMA ( autoregressive integrated moving 
average). Once the appropriate model (lag length, number of differentia-
tions) is selected, it can be used to forecast the dependent variable. Be-
cause ARIMA-models outperformed traditional economists' formulations, 
they were adapted and extended to a multivariate setting, producing the 
so-called VAR models. 
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Vector Autoregression 
The vector autoregression approach was introduced by Sims (1980). He 
stated that existing large simultaneous equation models "contain too many 
incredible restrictions" (ibid., 14) and therefore introduced the VAR ap-
proach, where all variables in the system are endogenous and depend on their 
own and all the other variables' lagged values. There are thus no restrictions 
introduced a priori, which also implies that the approach is atheoretical. 
The variables can then be written down as a vector which is explained 
by its own lagged values plus an error vector. The characteristics and limi-
tations of the VAR approach are now explained in more detail by using the 
example of a bivariate system with one lag. This presentation follows the 
outline in Enders (1995, 294ff.). 
Assume that the time paths of the two variables Yt and Zt mutually affect 
each other. Then 
Yt = b10 - b12Zt + 'YllYt-1 + ,12Zt-l + Eyt (5.1) 
Zt = b20 - b21Yt + 'Y21Yt-1 + ')'22Zt-l + Ezt (5.2) 
Assume further that Yt and Zt are both stationary, and that the error terms 
Eyt and Ezt are uncorrelated white noise disturbances with standard devia-
tions ay and az. In the above equations, there is a contemporaneous effect 
of Yt on Zt and vice versa~their size being expressed in b12 and b21, respec-
tively. The epsilons are pure shocks in the two variables. However, these 
equations are not reduced-form equations. The endogenous variables of the 
system (Yt and zt) appear on the right hand side as well, thus violating a core 
assumption of linear regressions. The reason for this violation is that these 
regressors are correlated with the error terms due to the interdepence of the 
various endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously (Kennedy, 
2003, 180). To lend themselves to estimations, they have to be rewritten 
in their reduced form, so that every endogenous variable is expressed as a 
function of exogenous (including lagged endogenous) variables. 
Using matrix algebra, 5.1 and 5.2 become 
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or in short form: Bxt = r0 + r 1xt-l + ft, This can be premultiplied by B-1 
to get Xt = B-1 ro + B-1 r1Xt-l + B- 1ft, Simplifying notation allows us to 
rewrite this equation as Xt =Ao+ A1Xt-1 + Ct or, expressed in explicit form, 
Yt =aw+ auYt-I + a12Zt-1 + Cit (5.4) 
(5.5) 
where aiO are the elements of Ao, aij of matrix A1, and Cit of vector Ct, This is 
the so-called standard or reduced form of the VAR, and equations 5.4 and 5.5 
can be estimated. Note however that the error terms Cit are now composed 
of the two original shocks Eyt and Ezt• Thus, without further restrictions, 
the impact of one of these pure shocks on the dependent variables cannot 
be identified. Formally, 
Thus, B- 1ft reveals the error terms 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
As before, b12 and b21 are the parameters that indicate the contemporaneous 
effect of one variable on the other. If they are non-zero, then the structural 
shocks cannot be identified from the estimated (standard form) VAR The 
errors Cit do have the desirable properties of being stationary, i.e. having 
zero means, a constant variance and zero autocovariances (Enders, 1995, 
296) and thus do fulfill the preconditions for an OLS estimation. On the 
other hand, their covariance will typically be non-zero, so the two error 
terms will be correlated. 
Identification 
5.1 and 5.2 cannot be estimated directly, but 5.4 and 5.5 can be. OLS will 
yield estimates for the parameters aio and a;J and we can calculate variances 
and the covariance of the residuals, var(cit) and cov(c1t, C2t), But the nine 
estimates are not enough to identify the original equations that have ten 
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unknowns, biO, rij, and the standard deviations f7y and f7z. Identification 
requires additional restrictions of the original system. 
One possible restriction is to set one of the coefficients of 5.1 and 5.2 
equal to zero. If, for example, b21 = 0, then Yt has no contemporaneous 
effect on Zt, and the system is exactly identified. The original time series 
can be rewritten as 
Yt = bw - b12Zt + rl1Yt-l + ,12Zt-l + Eyt 
Zt = b20 + r21Yt-1 + r22Zt-1 + Ezt 
The error terms of the reduced form become 





This form of identification is called a Choleski decomposition (Enders, 1995, 
303). The error terms show that the contemporaneous effect of Yt on Zt 
being zero can be restated as the original shocks Eyt and Ezt both influencing 
Yt, but Zt being only affected by Ezt· 
Impulse Responses 
In order to trace the effects of shocks on the variables over time, the vector 
autoregressive system needs to be rewritten in its moving average form. 
This is accomplished in analogy to the representation of a single variable 
autoregression in moving average form. Take a simple AR(l)-process 
Yt = rpYt-1 + Et 
If rp = 1, this process represents a random walk and thus is non-stationary. 
However, the first difference of the random walk is stationary since Et is 
stationary. We thus call the random walk integrated of order one (1(1)). In 
order to test for stationarity, so-called 'unit roots tests' test for this very 
characteristic. If rp -< 1, the series is stationary, in case it is above one, it 
would explode. We assume that Yt is stationary and can then express it as 
a moving average process. 
Yt-1 = rpYt-2 + Et-1 ==> Yt = rp2Yt-2 + rpEt-1 + Et 
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Yt-2 = 'PYt-3 + Et-2 ::::} Yt = cp3Yt-3 + cp2Et-2 + 'PEt-1 + ft 
Since cp --< I, 
Yt =Et+ 'Pft-1 + cp2Et-2 + cp3Et-3 + , .. + cpqEt-q 
The moving average representation of the VAR also requires stationarity. 
We use matrix notation as above and have 
Xt =Ao+ A1Xt-1 + et 
Recursive replacement yields 
and, after replacing n times 
n 
Xt =(I+ A1 +Ar+ ... + A1)Ao + Af+lxt-(n+l) + L A{et-n 
i=O 
In case of stability (A1 disappears as n grows towards infinity) the above 
equation can be rewritten as 
Xt = µ + L Alet-i 
where µ = [y z] t. Equivalently 
[ ;;] [;] + 2:: [ ::~ ::~r [ :::=:] 
where 
(5.12) 
_ [a20(l - a11) + a21a10] z = -----------
(I - a11)(l -a22) -a12a21 
The current value of vector Xt is expressed as a sequence of error terms eit, 
whose effect on Xt can now be traced through time. Note however that these 
again are the composed errors and not the structural shocks Eit- To identify 
the effect of a structural shock, first rewrite 5.6 and 5. 7 in matrix form 
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Replace the vector eit in 5.12 by the above expression to get 
-b12] [Eyt-i] 
1 Ezt-i 
In order to simplify notation, define matrix <Pi as 
with elements <Pjk(i). Thus, the VAR can be rewritten in a moving average 
form of the original shocks 
(5.13) 
The coefficients <Pjk(i) can now be interpreted as impulse responses. For 
example, ¢12 (0) is the immediate impact of a shock in Ezt on Yt-the so called 
impact multiplier. Similarly, ¢22 (1) represents the impact of a shock in Ezt-l 
on Zt. They can be plotted against i to yield the impulse response functions, 
or added up to yield the cumulated impulse responses. For illustration, take 
a single variable AR( 1) process of the form Yi = 0, 6Yi-1 +Et. A change of Et 
of one unit changes Yi by one unit. In the subsequent period, the change in 
Yi+1 is 0.6, in period two 0.62 and so forth. The impulse response function 
in this simple case thus would be </>(i) = (0.6f 
Yet, the crucial problem of identification remains to be solved. One 
possible solution that was explained above is to set one of the parameters 
expressing the contemporaneous effect of one variable on the other equal 
to zero. Sticking with the assumption taken above, b21 = 0 (Yt has no 
contemporaneous effect on zt), the error terms reduce to 5.10 and 5.11. This 
method is also called "ordering of the variables" (Enders, 1995, 307) because 
a shock in Zt affects both series, while a shock in Yt does not instantly impact 
on Zt- Zt is thus called 'prior' to Yt• The observed errors e2t can be attributed 
fully to the structural shock Ezt, and the sequence Eyt can be calculated with 
the help of 5.10. 
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Clearly, the ordering of variables is very important in this procedure 
and runs counter to the original advantage of VARs-that they do not re-
quire prior restrictions of the system. Ideally, the decision of how to order 
variables is motivated by economic theory, yet that is not always possible. 
Not surprisingly, this aspect is one of the major points of criticism of VARs 
voiced by a large number of authors (Kennedy, 2003, 347). Structural VARs 
as presented in the next section attempt to address this issue. 
Structural VAR analysis 
With little or no theoretical input, one has to be careful in interpreting 
the results of VARs identified in the way described above. It is useful in 
describing relationships between selected variables and in forecasting, but 
little can be said about causalities. 
As a remedy, some authors have proposed identification procedures that 
are motivated explicitly by economic theory. Sims, in estimating a six-
variable VAR, proposes coefficient restrictions in the matrix B that are con-
sistent with economic theory (Enders, 1995, 330). Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) on the other hand restrict the cumulative effect of a demand shock, 
setting the respective I:¢> = 0. The underlying assumption is that only a 
supply shock has a permanent effect on output. In the following section, 
linkages and sectoral development will be analyzed using another form of 
structural VAR analysis as proposed by Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005). 
5.2.2 Linkages and Sectoral Development 
As motivated above, I seek to investigate whether linkages between economic 
sectors are present and how large their contribution to individual sectoral 
development is. Methodologically I try to solve this puzzle by using an 
SVAR approach which not only allows to consider the direct input-output 
linkages between individual sectors, but also indirect effects that are not 
captured in 10-tables. 1 
The Econometric Model 
The model is based on a structural VAR model developed by Abeysinghe 
and Forbes (2005), which they used for the analysis of trade linkages and 
1This section is based upon joint work with Michael Wild (Schwank and Wild 2008) 
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output multiplier effects between countries. In our model the trade linkages 
are replaced by the linkages between sectors-stemming from intermediate 
inputs used in a sector that come from the rest of the economy. The reduced 
form representation of the output linkages is derived as follows. 
Let Y be an individual sector's production, which is a composite of 
Y = IM +A (5.14) 
where IM is the sector's output used as input in other sectors (intermediate 
output) and A is the part of output that is going to final consumption, 
exports and that is used in its own production. Rewriting equation (5.14) 
in a way where IM represents the sum of all the intermediate output going 
to the other (n-1) sectors gives 
n-1 
y = L I Mj + A 
j=l 
We rewrite equation (5.15) in terms of growth rates to get 
dY/Y-1/Y [~dIM; +dA] 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
In a next step, we assume that the intermediate output to sector j can be 
formulated as a function of total output in sector j. 
IM1 = IM1(Yj) 
Differentiating (5.17) with respect to Yj gives 
dIM1 = (8IM1/8Y1)dYj 
By inserting (5.18) into (5.16) we finally get 
n-1 





where 171 = (8IM1/8Yj)(Yj/IM1) represents the elasticity of intermediate 
inputs flowing from the sector under scrutiny to sector j with respect to 
sector j's production. It is thus a measure of how strongly the intermediate 
output flowing to a specific sector will react to this sector's growth. By 
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assuming now that this elasticity is the same across sectors and adding time 
and industry subscripts we can then rewrite and simplify equation 5.19 as 
im + Yit = GiYit Uit (5.20) 
where a= (IM/Y)rJ and yim = "£(/Mj/IM)yj. The elasticity 'f/, assumed 
to be the same across sectors, can be taken out of the sum, which leaves 
other sectors's growth rates weighted by their contribution to the total in-
termediate output of the sector under scrutiny. The error term Uit captures 
omitted variables. 
The core proposition of this formulation is that sectoral growth depends 
on the growth performance of other sectors in the economy. The extent of 
direct influence is determined by the intermediate output linkage I Mj. Yet, 
the model also captures indirect effects. For example, if output growth in 
the furniture manufacturing sector slows down, this obviously has a direct 
effect on the demand for machinery. There is also an indirect effect as 
the demand for transportation also diminishes, and thus transportation's 
demand of machinery. All the other determinants of sectoral growth will 
show up in the error term. 
In a next step, and to amend our equations to econometric estimation, 
we transform the model and rewrite it as a structural vector autoregression. 
We thus assume that sectoral output performance can be explained by its 
own past output performance and the past output performance of all the 
other sectors in the economy. The latter enter weighted according to the 
linkage strength. This representation closely matches equation 5.20 where 
sectoral growth is explained by growth in the rest of the economy, weighted 
by the respective linkage strength. The transformation to an autoregressive 
process requires the assumption that the error terms Uit are correlated over 
time and across equations and that they follow a vector ARMA process as 
described in Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005, 359). Formally, 
p p 
Yit = Ai+ L <PjiYit-j + L /3jiYft-j + Eit (5.21) 
j=l j=O 
where Ai is a vector of constants, the first sum captures all sectors' own 
lagged values and the second present and past values of the other sectors 
weighted by linkages. More precisely, 
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n 
yft = L WijYjt 
j=l 
Wij, the elements of the weighting matrix, are the shares of total intermediate 
output of sector i that go to the other sectors j ( I Mj /IM). i -/- j. The sum of 
all shares of sector i's output to the other sectors must equal one. Equation 
(5.21) can be estimated separately for each sector of the economy. However, 
they can also be written as an SVAR system of equations. To illustrate, 
assume that there are three sectors in the economy, and the estimation 





or, in a compact form, 
[Yltl [All 2t .X2 + 
Y3t A3 
/311W13] [Ylt-1] [E1tl /312W23 Y2t-1 + E2t 
q>33 · Y3t-1 E3t 
(Bo· W)Yt =A+ (B1 · W)Yt-1 + Et (5.22) 
where (·) stands for the element-products of the matrices. The matrix on 
the left hand side captures contemporaneous effects of the time series on 
each other, the 3x3 matrix on the right hand side captures the effect of own 
lagged values (1Jii) and lagged values of the time series on each other (/31i)-
The major difference of this approach to other SVAR works as stressed by 
Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005, 360) is that the model is overidentified as the 
elements of the weighting matrix Wij are known, and that we do not have to 
assume that the error terms Eit are uncorrelated as is usually the case, but 
can explicitly test for it. 
Data Description 
The model is applied to a number of settings at different levels of aggrega-
tion. A list of these sectors and the abbreviations used henceforth can be 
found in Table 5.1. 
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Our data set stems from the Quantec database, a commercial database 
which collects economic data for South Africa from different sources. The 
time period covered is 1970 to 2007, so we have 37 observations per time 
series. A highly aggregated sector composition-we look at the development 
of output in agriculture, mining, the secondary and the tertiary sector-
constitutes our first layer of analysis. Unit roots tests confirm their presence, 
thus output enters in log first differences in the estimation. In order to 
assess the relevance of the MEC concept for sectoral development, we use 
two specifications, where the second divides the secondary sector in MEC 
activities (excluding mining) and non-MEC manufacturing. Figure 1 in the 
appendix shows the development of total output in these 5 sectors. 
The corresponding weighting matrices that we need in the VAR are cal-
culated by using data on the intermediate input used in each sector stemming 
from the rest of the economy. Crucially, we only consider domestic inter-
mediate inputs, because only they will induce a backward linkage locally. 
This differentiation between domestic and total linkage effects is not always 
made in related analysis, perhaps due to a lack of data. Again, the Quan-
tee database provides this information. Although we could have used only 
one weighting matrix for the whole period, we decided taking the accurate 
weighting matrix for each year, as this captures the change in input linkages 
over time. An exemplary matrix that indicates linkages between sectors is 
presented in Section 5.2.2-note that, in line with the model specification, 
the intermediate input stemming from the sector itself has been set to zero. 
Upon inspection, we see that the secondary sector is a large consumer of 
intermediate goods from other sectors, thus potentially and not surprisingly 
the sector with the most pulling power in the economy. 
The second data set consists of a sample of output development and 
input linkages from 1970 to 2007 for the nine 2-digit sectors of the economy 
and is also taken from the Quantec database. Figure 2 in the appendix shows 
the individual sector's development over the whole period in absolute values. 
Again, we performed a unit root test in the level values and unsurprisingly 
detected it in almost every sector. Due to this and also to reflect the model's 
formulation in growth rates, the data is transformed into log first differences 
as well. 
Lastly, we look at 10 manufacturing subsectors, applying the same pro-
cedure. Figure 3 in the appendix displays their output performance over the 
period under scrutiny. The outlier in sectoral development is the Petroleum, 
Chemicals and Plastics sector. It performed strongly throughout the last 37 
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Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Pet, NMM, Basic Metals, Electricity 
Secondary Sector (Man, Elec, Cons)* 
All Services 
2-digit Sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing* 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Trade, catering and accommodation services 
Transport, storage and communication 
Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate 
Community, social and personal services 
3-digit sectors 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and leather 
Wood and paper; publishing and printing 
Petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastic 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Metals, metal products, machinery and equipment 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
Radio, TV, instruments, watches and clocks 
Transport equipment 
Furniture and other manufacturing 
Table 5.1: Sectoral abbreviations, *when MEC is included, Sec and Man 
represent non-MEC manufacturing 
years and did particularly well in the second half of the 1990s. Another 
important sector that grew strongly since the democratic opening is the 
Transport Equipment sector, reflecting the success of the industrial policy 
intervention in this specific area, the Motor Industry Development Pro-
gramme. 
In terms of linkages, there is no one sector within manufacturing that 
possesses a dominance equivalent to the manufacturing sector as a whole on 
a higher level. Overall, Transport Equipment draws the largest amount of 
inputs from other sectors-in accordance with the common understanding 
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that automotive production is desirable because of its widespread linkages 
and thus justifying the support the sector receives. 
Estimation Results 
The estimation follows the approach by Zellner and Palm (1974) which esti-
mates the model in the tradition of a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
model instead of using the standard SVAR approach. Thus, equation 5.21 is 
estimated for each sector separately. It can then be rewritten and expressed 
as a SVAR system so that impulse responses can be calculated. 
Due to the fact that we only have yearly observations, we can include 
only one lag of each sector. We estimated the model in 01S, 2S1S and 3S1S. 
For the latter two approaches the residual correlations have been calculated 
and the Breusch-Pagan test on the diagonality of the residual-correlation 
matrix has been applied. Even though this test rejects the null of diago-
nality for some of the specifications ( those involving 9 and 10 sectors), we 
decided to use the 3S1S estimates for our further analysis, as the number 
of significant correlation coefficients is lowest when compared to the 2S1S 
or 01S estimates. Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 display these coefficients for the 
three data sets, in the specification separating MEC activities from the rest 
of manufacturing. The other matrices are available on request, the number 
of significant non-zero correlations does not change, however. Those error 
term correlations that are significant at the 5% are printed in bold letters. 
For the highest level of aggregation there are no correlations significantly 
different from zero, indicating that the model is correctly specified. In the 
case of 9 (10 when one considers MEC manufacturing separately) sectors 
there are only 2. However, the 10 manufacturing subsectors include 9 statis-
tically significant correlations, two of which are negative which is certainly 
surprising. This might be due to poor data quality or improper specification, 
it definitely implies that results must be interpreted very carefully for this 
level of aggregation because there are unresolved problems in the estimation. 
Impulse Response Analysis 
To answer the question about the direct and indirect impact of a change 
in one sector on the other sectors we use impulse response analysis (Hamil-
ton, 1994). To this end we use the model estimated above and calculate 
the recursive relationships according to the VAR-results. This allows us to 
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agri min mec man tert 
agri 1.000 
min -0.019 1.000 
mec -0.184 0.204 1.000 
man -0.209 0.047 0.256 1.000 
tert 0.170 0.291 0.216 -0.018 1.000 
Table 5.2: Correlation for 3818 
Agri Min MEC Man Elec Cons Trade TrSC Finl Comm 
Agri 1.00 
Min -0.19 1.00 
MEC -0.09 0.03 1.00 
Man -0.18 -0.22 0.23 1.00 
Elec 0.39 -0.15 0.07 -0.07 1.00 
Cons -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.14 0.28 1.00 
Trade 0.19 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.16 -0.03 1.00 
TrSC 0.28 -0.15 0.48 -0.07 0.27 -0.09 0.01 1.00 
Finl 0.13 0.19 0.05 -0.25 -0.23 0.01 0.07 -0.03 1.00 
Comm 0.03 0.28 0.09 -0.23 0.22 -0.16 0.05 0.11 0.26 1.00 
Table 5.3: Correlation for 3818, bold indicates significance at the 5 % level 
isolate the effect of a unit shock in one sector on all the other sectors in the 
model. Technically, and as explained above in the theoretical section, the 
autoregressive system has to be transformed into a moving average form. 
The procedure is equivalent to the exposition in the theoretical section on 
impulse responses; starting with (5.22), by recursive replacement, we arrive 
at 
00 
Yt = L ctut-i (5.23) 
i=O 
where Ut-i = (Bo• w)-1Et-i and C1 = (Bo· w)- 1(B1 · W). The impulse 
response matrix thus is C{ ( Bo • w)-1 . 
Looking at the overall economy at the highest level of aggregation first, 
the change of sectoral shares between 1970 and 2007 reveals that the ter-
tiary sector has gained in importance, mostly at the expense of the primary 
sector, while the secondary sector remained roughly stable. A closer look, 
distinguishing between MEC and non-MEC manufacturing, reveals however 
that the latter declined in importance quite substantially, while MEC ac-
tivities became more dominant (see Figure 5.1). Any statement about the 
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Food Tex Wood Pet NMM Met ElecM Rad Trans Furn 
Food 1.00 
Tex -0.07 1.00 
Wood -0.21 0.31 1.00 
Pet -0.37 0.18 0.05 1.00 
NMM -0.25 0.17 0.41 -0.18 1.00 
Met 0.03 0.49 0.08 -0.04 0.16 1.00 
ElecM 0.42 0.34 0.04 0.15 -0.29 0.12 1.00 
Rad 0.42 0.25 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.62 1.00 
Trans -0.09 -0.38 0.31 -0.02 0.32 -0.22 -0.19 -0.23 1.00 
Furn 0.20 -0.03 -0.09 0.12 0.14 -0.21 0.08 0.12 0.34 1.00 
Table 5.4: Correlation for 3SLS, bold indicates significance at the 5 % level 
declining dependence of South Africa on its mining sector must therefore be 
qualified. 
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Figure 5.1: Share of Sectoral Output in Total Output in 1970 and 2007, 
Source: Quantec 
On the other hand, a look at the weighting matrices used in the estima-
tion (Table 5.5 shows an exemplary matrix for the year 2007) highlights the 
nonetheless central role of the secondary sector in the economy. The pre-
sentation of linkages is slightly unusual, so it requires explanation. Usually, 
the intermediate inputs used in a certain industry are displayed in rows, 
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Agri Min Sec Tert Agri Min MEC Sec Tert 
used in Intermediates from used in Intermediates stemming from 
Agri 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06 Agri 0.00 0.00 0,07 0,07 0.06 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.15 Min 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.17 
Sec 0.97 0.96 0.00 0.79 MEC 0.02 0.79 0.00 0.13 0.29 
Tert 0.03 0.04 0.82 0.00 Sec 0.96 0.16 0.49 0.00 0.48 
Tert 0.03 0.05 0.39 0.73 0.00 
Table 5.5: Share of intermediate inputs stemming from sectors (column) 
used in sector (row), 2007. Source: Quantec 
with each industry represented in a column. Here, the matrix has been 
transposed (for reasons that will hopefully become clear immediately), so 
each sector and the input it uses are to be found in the respective rows. The 
columns thus stand for the intermediate inputs domestically produced in the 
agricultural sector, and flowing to the rest of the economy-the intermedi-
ate input that remains within the sector has been set to zero in accordance 
with the theoretical model. These input flows to other sectors are reported 
as shares of total intermediate input goods produced in the respective sec-
tor. Therefore, they represent backward linkages-an expansion in a sector 
will increase its demand for intermediates, and thus induce expansion of 
production in upstream sectors. 
In terms of the sectors analysed here, the secondary sector is by far the 
largest consumer of intermediate inputs. For example, more than 97% of 
agricultural goods that are used as intermediate inputs in the rest of the 
economy go to the secondary sector. Albeit agriculture being the strongest 
case, the centrality of manufacturing is also evident for the other sectors. 
The introduction of the MEC as a separate sector slightly changes this 
picture. Overall, the secondary sector, now encompassing only non-MEC 
manufacturing, still is the single largest demander of intermediates. Yet, 
as expected, and justifying this specific aggregation, intermediate mining 
goods are overwhelmingly used in the MEC. 
Impulse responses to unit shocks in all sectors reveal a strong convergence 
to zero after 4 years. Table 5.6 thus displays the cumulated effects of a one-
unit shock in each of the sectors on the other sectors over a period of four 
years. The table must be interpreted as follows: the shock in a certain 
industry has an accumulated effect on all the other industries as displayed 
in the respective row. For example, in the 4-sector setting a one-unit shock 
in the secondary sector leads to a 0.338 unit increase of output in agriculture 
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Agri Min Sec Tert 
Shock in Cumulated impulse response 
Agri 0.742 0.033 0.056 0.070 
Min -0.040 1.198 -0.121 -0.258 
Sec 0.338 0.592 1.049 0.505 













Min MEC Sec 
Cumulated impulse response 
0.026 0.040 0.041 
1.327 -0.070 -0.084 
0.563 1.101 0.113 
0.355 0.408 1.330 







Table 5.6: Cumulated impulse response after 4 periods 
and relatively strong movements in other sectors of the economy as well-a 
result in line with the strong linkages detected in the manufacturing sector. 
The impacts of unit shocks in agriculture and mining are negligible, in the 
case of mining they are even negative. Lastly, spillovers from the services 
sector are smaller than those from manufacturing, but they are significant 
nonetheless, particularly when compared to agriculture and mining. Again, 
this is in line with linkage strength. 
Once the MEC is considered separately, it becomes clear that the ex-
pansionary spillovers we observe from unit shocks in the secondary sector 
are mostly due to non-MEC manufacturing. An expansion of the MEC has 
a positive spillover on mining, but the effects on other sectors are compara-
tively small. A unit shock in MEC industries only leads to a 0.113 increase 
in manufacturing output in this specification, and growth spillovers to agri-
cultural and services production are also much smaller than those observed 
with non-MEC manufacturing. 
For a more detailed analysis, we looked at the nine ( ten when MEC 
is stated separately) 2-digit sectors ( disaggregating the secondary and the 
tertiary sectors). Graph 5.2 reestablishes the falling role of mining itself 
but the surge in MEC manufacturing activities. The growth in services was 
particularly strong in the transport, storage and communication, and in the 
financial intermediation, insurance and real estate sectors. 
The corresponding weighting matrices are reported in the appendix ( see 
Tables 3 and 4). With regards to the impulse responses, we can confirm 
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Figure 5.2: Share of Sectoral Output in Total Output in 1970 and 2007, 
Source: Quantec 
Agri Min Man Elec Cons Trad Ti-SC Finl Comm 
Shock in Cumulated impulse response 
Agri 0.736 0.022 0.034 0.036 0.023 0.034 0.026 0.041 0.053 
Min 0.009 1.240 0.019 0.039 0.020 0.020 0.037 0.025 0.021 
Man 0.558 0.711 1.196 0.725 0.318 0.650 0.409 0.858 0.587 
Elec 0.005 0.045 0.011 1.711 0.044 0.010 0.007 0.019 0.007 
Cons 0.160 0.227 0.343 0.233 2.250 0.259 0.162 0.403 0.195 
Trad 0.133 0.170 0.266 0.395 0.541 1.664 0.364 0.862 0.237 
Ti-SC 0.132 0.175 0.278 0.408 0.289 0.391 1.420 0.544 0.229 
Finl 0.072 0.106 0.154 0.190 0.405 0.196 0.172 2.656 0.293 
Comm 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.018 0.025 0.018 0.013 0.041 1.408 
Table 5.7: Cumulated impulse response after 4 periods 
the findings of the above specification at a higher level (see Tables 5.7 and 
5.8). Agriculture and mining provide virtually no spillovers to the rest of 
the economy, while manufacturing appears to have significant pulling power. 
Interestingly, the construction sector has comparatively strong effects, given 
its size. Of the services sectors, community, social and personal services 
have by far the weakest effect, which is to be expected in the short run. 
Once the MEC is reported separately (Table 5.8), we again find its 
pulling power small in comparison to the rest of the manufacturing sector 
(with the obvious exception of the mining industry). This is notable also 
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Agri Min MEC Man Elec Cons Trad TrSC Finl Comm 
Shock in Cumulated impulse response 
Agri 0.737 0.031 0.037 0.040 0.049 0.039 0.043 0.032 0.062 0.056 
Min 0.007 1.223 0.011 0.012 0.024 0.014 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.013 
MEC 0.163 0.728 1.111 0.279 0.637 0.315 0.362 0.308 0.611 0.343 
Man 0.822 0.629 0.651 1.522 0.834 0.612 0.882 0.487 1.224 0.709 
Elec 0.028 0.190 0.043 0.052 1.799 0.188 0.050 0.034 0.091 0.036 
Cons 0.211 0.319 0.364 0.386 0.346 2.366 0.342 0.221 0.550 0.257 
Trad 0.312 0.385 0.410 0.550 0.751 0.972 1.916 0.584 1.452 0.456 
TrSC 0.265 0.369 0.412 0.482 0.717 0.596 0.649 1.492 0.976 0.403 
Finl 0.150 0.205 0.211 0.273 0.337 0.600 0.326 0.258 2.793 0.397 
Comm 0.047 0.064 0.069 0.085 0.108 0.138 0.103 0.070 0.206 1.372 
Table 5.8: Cumulated impulse response after 4 periods 
because the MEC is a significant consumer of intermediates from a number 
of sectors-yet this conventional backward linkage is not reflected to the 
same extent in the impulse response results. 
Lastly, we have also attempted to model spillovers within the subsectors 
of manufacturing. As reported above, a substantial part of the error correla-
tions in this specification are non-zero, which points to a misspecification of 
the model. Omitted variables are a likely cause, since we limit ourselves to a 
subsection of the economy here. Sectoral growth in the rest of the economy 
should be controlled for and we intend to do so in a follow up version of the 
paper. Therefore the following results have to be interpreted carefully and 
should be regarded as a first and tentative evaluation of the manufacturing 
subsectors. 
Sectoral output shares in 1970 and 2007 (Figure 5.3) reveals the petroleum 
products, chemicals and plastics sector as the star performer within man-
ufacturing over the last 37 years. Only transport equipment has gained in 
importance in a comparable manner-probably reflecting to an extent the 
efforts of the Motor Industry Development Programme. On the downside, 
labour-intensive sectors such as food and beverages and textiles now repre-
sent a much smaller part of total manufacturing, and the same is true for 
the metal, metal products and machinery sector. 
The weighting matrix, printed for 2007 in the appendix (Table 5), fur-
ther corroborates the positive role the transport equipment sector is playing 
in the economy: it is the sector with potentially the greatest pulling power, 
being the most important user of intermediate inputs from a variety of sec-
tors. Other than transport equipment, food and beverages, the petroleum 
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Figure 5.3: Share of Sectoral Output in Total Manufacturing Output in 1970 
and 2007, Source: Quantec 
products and chemicals sector significantly use intermediates from the rest 
of manufacturing sectors. 
Results of the estimation and the corresponding impulse responses (Table 
5.9) largely confirm these results. A unit shock in the transport equipment 
sector induces a 0.896 unit output increase in electrical machinery produc-
tion, a 0. 781 increase in textiles and clothing and a 0. 760 increase in the 
metal products and machinery sector. Other sectors are pulled along as 
well. In contrast to the pure input linkages, the metal products and ma-
chinery sector creates stronger spillovers, particularly when compared to the 
petroleum products and chemicals sector. Given that the latter belongs to 
the MEC, these results provide a further hint ( caution is due because of the 
specification problems) that MEC activities provide less of a spillover to the 
rest of the economy (in this case manufacturing) than non-MEC activities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out with a hypothesis derived from economic theory and the 
actual development experience of South Africa: that linkages are important 
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Food Tex Wood Pet NMM Met ElecM Rad Trans Furn 
Shock in Cumulated impulse response 
Food 1.332 0.067 0.083 0.090 0.092 0.074 0.066 0.056 0.096 0.053 
Tex 0.519 1.071 0.077 0.159 0.085 0.094 0.079 0.070 0.110 0.156 
Wood 0.115 0.079 0.987 0.149 0.049 0.067 0.057 0.076 0.073 0.176 
Pet 0.372 0.215 0.130 1.346 0.201 0.193 0.170 0.153 0.236 0.200 
NMM 0.068 0.064 0.061 0.099 1.003 0.085 0.065 0.053 0.087 0.057 
Met 0.198 0.231 0.136 0.331 0.194 1.223 0.437 0.312 0.312 0.251 
ElecM 0.079 0.080 0.064 0.164 0.117 0.190 1.113 0.338 0.099 0.128 
Rad 0.031 0.037 0.027 0.040 0.023 0.040 0.111 0.979 0.028 0.128 
Trans 0.508 0.781 0.227 0.583 0.475 0.760 0.896 0.723 1.442 0.380 
Furn 0.101 0.140 0.144 0.121 0.055 0.120 0.075 0.117 0.074 1.226 
Table 5.9: Cumulated impulse response after 4 periods 
in the sectoral growth process of an economy. They provide opportunities for 
local upstream and downstream producers and thus shape the development 
path of an economy. In the case of South Africa, economic development was 
and continues to be strongly influenced by its minerals endowment. The 
manufacturing industry evolved around the mining sector, initially serving 
its needs, and even today, within manufacturing subsectors, those activities 
close to the natural resources of the country still play an important role. 
We tried to empirically assess the strength of these linkages by estimating 
an SVAR model of sectoral output growth that explicitly incorporated the 
linkages between the various sectors in South Africa. With regards to the 
overall aggregations that we looked at first, the results strongly suggest that 
manufacturing as a whole is the sector with the greatest 'pulling power'in the 
economy, thereby justifying the continued attention it receives from policy 
makers. This is particularly true for those manufacturing activities that are 
not counted among the MEC. Positive shocks in the agricultural and mining 
sectors ( and, to a lesser extent, the MEC) lead to much smaller growth spurts 
in the rest of the economy, and the same is also true for tertiary sectors that 
are comparable in size to manufacturing. 
On a higher level of disaggregation, the growth performances of the ten 
subsectors within manufacturing in general are less dependent on each other, 
reflecting the fact that linkages to sectors outside manufacturing-neglected 
in this setting-play an important role. Linkage effects therefore have less 
explanatory power. The sector that stands out is the transport equipment 
sector that has by far the strongest growth effects on the rest of manufactur-
ing. Compared to simple linkage via intermediate inputs, we also observe 
a relatively prominent role of the metals, metal products and machinery 
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sector, which displays stronger growth impacts on the rest of manufacturing 
than the petroleum products and chemicals sector. 
The policy conclusions that can be drawn from this support a widely 
accepted stance in the literature and in policy circles: that South Africa will 
need to support its manufacturing sector to achieve higher overall growth 
rates, and that within manufacturing, more diversification and less reliance 
on capital-intensive sectors close to the mineral endowment such as chemicals 
is needed. It also vindicates support for the auto industry, given its central 
role within the manufacturing subsectors. 
152 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
Chapter 6 
Industrial Policy Revisited 
When reviewing South Africa's industrial development in Chapter Two, the 
goals, instruments chosen and outcomes of industrial policy have been high-
lighted consistently. After the theoretical and empirical work in Chapters 
Three to Five, I want to return to this theme now and take a closer look 
at very recent developments: the shifts of the South African government 
towards a more interventionist economic policy regime, noticeable since at 
least 2004, and explicitly linked also to a reformulation of industrial policy. 1 
Sectoral development and the linkages between these sectors have been 
the overarching focus of this thesis, and this chapter will attempt to re-
main within this framework. It will analyse the "National Industrial Policy 
Framework" (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007a), the main reference 
document for industrial policy makers, from this point of view. Particularly, 
I will try to assess whether this policy change is likely to facilitate more sec-
toral diversification-away from the dependence on resource-based sectors 
and towards more dynamically developing and possibly labour-intensive sec-
tors, also contributing to a healthier and more stable balance of payments. 
However, I will not limit myself to sectoral analysis but also try to locate this 
policy shift within a broader observable change in policy towards a develop-
mental state. An analysis of proposed measures, the actors and institutions 
involved in the process and a tentative evaluation of hitherto implementa-
tion in the realm of industrial policy provide a case study that allows to draw 
broader conclusions on South Africa's rocky path towards a developmental 
regime. 
1This section is based on Schwank (2008). 
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The concrete and applied policy steps that together make up the policy 
shift are taken from official policy documents. Additional insight is gained 
from interviews with key stakeholders and policy makers involved in the 
process and academic experts in the field that have closely followed the 
evolution of industrial policy since the advent of democracy. 
6.1 Developmental States 
The notion of the 'developmental state' was first introduced by Chalmers 
Johnson in his landmark study on trade and industrial policy in Japan 
(Johnson, 1982). In it he defines the Japanese state as a plan-rational or 
developmental state, differentiating it from the market-rationality of the 
United States (ibid., 18ff.). According to Johnson, a developmental state 
leads the industrialisation drive of the economy by pursuing strategic social 
and economic goals, usually with an emphasis on industrial policy. "In the 
plan-rational state, the government will give greatest precedence to indus-
trial policy, that is, to a concern with the structure of domestic industry 
and with promoting the structure that enhances international competitive-
ness." (ibid., 19). Johnson further asserts that a regulatory state like the US 
does not place emphasis on industrial structure, instead limiting itself to 
defining and monitoring the rules of the market process. 
Following Johnson, a number of authors have stressed the state's crucial 
contribution to growth performance, for example in East Asian countries 
like Taiwan and South Korea. The seminal works are Amsden (1989), Wade 
(1990) and Evans (1995), and an overview is provided in Chang (2006). 
This literature generally addresses two main questions: 1) What kind of 
interventions resulted in the phenomenal growth rates in these countries, 
and 2) Under which conditions did the incumbents choose to adopt and 
implement this set of policies successfully? Fine (2006, 103ft'.) uses these two 
guiding questions to divide the literature into an economic school focussing 
on the former question and a political school mainly concerned with the 
latter. Although authors of both schools would probably claim to have a 
broader research agenda, this distinction is useful for a brief summary of 
their main ideas. 
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6.1.1 Economic and Political Schools 
Alice Amsden, whose work shall serve as an example of the economic school, 
posits that development is about increases in productivity that are poten-
tially greatest in manufacturing. This is why developmental states like South 
Korea have subsidized the entry of entrepreneurs into the secondary sector 
at an early stage (Amsden, 1989, 2001). As the market process would not 
have led to diversification, due to a number of market failures, the policy 
makers deliberately had to "get prices wrong" (Amsden, 2001, 10), thereby 
setting incentives that facilitated manufacturing investment. For developing 
countries, the market failures most commonly identified in the literature are 
information and coordination externalities. The former relate to the uncer-
tainty of entrepreneurs with regards to the profitability of new investments. 
They do not know the exact costs involved in the exercise, and thus cannot 
know whether it should be pursued or not. In case of failure, the costs are en-
tirely borne by the entrepreneur, in case of success, the economy as a whole 
profits since the cost structure of the respective activity is now known and 
imitators will enter the industry and quickly erode any monopoly profits. 
Therefore the expected social value exceeds the private value and invest-
ment will be in short supply. The latter, coordination externalities, relate 
to the necessity of simultaneous, large-scale investments to make individual 
activities profitable (for example Rodrik, 2007, 104££.). 
Developmental states attempted to overcome these market failures through 
interventions in the form of developmental banking, subsidised credits in tar-
geted sectors, and managed trade that combined import substitution and 
tariff protection with export subsidies. Crucially, support was always com-
bined with policy standards (e.g. local content requirements) and perfor-
mance standards. The latter, best exemplified by minimum export require-
ments, guaranteed efficient production, and a failure to comply with them 
resulted in a withdrawal of support. All contributions by the economic 
school identify an interventionist industrial policy at the heart of a set of 
policy interventions that led to industrial diversification and rapid economic 
growth, with macroeconomic, trade and welfare policies supporting the in-
dustrialisation strategy. 
While the pursuit of industrial policy and trade policy, such as the im-
port substitution strategy, was by no means geographically limited to East 
Asia, few other developing countries having implemented such policies can 
boast a comparable growth performance. Within the political school, au-
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thors such as Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004) attempt to understand why 
some states were so successful while others failed. The key issues under 
consideration are policy coherence and state capacity. Firstly, they relate to 
the state's capability to define and pursue narrow goals-industrialisation 
and rapid economic growth-that lead to a coherent development strategy 
and a coherent economic policy. Secondly, the successful implementation of 
policy in turn relies on a competent and capable bureaucracy, based on a 
meritocratic civil service regime, and a pilot agency that coordinates eco-
nomic policy across all government agencies ( e.g. the MITI in Japan, the 
Economic Planning Bureau in Korea). 
Since the state is perceived as an actor in its own right analytically, both 
authors take into account the state's relation to society and classes. Evans 
coins the term "embedded autonomy" which captures the state's autonomy 
from particularistic interests, i.e. its ability to resist the pressure of influ-
ential groups with access to the corridors of power, and its simultaneous 
responsiveness to the needs of industry (Evans, 1995, 50). The concept of 
'autonomy' specifically refers to the state's dominance over private capital, 
allowing it to withdraw support from a certain sector or company if that is 
perceived necessary for the economy as a whole. If it were merely a reflec-
tion of capitalist interests, it would not be able to prevent such 'rent-seeking' 
activities. On the other hand, 'embeddedness' describes the close cooper-
ation and manifold ties between state and business that allow the state to 
elicit information from the private sector and to "orchestrate their activities" 
(Evans, 1995, 53). Kohli on the other hand asserts that successful devel-
opmental states usually pursue industrialisation and rapid economic growth 
in an elitist alliance with producer or capitalist groups. This alliance often 
comes at the expense of labour, which finds its demands suppressed by an 
authoritarian regime----notwithstanding those social policy initiatives that 
are perceived to be contributory to growth (Kohli, 2004, 10). 
6.1.2 Social Actors and the Accumulation Regime 
There are two critical omissions that Fine observes in the developmental 
state literature: an absence of the scrutiny of social actors and their inter-
ests, or class analysis, particularly visible in Evans' notion of state autonomy; 
and a lack of consideration of the structural features of an economy, the sec-
toral composition of its output and the specific system of accumulation in 
place - the "sectoral composition and level of investment, financed and coor-
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dinated through private and public institutions [ ... ] specific to each country, 
reflecting its history and dynamic as well as its evolving class structure" 
(Fine, 2006, 115). 
Kohli attempts to rectify the omission of social actors by emphasising 
the significance of the alliance between South Korea's capitalist class and the 
South Korean state under Park Chung Hee (in power from 1961 to 1979), 
in which the state played the dominant role. Under this regime, labour was 
tightly controlled and political mobilisation was suppressed (Kohli, 2004, 
96ff.). Fine and Rustomjee agree with this description of the class nature of 
the Korean state, but they also show how pressure from below was influential 
in the land reform (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, 46). The developmental 
state therefore needs to be situated in a conflictual context where policies 
invariably "have class biases either in their purpose or in their unintended 
outcomes. Some classes or groups become beneficiaries while others are 
alienated." (Cho and Kim, 1998, 130). Furthermore, state autonomy itself 
is a function of social and class conditions and not merely of bureaucratic 
competence. In a developmental context, it depends on the potential of 
resistance of the working class and peasants and of the old ruling class, 
presumably uninterested in change, and on whether a developmental alliance 
can be formed with capitalist groups (ibid., 131). Thus, conflicting class 
interests shape state institutions and policies and also determine the extent 
of state autonomy. 
Viewed within the South African context, state capacity and particularly 
state autonomy will therefore inevitably rely on the power, influence and 
access of various groups to state institutions as well. When compared to 
the East Asian prototypes, the main difference that is evident is the higher 
degree of mobilisation of the working class-which has direct access to policy 
formulation via the inclusion of the unions in the governing alliance-and 
the historically stronger, more independent and outward-oriented capital 
groups that have grown in the mining sector. Both these groups and their 
interests and pursuit thereof will have to be taken into consideration when 
analysing questions of capacity and coherence in policy, where the latter 
stems to a large extent from state autonomy from particular interests. 
With regards to the accumulation regime of South Korea, "the state's 
near-exclusive commitment to high growth coincided with the profit-maximizing 
needs of private entrepreneurs" (Kohli, 2004, 12f.). The domestically owned 
and diversified chaebols were mostly responsible for real accumulation, and 
government policy ensured domestic investment opportunities and their prof-
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itability in targeted sectors. At first this mainly applied to labour intensive 
sectors such as textiles, but in the 1970s the government also orchestrated 
a push into heavy industries such as steel and ship-building, which again 
served the interests of large-scale domestic capital and further marginalized 
other sections of business (Fine and Rustomjee 1996, 46, see also Cho and 
Kim 1998, 144). 
The case of South Africa is quite different: historically, investment has 
been concentrated in mining and closely related downstream manufacturing. 
It has come from a small number of hugely influential conglomerates and 
from the state itself that long favoured a development path along these 
lines, particularly during the apartheid years. A developmental strategy of 
industrial diversification and less reliance on the mineral endowment thus 
represents a break with past patterns, and it requires influential and powerful 
actors in the country to change their strategies-a considerably more difficult 
challenge then the one confronting a state like South Korea in the 1960s and 
1970s. Again, these structural preconditions have to be kept in mind when 
assessing any developmental-in our case industrial-policy initiatives. 
To summarise, in this light neither state capacity and policy coherence 
nor economic policy choices can be analysed in isolation from the specific 
system of accumulation and the class relations in an economy. The latter 
shape institutions and policy choices and thus certainly help to explain the 
existence ( or absence) of a coherent strategy and the expertise and capacity 
( or lack thereof) in different government agencies. Therefore, the following 
study of the South African developmental state, both as a broad concept and 
in a case study on industrial policy, will attempt to include these concepts 
and also shed light on social actors, their interests, the structure they create 
and how they shape the developmental regime. 
6.1.3 A South African Developmental State 
Based on a narrow interpretation of this literature, the definition of a devel-
opmental state is often limited to a list of interventionist economic policies, 
and industrial policies in particular, as well as an analysis of the state's 
capacity to implement them coherently. However a critical reading reveals 
as conducted above reveals that such an analysis must be placed within the 
context of a broader view of class relations and the accumulation regime 
within an economy. I will try to show that this analytical ambiguity is re-
158 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
fleeted in the controversial use of the concept and in studies on the South 
African development state thus far. 
The Evolving Strategy of the ANC 
In the mid-1990s the emerging economic strategy of the first African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) government encouraged little debate on the notion 
of South Africa as a developmental regime. Too firmly was their strategy 
rooted in a discourse on macro-economic stabilisation that left little room 
for an activist state. The publication of GEAR (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution) as a cornerstone of economic policy confirmed a narrow un-
derstanding of this stabilisation approach-fiscal restraint and inflation re-
d uction accompanied by a liberalised trade regime. The adoption of GEAR 
and its consequences for the economy have been analysed above, in Chapter 
Two. At this point, I focus on the criticism of GEAR that emerged quickly 
within the ruling party and the recent strategic shifts that resulted from the 
criticism. 
Not surprisingly, GEAR was met with stiff opposition from the ANC's 
alliance partners on the left-the trade union federation COSATU and the 
Communist Party of South Africa (SACP), exponents of which were later 
labelled 'ultra-leftist' by Mandela's presidential successor, Thabo Mbeki. 
The criticism never subsided, fuelled by a very mixed performance of the 
economy. While inflation and budget deficits came down, growth remained 
well below expectations. Contrary to the government's predictions, private 
and foreign direct investment did not pick up and massive job losses, par-
ticularly in manufacturing, led to an ever rising unemployment rate. As a 
result, social protests over delivery increased sharply, particularly after the 
second democratic election in 1999, and gave critics of GEAR more leverage 
(Ballard et al., 2006, 397). 
In response, the ANC shifted its priorities, and the change became no-
ticeable in more expansionary budgets after 2001. These were loudly trum-
peted in the election campaign and the pre-election budget of 2004, which 
promised to halve unemployment and poverty in the country's second decade 
of democracy. A more activist state was supposed to increase public expen-
diture, particularly investment in infrastructure, and revitalise rather than 
privatise public enterprises, as well as further boost social and welfare spend-
ing (Daniel et al., 2005, xxiii). 
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While these changes are interpreted as a logical next step in government-
successful macro-stabilisation followed by micro-economic reform and tar-
geted intervention-in this case they also clearly signal a change in course. 
The ANC's key strategic documents indicate that it has now committed 
itself to building a developmental state. This state aims to mobilise soci-
ety and gain a strong popular mandate in order to drive change and attain 
"sustained development based on high growth rates, restructuring of the 
economy and socio-economic inclusion" (African National Congress, 2007). 
The declared intention of this developmental state is to obtain the capacity 
to formulate the national agenda (e.g. a growth strategy) and implement 
policy throughout government spheres. 
In terms of economic policy, this agenda has been most clearly laid out 
in the government-led Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (AsgiSA) 
which is supposed to remove the binding constraints that prevent the econ-
omy from achieving growth rates compatible with its ambitious socioeco-
nomic goals. The most prominent interventions include increased infras-
tructure investments, an industrial policy with detailed sector strategies, 
the addressing of capacity issues within the public sector, skills develop-
ment and the stabilisation of the exchange rate (The Presidency, 2006). 
Since 2004, non-interest spending by the central government has in-
creased annually by an average of more than 9%. The bulk of the money has 
gone into increased public investment, both by the government itself and by 
public enterprise, which was the fastest growing position, rising annually by 
almost 20% in real terms (Department of Finance, 2007, 46f.). In addition 
to roads and public transport infrastructure, this area also covers increased 
spending on social infrastructure, such as health facilities, schools, public 
housing, and access to electricity and water for poor communities. Social 
expenditure is thus geared towards increasing productivity levels. The gov-
ernment's vehement resistance against a monthly basic income grant, which 
would, according to various statements, establish a 'culture of dependency', 
is further indication of a 'productivist' social policy typical of developmental 
states. Despite increased spending, service delivery has not always kept the 
pace however, as many critics have pointed out and as the Treasury readily 
admits in its own assessment (Department of Finance, 2007, 49). Capac-
ity problems within the relevant parts of the public sector-particularly the 
provincial departments of health and education-are responsible for poor 
delivery. 
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State-owned enterprises are considered key actors in the more interven-
tionist strategy and have received budget boosts since 2004 that have al-
lowed them to address infrastructure backlogs in electricity (by the elec-
tricity provider Eskom) and road and public transport infrastructure (by 
Transnet, which is responsible for South Africa's ports and railways). The 
state's attitude towards these public companies is quite telling in the context 
of strategic shifts in economic policy. Once a cornerstone of the apartheid 
regime's plan to achieve economic self-reliance, these businesses were par-
tially privatised towards the end of the 1980s when a black dominated gov-
ernment became an increasingly likely prospect. Under the banner of GEAR, 
the ANC vowed to continue this policy, however, it preferred to label it 're-
structuring' and aimed for the mobilisation of resources, increased efficiency, 
international investment and the diversification of ownership in the national 
economy through sales to black-owned companies (Southall, 2007a, 208). 
For various reasons, real progress has been slow, and in 2004 the minister of 
public enterprise, Alec Erwin, announced a "major investment and efficiency 
programme" for state-owned enterprises in keeping with the general shift to 
a more interventionist policy, along with a pledge to spend 165 billion Rand 
"to address chronic backlogs" (Southall, 2007a, 219). Quite characteristi-
cally, the state-owned enterprises are also supposed to be drivers of change 
and transformation, providing opportunities for aspiring black profession-
als through affirmative action hiring and black-owned companies in their 
procurement. 
Another core aspect of the growth initiative AsgiSA is its pledge to 
implement sector strategies that provide targeted support for prioritised 
sectors. As a result, the cabinet adopted the National Industrial Policy 
Framework (NIPF) (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007a) in January 
2007. It was released to the public in August 2007 and will be analysed in 
detail in the following section on industrial policy. 
One last point worth mentioning here is the coordination and centralisa-
tion drive of the government under the auspices of President Thabo Mbeki, 
as it relates to the state's capacity to formulate and implement policy in 
a coherent way. Under Mbeki's reign, the Presidency became the coordi-
nating and guiding unit within the government and steadily extended its 
influence over policy formulation. Additionally, departments were organised 
in clusters to align programmes and implementation (Makgetla, 2005, 12). 
Together with interventions to improve skill levels of civil servants and effi-
ciency in service delivery, these initiatives clearly aim to replicate the capable 
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bureaucracies that were characteristic of East Asian developmental states. 
While these efforts were positively received by cabinet ministers (ibid.), the 
concurrent centralisation of decision making within the ANC was far more 
controversial. It caused major discontent among ordinary ANC members 
and was an important reason Mbeki lost the party's presidency to his bit-
ter rival, the trade union and communist backed Jacob Zuma, in December 
2007. 
Problems of Implementation? 
In a first critical assessment of South Africa's attempts to become a more 
developmental state, a number of authors have pointed out stumbling blocks 
that could derail the project. Most prominently and in line with the em-
phasis of developmental state scholars, they point out limits in the state's 
capacity to implement policy, as well as a general lack of coherence in policy. 
Capacity problems abound in large parts of the public sector and the 
resulting failures in service delivery are explicitly acknowledged by the gov-
ernment (The Presidency, 2006). They are most visible in the failure of 
provincial and national departments to spend allocated budgets and in the 
large number of unfilled positions in the higher management echelons of 
public administration (Hamlyn, 2007). They are however not uniform, nei-
ther across government agencies nor across regions. The National Treasury, 
at the heart of successful macroeconomic stabilisation efforts since 1994, is 
an oft-cited example for administrative excellence within government. It 
contrasts starkly with other departments that were not able to stamp their 
authority on government policy to such an extent~! will come back to this 
issue when assessing industrial policy below. 
Nonetheless, the existence of capacity problems is not altogether surpris-
ing in light of South Africa's history. Public service delivery was extremely 
uneven during the apartheid years, and the notorious education policy led 
to a vast shortage of skilled workers. This shortage is most acutely felt in 
the public sector which not only aspires to become more efficient, but also 
more representative (Southall, 2007b, 6). If there is an equity /efficiency 
trade-off, this might be indicative of a broader dilemma for the ANC: Does 
its democratic tradition and its aim to transform South Africa into a truly 
democratic society stand at odds with the single-mindedness and coherence 
of the archetypal developmental state? In more controversial terms, is there 
a democracy/growth trade-off? Kohli emphasises this point: "[An] element 
162 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
of 'ruthlessness' or of coercion in its various forms has also been omnipresent 
in the most successful cases of rapid industrialization in the contemporary 
developing world. The normative implication then is to treat with suspicion 
claims that trade-offs are not necessary and that all good things can read-
ily go together" (Kohli, 2004, 422). The broad-based alliance that governs 
South Africa certainly cannot and does not intend to pursue industrialisa-
tion and economic growth as its only policy goals. The racial transformation 
of the public sector is one example of this, and progressive labour laws are 
another. 
Perhaps more importantly, the structure of South African capital bears 
little resemblance to that of East Asian countries. It was and continues 
to be shaped by the mining industry and big business, and therefore has 
a very different outlook. It is certainly more outward-oriented and there-
fore less inclined to favour domestic industrialisation (Makgetla, 2005, 6). 
While the ANC is aware of the powerful and antagonistic interests that 
pervade the South African socio-economic landscape, there seem to be dif-
ferent approaches to achieving policy coherence within the party. While the 
left argues for mass mobilisation of the working class and the poor and a 
strengthening of the party base to ensure hegemony for these forces (South 
African Communist Party, 2006, 29ff.), others strike a distinctly different 
chord. Alec Erwin, the minister of public enterprise and an influential mem-
ber of Mbeki's cabinet, argues for the mobilisation of "a multi-class political 
force capable of designing and effecting a strong state" ( emphasis added, Er-
win, 2007). He asserts that, in the context of a globalising economy that 
constantly reduces policy space for nations while weakening local capital 
and the working class, national development can only be fostered by an al-
liance between these forces under the leadership of a strong state. Thus, 
there are different visions of the developmental state within the governing 
alliance, and the concept of development is vague enough to accommodate 
both those who aim to reduce the costs of doing business by eliminating 
binding constraints for investors and those who aim to alter the development 
trajectory of the South African economy by breaking the alliance between 
state and capital. While both of these camps want higher growth to tackle 
unemployment and poverty, their envisioned ways of achieving this goal are 
radically different. 
The leadership struggle within the ANC, which saw leftist candidate 
Jacob Zuma's ascent to power, is indicative of the conflicting visions of 
a developmental state within the ANC. As a result of internal upheaval, 
163 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
Mbeki and other key proponents of the '1996 class project' (a term the 
communist party SACP uses to describe the neo-liberal turn of the ANC 
that cumulated in the 1996 publication of GEAR) were relieved of their 
positions by the party base and replaced by a more left-leaning leadership. 
However, the battle is far from over and differing ideas and interests within 
the party will likely continue to be reflected in an incoherent policy. In this 
light, incoherence is better perceived as a result of conflicting class interests, 
as exposed in the above examples, than simply as a weakness of the state. 
In the following case study on industrial policy, I try to illustrate South 
Africa's attempts to become a developmental state and 'the problems it has 
encountered along the way'. As I attempted to illustrate in the general 
discussion above, these problems are related to issues of capacity and coher-
ence which cannot be fully grasped without considering the peculiar design 
of South Africa's accumulation regime. 
6.2 Industrial Policy in a Developmental Regime 
The analysis of industrial policy of course needs to be embedded in both a 
discussion of industrial development and the broader directions of economic 
policy. While this has been the focus of Chapter Two, I will recount these 
issues in the time period after 1994 below, with a particular focus on indus-
trial policy measures implemented. This discussion will lead us to the recent 
shifts in industrial policy, expressed in the publication of the National In-
dustrial Policy Framework NIPF in 2007, and to an evaluation of its content 
and hitherto implementation. 
6.2.1 Industrial Policy after 1994 
An interventionist industrial policy has undeniably formed the core of all 
East Asian developmental states. This means that an evolving range of sec-
tors have been targeted over time and vigorously supported through an array 
of policy measures-from R&D support and subsidised credit to direct state 
involvement by public companies. South Africa's apartheid regime adhered 
to a comparable industrial policy when it supported and essentially built 
up industries such as iron and steel and later heavy chemicals. As was the 
case in East Asia, the ultimate aim of South Africa's policy was to preserve 
national security. However, while East Asian industrial policies successfully 
generated jobs and economic growth in the process, South African policy 
164 
Oliver Schwank - 978-3-631-75385-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:39:49AM
via free access
makers' focus on the white population and on economic and, more impor-
tantly, military self-sufficiency created different incentives. The resulting 
interventions-particularly the reinforcement of the minerals-energy core of 
the economy-were massive and continue to shape the South African econ-
omy. 
After 1994, with macroeconomic stabilisation looming large in policy 
makers' minds, industrial policy and more specifically sector-specific inter-
ventions were not a priority area for the incoming government. Yet, this 
certainly was not due to a shortage of discussions on industrial policy within 
the ANC, its alliance partners and associated or sympathetic researchers. 
There were a number of research projects, but the discussions failed to pro-
duce a clear path forward in terms of industrial policy strategy, and the 
resulting ambiguities might be one reason for industrial policy's shadowy 
existence in the 1990s. 
The most prominent among these works certainly was the report of the 
Industrial Strategy Project (ISP), a group of researchers affiliated with the 
biggest union federation COSATU, named "Improving Manufacturing Per-
formance in South Africa" (Joffe et al., 1995). Its focus was on increasing the 
productivity of South African firms, eschewing a strategy based on cheap 
labour and instead focusing on moving up the value chain. The authors 
explicitly recognized that jobs thus created would in their majority be lo-
cated at the upper end of the skills spectrum and that industrial policy 
alone would not solve the unemployment crisis. This view was also associ-
ated with a specific interpretation of the weaknesses of the manufacturing 
sector-resulting from a failed or exhausted import-substitution industrial-
isation strategy (Lewis et al., 2004, 154f.). In terms of policy recommenda-
tions, trade policy reform, skills creation and the support of technological 
upgrading and innovation (Joffe et al., 1995, 31) hinted at a supply-side 
oriented policy focus. 
On the other hand, the work by Fine and Rustomjee (1996) interpreted 
South Africa's industrial history in a different light (see above). There are no 
easily applicable policy recommendations to draw from this strand of work, 
but "the MEC view tends to a more dirigiste approach to industrial policy, 
one inclined to a close interaction between the state and those relatively few 
firms that dominate the MEC core, interactions designed to strengthen their 
material linkages with the rest of the economy" (Lewis et al., 2004, 155). 
Hirsch formulated this as a choice between support for "smaller busi-
nesses and pre-reform uncompetitive labour-absorbing sectors [or] policies 
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designed to exploit existing comparative advantages and bigger projects" 
(Hirsch, 2005, 122). He also states that the actual outcome was more of 
an "unresolved compromise" (ibid.). This critical assessment from an in-
side perspective is widely shared in the literature and with policy makers. 
The Department of Trade and Industry initially focused on trade policy and 
supply side measures-with a myriad of support programmes for firms-in 
line with the priorities formulated in the Industrial Strategy Project report. 
Trade liberalisation was combined with a range of general-i.e. not sector-
specific-supply side measures in order to boost international competitive-
ness and exports. These included export credit guarantees and support in 
market access, innovation, research and development. However, firms do not 
appear to have frequently taken advantage of these measures and this has 
limited their effectiveness (Kaplan, 2004, 626). 
At the same time, there were also strong elements of continuity in the 
implementation of industrial policy which was historically tilted towards the 
MEC (Zalk, 2007). One of the most important supply side programmes, the 
Spatial Development Initiatives, and its flagship project, the Maputo De-
velopment Corridor, provide a telling example. The initiative intends to 
revitalise a long-neglected region of South Africa, Mpumalanga, by making 
it globally competitive. But the benefits of the improvement in infrastruc-
ture have been limited mostly to the anchor project-the huge aluminium 
smelters of Mozal that are extremely capital intensive and provide very few 
linkages with the regional economy (Soederbaum 2004, 160ff., see also Lewis 
et al. 2004, 171). 
Another example is the Strategic Industrial Projects programme, imple-
mented by the DTI between 2002 and 2005, providing tax relief for large 
investment projects. Again, these projects were mainly concentrated in 
heavy industry (Roberts, 2005, 25). The same is true for the lending of the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), South Africa's main develop-
ment bank and holding company. It has historically supported industries 
close to mining and continued this pattern throughout the 1990s. Continu-
ity was particularly visible also in those fields of industrial policy that were 
not under the direct control of the DTI, such as infrastructure provision, 
electricity or arms procurement (Mohamed, 2007). 
In contrast to these ambiguities, the commitment to trade liberalisation 
was strong. At first sight, this might seem surprising, but many in the 
incoming government viewed protective tariffs as support for a privileged 
group of white business and embraced a strategy of opening the economy to 
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global competition (Lewis et al., 2004, 161). South Africa's offer to GATT 
in early 1994 was a joint effort by business, labour and the incoming govern-
ment (institutionally situated in the 'National Economic Forum'), and was 
publicly endorsed by the then presumptive president Mandela. The country 
became a founding member of the WTO in 1995 and implemented a simpli-
fied tariff structure and an overall reduction of tariffs. At the same time, the 
expensive and-by many accounts-inefficient export support scheme GEIS 
(General Export Incentive Scheme) was abolished (Hirsch, 2005, 127ff.). 
This focus on trade policy also had institutional consequences, as the nego-
tiation and administrative processes (including those related to later trade 
agreements with the Southern African Development Community and the Eu-
ropean Union) tied up many of the resources available in the DTI, an insti-
tution already heavily taxed by internal restructuring processes (Makgetla, 
2007; Mohamed, 2007). 
One notable exception to this pattern-a successful sectoral support pro-
gramme outside the confines of the MEC-is the automotive industry. The 
Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) managed to retain pro-
duction in South Africa amidst a significant reduction of tariffs, helping 
producers achieve international competitiveness. Moreover, there are sig-
nificant linkages to other sectors due to local sourcing incentives (Roberts, 
2005, 28). Historically, producers in the local auto industry built a vari-
ety of vehicles ( at high unit costs), predominantly for the protected do-
mestic market. The imperatives of global trade reform and South Africa's 
commitment to liberalisation necessitated a reorientation and a move away 
from inward-oriented production patterns. The industry development pro-
gramme, started in 1995, gradually reduced tariffs on fully built-up vehicles 
and at the same time introduced 'Import Rebate Credit Certificates' that 
could be earned by exporters of vehicles and components and allowed them 
the duty-free import of built-up vehicles and components (see for example 
Black, 2001, 782). The intention of course was to entice producers to reduce 
the variety of locally produced vehicles and focus on one or fewer models, 
manufactured at efficient scale and globally competitive costs. Although 
there is criticism, particularly from the point of view of domestic auto prices 
paid by South African consumers ( there still is significant protection of the 
domestic market), the MIDP is generally regarded as a major success of 
industrial policy. The success of this sector, however, is exceptional and has 
not been repeated in other sectors where firms place little importance on the 
Department of Trade and Industry's strategies (Kaplan, 2004, 627). Perhaps 
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characteristically, the MIDP was an outcome of research carried out within 
the union-aligned Industrial Strategy Project rather than an initiative of the 
DTI initially (Mohamed, 2007). 
Not surprisingly, most assessments of industrial policy in the first decade 
of democracy are critical and find only limited success. As seen above, South 
Africa has certainly failed to significantly develop manufacturing capacities 
outside the MEC and limited pockets such as auto components. To a large 
extent, this view is shared by policy makers and also informs new policy 
priorities. Alan Hirsch, the former Chief Director of the DTI, states: "It 
is probably fair to say that government is haunted by the nagging feeling 
that we could have and should be doing more. Surely we know enough 
to be able to identify some key sectors that can grow faster with effective 
policies" (Hirsch, 2005, 160). This statement must be understood within 
the context of a gradual shift in emphasis occurring at the time-towards a 
more interventionist industrial policy that targets sectors explicitly and on 
a broader basis. 
6.2.2 National Industrial Policy Framework 
The industrial policy initiative NIPF must be examined within the broader 
context of the government's growth programme AsgiSA which-at the time 
it was implemented-already contained explicit references to this yet-to-be-
published document. Just as AsgiSA provided a framework for the overall 
growth strategy, the NIPF lays out a vision for South Africa's industrial 
development and intends to be the point of reference for all stakeholders in 
the process. Most importantly, this includes other government agencies and 
private business. Through the publication of this document, the DTI seeks 
to achieve better coordination within government to provide the necessary 
coherence in industrial policy and to offer the private sector security about 
future policy directions. 
The document begins with a critical assessment of industrial policy since 
1994, admitting that, amongst other shortcomings, "sectoral programmes to 
restructure the industrial economy[ ... ] were generally not of a sufficient scale 
to induce the necessary structural change." (Department of Trade and Indus-
try, 2007a, 13). It further states that, in order to "facilitate diversification 
beyond our current reliance on traditional commodities and non-tradable 
services" (ibid., 6) and move towards tradable, labour-absorbing goods and 
services, South Africa cannot rely on market forces alone but has to imple-
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ment an interventionist strategy based on an analysis of concrete constraints 
and opportunities. The DTI thus rejects the 'one-size-fits-all' approach of 
the Washington consensus and considers this the main lesson to be learnt 
from the successful development trajectory of the newly industrialised East 
Asian countries, thereby locating itself firmly within the discourse on devel-
opmental states. 
In order to be successful, the DTI reckons that industrial policy inter-
ventions need to take place in a suitable macroeconomic, regulatory and 
infrastructural environment. With regards to the macroeconomy, this im-
plies that fiscal, monetary and industrial policy need to better complement 
each other-a stable and competitive exchange rate is explicitly mentioned 
at this point. Furthermore, interventions are to take place on a sectoral level 
and on cross-cutting issues that concern the whole economy through Key 
Action Plans (KAPs) (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007b), and will 
always be preceded by consultation with business and other stakeholders 
in a so-called 'self-discovery process'. The Key Action Plans comprise de-
tailed benchmarks to evaluate outcomes, name the stakeholders responsible 
for implementation and put specific time frames on expected completion. 
Although the NIPF itself does not intend to pick sectors (its focus lies on 
defining procedures), a number of priority sectoral groupings with potential 
are identified. The handful of priority sectors that will eventually be chosen 
for support every three years should mainly be found within these group-
ings. These are natural resource-based sectors, medium technology sectors, 
advanced manufacturing sectors, labour intensive sectors and tradable ser-
vices (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007a, 19)-a broad selection by 
all measures. 
The first round of action plans, which is intended for immediate imple-
mentation, focuses on the following four lead sectors: capital and transport 
equipment and metal fabrication; automotives and components; chemicals, 
plastics fabrication and pharmaceuticals; and forestry, pulp and paper and 
furniture (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007b). The metals sector 
provides 18% of manufacturing jobs in South Africa, nonetheless it has 
underperformed in the past. Providing mostly inputs to other industries, 
firms in the sector have certainly suffered from low investment levels in the 
economy, and particularly from the public sector and the mining industry. 
Additionally, and in common with the plastics sectors, the uncompetitive 
pricing of inputs is identified as the major constraint, and in both cases a 
review of tariffs on upstream products is suggested. With regard to steel 
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and aluminium, the action plan in this sector also foresees a strengthening 
of the competition act to put more pressure on the dominant domestic pro-
ducers with huge market power. The public infrastructure investment pro-
grammes, in particular the spending of state-owned enterprises, also come 
under scrutiny, as the DTI intends to commit relevant actors to a higher 
level of local content in their procurement. Policy in the automotives and 
components sector is driven by the Motor Industry Development Programme 
which expires in 2009. The DTI has committed itself to a continuation of 
sector support and announced the publication of a replacement programme 
that intends to help firms double production by 2020. Finally, the labour 
intensive forestry sector could provide jobs in poor rural communities. Tech-
nical and financial support should enable small growers to participate in the 
growth of the industry. 
Apart from these sectors, the activities that have already been singled 
out in AsgiSA will continue to receive attention; among these are business 
process outsourcing, the tourism sector and biofuels; all three are charac-
terised by their labour-intensity. In addition, the DTI intends to reserve 
some attention for the clothing and textiles sector, diamond beneficiation, 
agro-processing, film and television, and crafts; and will develop strategies or 
perspectives for mineral beneficiation, ICT services and products, creative 
industries, white goods, retail and other sectors. 
The cross-cutting issues that are to be tackled immediately complement 
and often are a crucial part of the sectoral interventions. They include the 
improvement of the industrial financing system, the leveraging of public pro-
curement, the reduction of intermediate input costs, and the improvement 
of research and development support, infrastructure and skills development. 
Industrial financing is to be expanded through the existing institutions-the 
DTI itself and the Industrial Development Corporation-and improved by 
more prioritisation, in line with overall sectoral priorities, and higher reci-
procity. The massive increase in public investment that is currently under 
way should be carried out in a way that maximises opportunities for South 
African firms. While price and quality considerations must continue to in-
form procurement decisions, all government departments should include the 
domestic production perspective in their consideration. The reduction of 
input cost has already been mentioned in connection with the metals and 
plastics sector; the DTI's efforts in the field of infrastructure improvement 
and skills development mostly concentrate on aligning current initiatives of 
other departments with the sector priorities in the industrial policy strategy. 
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6.2.3 Capacity and Coherence 
The public reception of the NIPF was decidedly mixed. While it drew 
applause from some quarters, it was met with skepticism and severe criticism 
in others. It is certainly too early to make a definite statement about the 
policy, however a review of recent developments and an interpretation of the 
policy's aims within the context of South Africa's growth trajectory permit 
a tentative assessment. 
The publication of the NIPF has definitely put industrial policy back 
in the spotlight. First steps are being taken toward implementation and 
a comprehensive review of tariff protection for upstream industries is al-
ready under way. In timely coincidence, the Competition Tribunal has fined 
Arcelor Mittal Steel, South Africa's dominant steel producer, 700 million 
Rand for excessive pricing. The DTI also gave first broad indications of how 
support for the automotive industry will look when the original MIDP ex-
pires. The revised programme will be published in August 2008, but support 
has been pledged until 2020. 
The MIDP and its successor programme can also serve to illustrate one 
of the major concerns-that of the department's capacity, or lack thereof. 
The review of the programme started in 2005, but publication of its results 
and the revised programme has been repeatedly postponed, much to the 
dismay of car producers and critics who have urged the government to pro-
vide clarity. Many interpret this as a sign that the DTI still faces severe 
capacity constraints. This is a long-standing problem to which the DTI it-
self cautiously admits: "[C]apacity to formulate and implement high-quality 
industrial policy interventions has been uneven across government depart-
ments" (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007a, 28). One reason for these 
capacity problems was the historical focus of the DTI on the administration 
of tariffs and, on the eve of democracy, on the export support programme 
GEIS. Its staff, redeployed to administer the taxing supply-side programmes 
that formed the core of industrial policy in the 1990s, struggled to fulfill this 
new role (Lewis et al. 2004, 175, Robbins 2007). Additionally, there were nu-
merous processes of internal reorganisation which led to large fluctuations 
within the department and to a less than optimal retention of knowledge 
gained in the process of engaging with industry stakeholders (Morris et al. 
2006, 207, Robbins 2007). 
In addition to in-house capacity, the implementation of an industrial 
strategy requires close coordination across government agencies, in other 
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words, the capacity of a nodal agency to drive policy. The sectoral and 
cross-cutting Key Action Plans invariably involve a number of different de-
partments, agencies or state-owned enterprises that should play their part 
in implementation. Whether the DTI has the clout to be this agency in 
South Africa remains to be seen. It is an open secret that the National 
Treasury is less than convinced of the merits of an interventionist industrial 
policy. Its response to the publication of the NIPF has been lukewarm, and 
in his medium term budget policy speech before parliament in November 
2007 finance minister Trevor Manuel told parliament that, in order to di-
versify its exports, South Africa would have "to ensure that competition is 
fostered through tariff simplification and reform." (Manuel, 2007, 6) The 
corresponding policy statement contains an explicit critique of high levels of 
protection in the auto and textiles industries without even mentioning the 
NIPF (Department of Finance, 2007, 22). 
If there is a nodal agency with regards to economic policy in South 
Africa, it still seems to be the National Treasury that is at the heart of 
the economic policy making process (e.g. Mohamed, 2007, also Zalk, 2007). 
In another intervention that overlaps with the competency of the DTI, 
the Treasury hired an international advisory panel, comprised of mostly 
American-based economists, to identify the binding constraints that ham-
per the South African economy, and particularly its industry. The findings 
were published over a period of two years with the final report released on 
the Treasury's website in May 2008 (Hausmann, 2008). While they do not 
represent the policy positions of the Treasury, the findings nonetheless serve 
as an indicator for its overall policy preferences since they are concordant 
with its other publications and statements. Some of the recommendations 
of the panel are in line with the industrial strategy proposed by the DTI, 
notably the targeting of a more stable exchange rate, but also with re-
gards to higher investment in public infrastructure. On the other hand, 
the authors are critical of sectoral targeting as proposed in the NIPF -they 
suggest to "[s]ubstitute or complement the current DTI policy of developing 
customized sector programs with a strategy based on an open-architecture 
approach with self-organization of relevant actors" (ibid.). Also, they call for 
a more wide-reaching simplification of the tariff regime and a reduction or 
elimination of tariffs on inputs. Lastly, the report is highly critical of initia-
tives to promote beneficiation, stating that, if viable, it should and would 
have happened already. 
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For now, the Treasury continues to subscribe to an economic policy vision 
that views sectoral targeting and tariffs with suspicion. From 'the other side' 
of the political spectrum, the unions put pressure on the government to 
implement a more interventionist strategy. In a strategy paper on industrial 
policy, COSATU asks for a "fundamental redirection of activities by all 
stakeholders, including the state, capital and even labour" (COSATU, 2006, 
14). This redirection includes a more expansionary fiscal and monetary 
environment, more public ownership and a more protective trade policy, all 
under the mantle of a developmental state. 
If coherence is one of the pillars of success of East Asian industrial pol-
icy, South Africa will in all likelihood fall short of meeting this criterion. 
Different players within the governing coalition and within cabinet adhere 
to differing strategic visions of industrial policy. The ascension of Jacob 
Zuma to President of the ANC and his likely taking over of the country's 
presidency after the general elections in 2009 might lead to a shift in policy 
priorities towards the vision expressed by COSATU. The union federation, 
the communist party and the ANC left are among his most vocal and in-
fluential supporters. For now, the more cautious stance of the Treasury 
holds sway, creating a significant amount of insecurity over future policy 
directions. 
A similar argument could be made with regard to macroeconomic pol-
icy. The DTI is not alone in its call to alter monetary policy strategy in 
order to provide South African exporters with a more competitive exchange 
rate. However, the independent Reserve Bank's inflation targeting policy-
causing high interest rates and an overvalued currency-is not under review. 
The liberalisation of the capital account, very much in the interest of mining 
conglomerates that rapidly internationalised since 1994 and saw investment 
opportunities mostly outside South Africa, is not under scrutiny-if any-
thing there are calls for further liberalisation, for example by the panel 
engaged by the Treasury (Hausmann, 2008). So it is likely that interest 
rates will have to remain high to continuously attract short term capital 
inflows (Fine, 2008). And while state expenditure has indeed increased over 
the last few years, the Treasury remains cautious in its policy stance, bud-
geting for a surplus for the period from 2008 to 2010. So far there is no 
indication that industrial policy as laid out in the NIPF will also govern the 
decision making of these key economic policy institutions. This implies that 
a more conservative interpretation of the developmental state continues to 
hold sway in South Africa. 
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As mentioned above, the recent changing of the guard in the ANC could 
alter the balance of forces in government over time. In light of some of the 
policies the DTI promotes, this is probably a prerequisite for success. The 
first sector strategies target downstream industries such as plastics and they 
will inevitably have to tackle the monopoly power of upstream suppliers. 
The announced reduction of input tariffs will not suffice in this regard, and 
this might also be true for the strengthening of the Competition Act. Chang 
argues that a purely legalistic approach to competition policy is unsuitable 
because it is a long and costly process (Arcelor Mittal will of course appeal 
its fine in the Competition Appeal Court), which moreover does not achieve 
what South Africa needs most from its conglomerates: increased domestic 
investment. He advises a more hands-on approach, controlling outward in-
vestment and striking deals to increase domestic engagement (Chang, 1998, 
68f.). What has happened so far is the opposite: South Africa experiences 
a net outflow of foreign direct investment and its economic policy facilitates 
further capital outflow (Fine, 2008). 
This brings us back to the structural features of South African capital, 
which differs markedly from its counterparts in other aspiring developmen-
tal states. "Where the developmental states of Asia faced national capital 
groups that saw industrial growth as their main road to profit, key sectors 
of South African capital saw their future in mineral investments abroad" 
(Makgetla, 2005, 6). This point is also forcefully made by Fine, who claims 
that "conglomerates attached to the MEC [ ... ] have otherwise demonstrated 
little or token commitment to the economic and social restructuring and ex-
pansion of the local economy other than in furnishing continuing and secure 
profitability to feed into their globalisation" (Fine, 2008). So far, the in-
terests of mining and financial capital have been well served by economic 
policy-the immediate opening of capital markets in 1995 and the conser-
vative monetary policy regime are obvious examples. 
If the DTI is to achieve its objectives of industrial diversification and 
higher growth in tradable goods sectors, then macroeconomic policies will 
have to change as well-notably in the form of a more competitive exchange 
rate. This further implies a change in the financial system, gearing it to the 
needs of industry rather than those of international and domestic financial 
investors. The NIPF only tentatively addresses these issues and it indeed 
sounds rather ambitious. However, a changing of the growth trajectory of 
the South African economy will always be an ambitious project. A different 
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policy outlook by the new ANC leadership might lead to bolder proposals 
and a more vigorous implementation in the future. 
6.2.4 Competing Visions 
The aim to transform South Africa into a developmental state is shared by all 
constituencies within the ANC. This goal therefore serves as a rallying point 
upon which all its members can agree. However, similarly to the strategic 
concept of the National Democratic Revolution, its interpretation is fiercely 
contested. While some merely consider the developmental state a competent 
state that can intervene in targeted areas to reduce the cost of doing business 
in South Africa, the left subscribes to a different interpretation, based on 
which a progressive developmental state would have to alter the capital-
intensive growth trajectory of the South African economy and therefore 
clash with the entrenched interests of capital. 
This case study on industrial policy has reaffirmed that there are indeed 
competing visions of the South African developmental state. While the 
National Industrial Policy Strategy sets itself the goal of diversifying the 
South African economy beyond its traditional reliance on commodities, this 
diversification will not be possible without a disruption of the dominance of 
upstream monopolies and a fundamental alteration of the macroeconomic 
framework. At the moment, the DTI does not have the clout to implement 
such measures. However, the recent change in ANC leadership could improve 
its chances to do so in future. 
Finally, the case study also shows that, while concerns about the state's 
capabilities and the coherence of policy are justified, they cannot simply be 
interpreted as administrative weaknesses of the state. They are rather a 
result of conflicting class interests, reflected in the governing alliance and 
within government departments, and shaping its policies. The more fun-
damental issue at stake then is which groups can assert their interests and 
determine what kind of a developmental state South Africa eventually wants 
to be. 
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This dissertation intended to answer to what extent linkages between sectors 
define South Africa's development trajectory, and how suitable its economic 
policy is to change its path to achieving a more diversified industrial sector 
that is less reliant on its mineral endowment and that is also more labour-
absorbing. For this purpose, I provided a detailed overview of the history of 
the country's economic and particularly its industrial development. Building 
on the stylised facts established in that section, I implemented a model 
that aimed to take the mineral endowment and linkages between economic 
sectors into consideration. Lastly, an econometric exercise and a policy 
analysis assess the strength of linkages and issues of path dependence in 
policy formulation that explain the continued focus of the South African 
economy on sectors close to mining. 
The historic overview has shown that it was indeed the country's min-
eral endowment, its abundant supply with gold, diamonds, coal, platinum 
and a host of other raw materials, that at first triggered and then contin-
ued to shape its development path. In the very beginning, manufacturing 
activity was started in reply to the needs of mines. Explosives, electricity, 
and a basic supply of consumer goods for mine workers were soon provided 
locally. At later stages, successive governments attempted to broaden the 
manufacturing base by employing import substitution policies, while those 
manufacturing sectors close to mining-basic metals and chemicals are the 
most important examples-also received strong government support. As 
a result, the South African economy inherited by the ANC when it came 
to power in 1994 was largely inward oriented. This was particularly true 
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for manufacturing. The deficit accrued in these foreign-exchange consum-
ing activities was financed mostly by the exports of minerals and of goods 
produced within the confines of the Minerals Energy Complex or MEC. 
In addition to inward orientation, this industrial structure was problem-
atic for a second reason: despite a large supply of unskilled labour, South 
African manufacturing and industrial activities are very capital intensive, 
resulting in high unemployment. While the challenges were clear to the 
incoming government, the appropriate policy responses were less so. The 
discussions on the economic interventions focused on macroeconomic policy 
mostly, but were partly reflected in industrial policy as well. In the end, the 
ANC chose to liberalise its trade regime to foster an opening of the econ-
omy and increased competitiveness of manufacturing firms, simultaneously 
supporting them by a range of supply side programmes. However, at least 
in the early phases, the desired results-more diversification, job creation 
in manufacturing, an improved performance in international markets-were 
not accomplished. Quite to the contrary, the country experienced a more 
strongly accentuated development of capital-intensive sectors, while more 
jobs were lost in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and clothing. 
The simulation in Chapter 4-based on a New Economic Geography 
model of the vertical linkages type-takes two stylised facts from this his-
torical development as its starting point: the role of a mineral endowment 
and the role of inter-sectoral linkages in the industrialisation process. I set 
up a three-regions model where only one region disposes of minerals that are 
used as an input in the production of one of its industrial sectors. All man-
ufacturing sectors are linked with each other in an input-output framework. 
Other than that, they only use labour as an input in production. As is com-
mon in NEG models, there is an industrialised core region that concentrates 
economic production in the manufacturing sector within its confines. The 
driving force for this agglomeration (or, more precisely in a linkages frame-
work, specialisation) are the forward and backward linkages at play. They 
allow firms to buy inputs more cheaply and to profit from a larger market 
for its output in the core region. On the other hand, higher economic ac-
tivity in the modern sector drives up wages-the resulting wage gap with 
the peripheral regions acts as a countering force on complete specialisation. 
Of the two peripheral regions, one profits from the above-mentioned min-
eral endowment, most likely resulting in its specialisation in the respective 
sector. 
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From this initial point, a growth process is introduced which increases 
worldwide demand for manufacturing goods. The simulations show that 
this increase at first leads to further growth of manufacturing industries 
in the core-with the exception of the mining sector that heavily uses the 
mineral input-while the other two regions remain peripheral. Yet, at the 
same time, the wage gap widens, making it more and more attractive for 
some firms to go into business in the periphery. At one point, this reset-
tling indeed occurs, its concrete manifestation depending on the strength of 
linkages in the respective sectors. Using an artificial input-output matrix 
with a mining sector, a strongly linked second sector close to mining and 
three very weakly linked labour-intensive sectors, the resettlement of indus-
tries takes place in the latter three sectors only, and they all move to the 
peripheral region without minerals, allowing it to profit from linkage effects 
itself and leading to its rapid development. The mineral-rich region (South 
Africa) continues to specialise entirely in the resource-heavy sectors and is 
eventually overtaken in terms of wage levels by the third region. With a 
more realistic input-output structure taken from South African data, the 
results are less clear-cut, but the overall picture remains the same: growth 
in the mineral-rich region is concentrated in sectors heavily linked to the 
mineral endowment (e.g. chemicals), while sectors more intensive in the use 
of other factors move to the third region. The simulation thus confirms on 
a theoretical level that it is indeed possible for a country to forego the op-
portunity of a more diversified and labour-intensive industrialisation path 
due to a specialisation in mining and closely related sectors-due to linkage 
effects and wage differences. 
A simulation exercise is no substitute for empirical work, and thus Chap-
ter 5 attempts to empirically assert to what extent linkages influence sectoral 
growth in South Africa and how growth shocks in a sector might pull other 
sectors along--or fail to do so. The method used is a version of the SVAR 
approach where sectoral performance is explained by its own and other sec-
tors' past performances, and the latter are weighted according to linkage 
strength. Estimation points to a strong pulling power of the manufacturing 
sector as a whole which-due to linkage and spillover effects-has positive 
effects on the other sectors of the economy. This is in marked contrast to the 
MEC, which, despite sizeable linkages to the rest of the economy, does not 
provide comparable spillover effects. Looking at manufacturing sub-sectors, 
the effects are weaker, but a cautious interpretation points to a positive in-
fluence of the transport equipment and (to a lesser extent) the metals and 
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metal products sector, while petroleum and chemicals, a very dominant and 
strong performer in the South African economy, has relatively weak positive 
spillover effects on other manufacturing subsectors. Growth in mining and 
closely related sectors thus diffuses only weakly to the rest of the economy, 
and particularly to those sectors that would provide more employment op-
portunities. This evidence could be read as a confirmation of the tendency 
towards path dependency established in the theoretical work or at least does 
not contradict it. 
Lastly, in Chapter 6, the recent shifts in industrial policy came under 
scrutiny. Industrial policy and economic policy more broadly have to a large 
extent reinforced the lopsided development of the South African economy 
since 1994, despite the repeatedly stated aim of policy makers to change 
the economy's course. With the notable exception of the Motor Industry 
Development Programme that has helped the South African auto industry 
to become more competitive on a global level, industrial policy has failed to 
push the manufacturing sector towards more diversification. Particularly in 
the 1990s, institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation, but 
also the broader macroeconomic and trade policy framework have favoured 
those sectors that have profited from policy support in the old regime as 
well: mining itself and the upstream users of the mineral endowment such 
as chemicals and basic metals. The latest initiative of the Department of 
Trade and Industry, the National Industrial Policy Framework, admits to 
these shortcomings and attempts to redirect policy interventions. The doc-
ument puts a lot of emphasis on policy coordination of various government 
agencies, so that a consistent industrial policy in line with the DTI's goals 
can be pursued. While the attempt is laudable and the analysis it is based 
on confirms many of the findings of this study, a careful reading of the doc-
ument, its reception in the country, and an analysis of the drivers of this 
policy and first initiatives that emerged from it lead to a cautious and rather 
skeptical assessment: it is questionable whether the DTI has the clout to 
implement the wide-ranging changes it envisions for the country's indus-
trial policy strategy, and a number of indicators point toward a less radical 
change, leaving many of the key characteristics of policy as they were, and 
therefore implying more continuity in South Africa's industrial and economic 
policy regime. 
The answer to my research question then is a nuanced one: linkages did 
play an important role in industrial development, yet they have often been 
reinforced by policy interventions that make it difficult to isolate their effect. 
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On a theoretical level, their importance in shaping the development path has 
been shown to be plausible, and empirically, the development of certain sec-
tors is indeed strongly influenced by other sectors. As input-output linkages 
continue to matter today, so does industrial policy which shows a surprising 
amount of path dependency as well. Despite many assurances and honest 
attempts to change this fact, industrial policy is still geared to benefit the 
sectors close to the country's mineral endowment, and thus contributes to 
the continuity of South Africa's lopsided industrial development. 
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Appendix 
Simulation Parameters for Section 4.2.1 
In the first simulation, the following parameter values are used: a = 5, 
1 = 0, 94, T = l, 3 (a low transport cost environment), and Y = 0, 7. 
In terms of consumption shares, parameter values for µ8 are equal across 
all three countries and 0.098, 0.103, 0.109, 0.115, 0.12 for industries 1 to 5. 
The input-output matrix is defined as follows: 
MEG Non-MEG 
015 025 035 045 055 
05l 0,11 0,12 0,02 0,02 0,02 
052 0,1 0,1 0,02 0,02 0,02 
053 0,02 0,02 0,08 0,09 0,1 
Os4 0,02 0,02 0,07 0,09 0,09 
055 0,01 0,01 0,07 0,08 0,09 
o 9 , the share of the mineral resource in the production of the mining 
sector is set to o 9 = 0, 5. 
Simulation Parameters for Section 4.2.2 
Parameter values used in this section are a = 5, 1 = 0, 94, T = l, 2 and 
Y = 0, 7. Sensitivity analysis has been conducted for all of them. The 
value for a, the elasticity of substitution, is a standard assumption in the 
NEG literature. Simulations show that the results hold for 3 < a< 7. 
For other values, the simulations yield non-real results. Sectoral growth 
outcomes are not affected by small changes in I and T either, and both are 
again equivalent to the values assumed in related literature. Transport costs 
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must of course remain sufficiently small, otherwise interior equilibria could 
no longer be expected. 
Consumption shares µs are 0.05, 0.093, 0.099, 0.1, 0.102, 0.080, 0.085, 
0.08, 0.08, 0.075 for the 10 industries and are equal across all regions. 
The input-output matrix stems from the South African input-output ma-
trix. Data are taken from the Quantec 'RSA and Global indicators' database 
and describe the intermediate outputs of mining and manufacturing sectors 
to other sectors for the year 2006 in 2000 Rand. The original matrix looks 
as described in the table Al below. 
Min Food Tex Wood Chem NMM Metals ElecM Trans Furn 
Min 337 237 40 257 29200 3583 17264 45 409 6663 
Food 23 15869 909 149 612 23 22 15 12 11 
Tex 240 210 7966 208 551 42 170 113 1981 823 
Wood 988 4476 299 21164 1190 457 595 419 464 3276 
Chem 7151 5950 3617 6504 55637 1428 4895 3366 5327 2880 
NMM 604 1300 87 62 703 2077 214 318 815 99 
Metals 7836 3716 939 1945 4776 1432 51081 5742 13152 4834 
ElecM 926 11 5 40 47 4 1118 6205 2159 110 
Trans 2849 755 114 127 522 100 429 99 64784 77 
Furn 61 87 233 488 297 25 187 497 30 1464 
Table 1: Intermediate Inputs in Million Rand (Al) 
Through normalisation, an identical structure with values suitable for 
the model is retained-see Table A2. 
Min Food Tex Wood Chem NMM Metals ElecM Trans Furn 
Min 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,145 0,018 0,086 0,000 0,002 0,033 
Food 0,000 0,079 0,005 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Tex 0,001 0,001 0,039 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,010 0,004 
Wood 0,005 0,022 0,001 0,105 0,006 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,016 
Chem 0,035 0,029 0,018 0,032 0,276 0,007 0,024 0,017 0,026 0,014 
NMM 0,003 0,006 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,010 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,000 
Metals 0,039 0,018 0,005 0,010 0,024 0,007 0,253 0,028 0,065 0,024 
ElecM 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,031 0,011 0,001 
Trans 0,014 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,321 0,000 
Furn 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,007 
Table 2: Normalised Intermediate Inputs (A2) 
Again, a9 , the share of the mineral resource in the production of the 
mining sector is set to a9 = 0, 5 
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Data and Results for Chapter 5 
Output performance The estimation is based on output development of 
the various sectors we analyzed in the different aggregations. Below, their 
output development is depicted for the period under consideration, 1970 to 
2006. 
The sectors are agriculture, mining, MEC manufacturing, manufactur-
ing, and the tertiary sector. Data has been aggregated from the Quantec 
Database. The relatively stagnant development of mining in recent years is 
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Figure 1: Development of output for 5 sectors 
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Figure 3: Development of output for the 10 3-digit sectors 
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Weighting matrices Linkages are modeled by using weighting matrices 
as explained in Chapter 5. The weighting matrices have been calculated 
for every year, to account for changes in the structure of the South African 
economy and thus of linkages between sectors over time. Below are three 
exemplary matrices for the year 2007-the most recent year used in the 
estimations. Matrices for other years are available upon request from the 
author. These linkages represent inputs from domestic sources - imported 
inputs have not been considered in order to better reflect impulses that 
might emanate from growth in one particular sector. 
The tables have to be read in the following way: the share of interme-
diate input produced in one sector that is used in the other sectors of the 
economy is presented in the sector column. Intermediate input that is used 
in production within the sector is set to zero. Therefore, the columns all 
sum to one. 
Agri Min Man Elec Cons Traci TrSC Finl Comm 
used in stemming from 
Agri 0.000 0.002 0.085 0.022 0.012 0.029 0.031 0.011 0.088 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.115 0.037 0.025 0.187 0.Ql8 0.059 
Man 0.974 0.696 0.000 0.405 0.001 0.461 0.237 0.273 0.401 
Elec 0.000 0.247 0.018 0.000 0.143 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.001 
Cons 0.000 0.019 0.184 0.011 0.000 0.036 0,017 0.050 0.010 
Trad 0.017 0.001 0.140 0.131 0.216 0.000 0.242 0.312 0.035 
TrSC 0.000 0.002 0.193 0.132 0.058 0.169 0.000 0.112 0.046 
Finl 0.001 0.023 0.134 0.100 0.382 0.143 0.181 0.000 0.358 
Comm 0.007 0.010 0.177 0.084 0.152 0.127 0.098 0.204 0.000 
Table 3: Weighting matrix for 9 two-digit sectors, 2007 
Agri Min MEC Man Elec Cons Trad TrSC Finl Comm 
used in stemming from 
Agri 0.000 0.002 0.060 0.059 0.022 0.012 0.029 0.031 0.011 0.088 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.054 0.115 0.037 0.025 0.187 0.018 0.059 
MEC 0.019 0.581 0.000 0.113 0.269 0.000 0.107 0.154 0.099 0.147 
Man 0.955 0.115 0.424 0.000 0.136 0.001 0.355 0.083 0.175 0.254 
Elec 0.000 0.247 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.143 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.001 
Cons 0.000 0.019 0.129 0.132 0.011 0.000 0.036 0.017 0.050 0.010 
Trad 0.Ql7 0.001 0.052 0.163 0.131 0.216 0.000 0.242 0.312 0.035 
TrSC 0.000 0.002 0.126 0.151 0.132 0.058 0.169 0.000 0.112 0.046 
Finl 0.001 0.023 0.055 0.150 0.100 0.382 0.143 0.181 0.000 0.358 
Comm 0.007 0.010 0.101 0.158 0.084 0.152 0.127 0.098 0.204 0.000 
Table 4: Weighting matrix for 9 2-digit sectors including separated MEC, 
2007 
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Food Tex Wood Pet NMM Met ElecM Rad Trans Furn 
used in stemming from 
Food 0.000 0.050 0.412 0.188 0.364 0.102 0.002 0.002 0.343 0.048 
Tex 0.525 0.000 0.026 0.100 0.023 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.050 0.129 
Wood 0.078 0.042 0.000 0.177 0.017 0.022 0.002 0.055 0.054 0.248 
Pet 0.350 0.130 0.111 0.000 0.198 0.088 0.009 0.028 0.236 0.162 
NMM 0.012 0.009 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.034 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.013 
Met 0.012 0.037 0.055 0.144 0.061 0.000 0.254 0.095 0.194 0.103 
ElecM 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.085 0.079 0.145 0.000 0.349 0.027 0.037 
Rad 0.008 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.230 0.000 0.016 0.243 
Trans 0.007 0.506 0.044 0.157 0.227 0.421 0.493 0.322 0.000 0.017 
Furn 0.007 0.197 0.275 0.094 0.026 0.152 0.008 0.149 0.037 0.000 
Table 5: Weighting matrix for 10 3-digit sectors, 2007 
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